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Summary  and  Conclusions 
Current concern over  the competitiveness of  Community  industry arises  from 
a  widely-held but vague  general  feeling  that  the  Community  is  in danger  of 
"losing.the race".  Several  factors have  combined  to  bririg  about  this 
unease: 
the decline of  a  number  of  traditional  industries which,  in  the  past~ 
provided  the main-stay of  economic  prosperity.  This  decline is by  no 
means  exclusive  to  Europe  but  some  of Europe's competitors,  especially 
Japan,  seem  to have  adjusted better; 
the changing  structure of world  trade.  The  emergence  of  newly 
industrialising and  certain developing  countries  as direct competitors 
for  a  wide  range of markets  has  intensified  the  pressure for  change 
but  the  enduring nature of  the recession has  hampered  the  necessary 
switch into alternative areas.  The  importance of  trade  to  the  economy 
of  the Community  makes  it imperative  that a  competitive  solution be 
found; 
the recognition of  the  importance of  the  new  technologies  to  "post-
industrial" society and  the  awareness  that other  countries,  such  as 
the  US  and  Japan,  are further  advanced  than  the  Community  in  the 
commercial  application and  develOpment  of  these  technologies. 
The  purpose of  this report is  to  carry out a  preliminary appraisal of  the 
performance of  Community  industry,  on  the basis of  the main  indicators, 
vis-a-vis  two  of its principal industrialised  trading partners,  the  USA  and 
Japan.  Obviously,  because  the issue  is such  a  complex  one,  it is not 
possible  to  give  a  simple or  conclusive  answer  to  the  question "How 
competitive is Community  industry"?  Tne  answer  will vary from  sub-sector 
to  sub-sector and  between  the Member  States.  Neither  is it possible  to 
make  direct comparisons  between  the Comiri'unity,  composed  of  ten Member 
States of very different size,  levels of  development and  industrial 
infrastructures on  the one hand  with  the size and  internal coherence of  the 
USA  and  Japan on  the other.  Despite  these very real  limitations certain 
trends  can be discerned which  have  a  ~earing on competitiveness.  The 
message which  emerges most often is  that,  in  the  face  of  the challenges 
posed  during  the  1970's,  the  Community  has  not fared  so  badly  to date but 
that unless remedial  action is  taken  now  future  performance could be 
impaired. 
Trends  in international  trade 
The  Community  is  the world's  largest trading area.  Extra-Community  exports 
account  for  15.7%  of  total world  exphits.  The  Community  holds  substantial 
shares of  world  export markets  for  a  very wide  range of  products. 
Furthermore,  total  trade between the Member  States is even larger  than the 
Community's  international trade. 
In view of  the more  rapid  development of  industrial  exports  taking  place in 
other areas of  the world,  it is not surprising that  some  of  these  export 
market shares  are coming  under  pressure.  If one were  to  take account of 
the development of  local  industry  in; third world markets,  the declin·e .in 
our  share of  total markets  would  prob'&·b'l:y  prove  to  be  even greater. (ii) 
If the  Community  was  participating in  the development of  the world  economy 
in a  balanced  and  beneficial manner  it would  be  quite  normal  to  relinquish 
shares of markets  in which our  comparative  advantage or  competitiveness was 
declining,  and  to  make  compensating  gains  in other markets. 
But  in practice we  are  concerned  that this  is not  taking  place sufficiently 
and  that  the  Community  is not doing well  enough  in  those products  where  we 
ought  to  have  a  comparative  advantage  to  make  up  for  the products where  we' 
are doing  less well,  and  in some  cases  quite badly.  Only  the  Community's 
agro-industries,  raw materials  and  energy products  have  done well  in world 
markets. 
The  Community  is not alone  in  this respect:  there are  some  indications 
that the United  States  is experiencing  similar problems with its manufacturing 
exports.  However,  the  US  is less dependent  than is  the  Community  on 
manufacturing  exports,  and  holds  a  very  strong position for  agricultural 
products  and  unworked  metals. 
Consequently,  the overriding  concern is  that  the  Community  as  a  whole 
remains  heavily committed  to  exporting  a  wide  range of medium-technology 
industrial products  where  our  competitiveness  is  threatened  both on price 
and on innovation.  These  threats  impinge first  in  those  Member  States  and 
industries where  the  structure is weakest,  and  the resulting decline in 
output,  employment  and  exports  is clearly already  taking place in several 
parts of  the Community. 
Since  the Community  already holds  substantial market shares  in so  many 
areas,  and  our  products  do  not seem  to  be  outstandingly competitive,  there 
are limits  to  the  extent  to which  we  can solve our  problems  of  low  growth 
and high unemployment  simply  by  further  increasing market shares:  our 
firms  are as  likely  to  be competing with  each other  in third markets  as 
with Japanese or  American firms.  Community  industry consequently has  a 
major  interest in a  recovery in the overall rate of  growth of  world  demand 
which would  carry  the  absolute level  of  Community  exports  up  with it, 
without necessarily having  to  increase market shares  (1). 
Meanwhile,  there are certain high  technology,  high skill. product areas 
where  Community  industry has  no  business  to  be  turning  in  such medocre 
results.  Here we  have much  to  learn from  the  Japanese,  both regarding 
corporate strategy and  regarding public policy. 
Industrial  specialisation 
When  we  compare  the degree of  spec-i.alisation of  Community  exports with 
those of  the  USA  and  Japan,  we  find  first  that both  the  United  States and 
Japan are much  more  specialised  in certain products.  This  in  turn tends  to 
reflect the outstanding international  success  of  a  few  major  corporations  (2) .. 
By  contrast,  the overall structure of  the  Community's  exports  is rather 
close  to  the  average structure of  total  OECD  exports,  which  is not 
surprising given the  weight  of  Community  exports  in international  trade, 
and  is conHistent with  the broad  conclusion reached  above  regarding export 
market shares. 
(1)  The  European Community  problems  and  prospects,  Cambridge  Economic 
Policy Revie\v,  December  1981. 
(2)  For  example,  Boeing,  IBM,  Sony,  Toyota. (iii) 
Not only are Community  exports relatively unspecialised,  the degree of 
specialisation in high  technology,  high skill products  seems  to  be 
declining and  certain Member  States'  exports are  even specialising in 
product areas where  they are - or  will be  ~ competing  mainly with newly 
industrialising countries,  rather  than with other  developed  countries.  This 
is a  disturbing prospect as it raises  the whoie  question of  productivity 
and  price competitiveness at the relatively high level  of  wages  (by  world 
standards)  which  prevail  throughout  the Community. 
It is not very clear what  can be done  about  this in  the  short  term 
particularly as  the level of  industrial  investment is  so  low,  but  this 
prospect,  and  the inherent dangers,  should  concentrate  the minds  of 
corporate planners and  industrial policy makers  in the Community. 
Costs,  prices and  exchange rates 
The  results of our analysis of  the  inter-relationships between wages, 
productivity,  prices and  exchange rates as  they affect competitivity are 
not unambiguous.  Thus  we  may  conclude  tentatively: 
that countries which  have  been less  successful at controlling their 
wage  costs have  also had  more  balance of  payments  problems; 
although hourly productivity  trends  are not inversely proportional  to 
changes  in unit wage  costs,  rapid  increases  in productivity help  to 
moderate  the  effects of  increased  wage  costs; 
in general  the fall  in the rate of  growth of  productivity  (I)  does not 
explain competitiveness  problems during  the  1970's; 
the foreign trade performance of different sectors is sensitive to 
increased  Wlge  costs  to very different degrees:  there  seems  to  be a 
direct link in textiles,  leather  goods  and  clothing industries;  but  no 
identifiable link at all for  the capital  goods  industries; 
since  1970,  exchange rate fluctuations  appear  to  have  been greater 
than  changes  in unit wage  cost~;  Their effects on competitiveness 
is difficult to  assess  because  the divergence  between nominal  and  real 
exchange rates. 
Price competitiveness is only a  part bf overall  competitiveness  and 
improvements  in this  sphere will be  neither  beneficial nor durable if other 
factors are leaning  in the opposite direction..  In. particular,  if a  budget 
deficit that cannot be readily financed  domestically  then a  reduction in 
the "real" rate of  exchange will  not lead  to  an  improvement  in international· 
trade.  Rather,  inflation will accelerate and  trigger  further  damaging 
falls  in the  exchange rate,  increases  in  the external deficit and  inflation 
such that  the "vicious circle" will only be broken·by even more  severe 
action on  the budgetary and  monetary  side  than would  otherwise have been 
necessary. 
(l)  The  decline  in the rate of  growth of  productivity is much  more 
striking in the  US  than in most  ~f the  Community. (iv) 
Industrial  structure 
The  evidence about  industrial structure and  investment  draws  attention  to 
the fact  that industrial structure has  been adjusting  slowly  to  the  new 
economic  situation.  A few  sectors  such as  chemicals  and  transport 
equipment  have  increased  in relative  importance whereas  textiles,  leather 
and  clothing have declined quite rapidly and  food,  beverages  and  tobacco 
have declined more  slowly.  On  the other  hand,  value  added  in comparatively 
advanced  sectors  such as  industrial machines,  office machines  and  electrical 
goods  have  grown  rather  slowly. 
The  trends  in industrial  investment  suggest  that  the  adjustment which  1s 
taking place is at least in  the right direction;  within  the  limits  of  a 
very modest  level  of  investment  in manufacturing  industry the rate of 
investment appears  to  have  been growing  most  rapidly  (in most of  the Member 
States)  in those  sectors where  the  level of  technology  and  skills  suggest 
that  the  Community  ought  in future be  able  to  maintain its comparative 
advantage. 
By  comparison with  our  competitors,  the available evidence suggests  a  very 
rapid  growth in the Japanese capital stock in the past decade,  bringing it 
up  to  the  levels of  the  USA  and  the Community.  By  contrast,  capital  employed 
per  employee  in the  USA  and  the Community  appears  to have more  or less 
stagnated  since  the mid-1970's.  In  1979,  for  example,  investment in 
manufacturing as  a  percentage of  GDP  was  almost  twice  as  high in Japan 
as  in the  Community  and  the  USA. 
In the  Community  and  the  USA  there is  an  immediate  need  for  investment  in 
productive facilities  in a  wide  range  of  sectors  in order  to  bring  about 
modernisation  and  rationalisation.  The  generalised  shift in industrialised 
countries  to  the service  sector will of itself reduce  the overall  importance 
of  investment  in manufacturing but will also require  a  major  investment 
effort,  particularly in new  technologies. 
There are also  considerable differences  in manufacturing  investment  trends 
between  the Member  States.  For  example,  the absolute  level  in France  and 
Germany  is about  double  that of  Italy and  the  UK. 
Energy 
Concerning  energy,  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  the  primary effect of 
the  two  dramatic  increases in oil prices  in  1973  and  1979  on industry has 
not been  the  increase in energy costs,  but  the deflationary effect of  the 
un-recycled  transfer  to  OPEC.  Consequently,  the  primary  reason  for 
reducing  energy  consumption is not  to  reduce costs,  per  se,  but  to  reduce 
the  Community's vulnerability  to  further  levies  of  this kind,  the  potential 
cost of which having  now  been so  conclusively demonstrated. 
For practical reasons it will be necessary  to  use  the  price mechanism  and 
energy  taxes  to  hasten  the adjustment  to  a  much  lower  level of  energy 
consumption,  and  in  the short  term  this will  result in a  competitive 
disadvantage  to  parts of  industry. (v) 
However,  the burden of  these costs  should  not be  exaggerated.  On  the  ohe 
hand,  it is quite possible to  adjust  to  a  less energy-intensive  economy, 
without sacrificing growth by making best use of  available  technology  (1). 
On  the other  hand  Japan,  which has  an  even worse  energy and  raw material 
situation,  has  been able  to  adjust rapidly in this direction following  each 
oil price rise. 
Human  capital 
The  changing nature of  employment  in recent decades  has  increased  the 
importance of  human  capital endowments  as  a  determinant of  economic  growth 
and  international competitiveness.  In many  respects  the  Coi:iunuhH:y;  'the  US 
and  Japan have  similar human  capital endowments  - educated work forces, 
rising levels of  female participation,  low  levels of  population growth, 
broadly similar employment  structures etc.  but  one  must  look  to variations 
in emphasis  for  clues  as  to  the positive or negative contributions  to 
competitiveness which  the different populations represent. 
At  the moment  the  US  and  EC  have  labour  forces  of  roughly  comparabl'e  size 
and  about double  that of  Japan.  In view of  the increasing  technical 
sophsHcation of  the prpduction  system and  the  spread of  new  techno":Logies 
'to  all parts of  the economic  system there is a  growing  need  for  these 
labour forces  to  have  a  high level of basic education and  some  form  of  post 
school  training.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  evidence  is  incomplete it 
appears  that the Community  could  be a't relative disadvantage vis-·a.-vis  the 
US  and  Japan in  terms  of availability of  technically skilled wo'rkers.  For 
example  there are indications of  lower  levels of scientists and  engineers 
in  the Community  labour  force  than in either  the  US  or  Japan and  in a 
number  of Member  States  the  proportio'n of  students  following  science and 
engineering courses has  fallen-'Cluring  the last decade.  In addition  the 
level of  vocational  education in the  Community  appears  lower  than  that of 
the  US  and  is  more  heavily concentratEd  on young  people.  The  fact  that 
around  40%  of young  school leavers  pu·rsue  no  further  training or  education 
is particularly worrying.  In Japan  th¢r'e  appears  to  be considerable 
emphasis  on engineering skills, which is  to  be  expected  from  the  emphasis 
on streamlined production systems.  I'tost  vocational  education is on  the 
job,  which  tends  to make  it very specific. 
Among  the most  commonly  cited  indicators of  international labour 
competitiveness are wage  costs and  productivity.  The  evolution of unit 
wage  costs  1970-1980  (in national  cuirencies)  for  the manufacturing  sector 
shows  similar trends for  the  USA  (6.;2%)  and  Japan  (6.6%)  and  wide variations 
in Member  State performance  (from  5.5%  in Germany  to  15.5%  for  Italy and 
the  UK). 
Trends  in hourly productivity rates in volume  terms  for  the  same  period 
show  the highest  increase for  Japan ·(7.4%),  a  relatively bad  performance by 
the  USA  (2.4%)  and  again widely different performances  by  Member  States 
(2.7%  in UK  and  7.4%  in Belgium).  I~ the period  1975-80  Japan increased 
its productivity growth  even more  to  7.9%  while  the  US  fell  to  1.9%  and 
Belgium  (the highest ranked  EC  country)  decreased  slightly  to  6.8%. 
However,  exchange rate changes also have  an important bearing on  international 
comparisons  of  this kind  as  can be  seen from  a  comparison of wage  costs  in 
US  dollars. 
(I)  Pour  une  Croissance Econorue  en Energie,  Juin 1979. (vi) 
Corporate  structure and  performance 
The first response  to  any  challenge  to  European compet1t1veness  must  come 
from  the individual  companies  in  the different sectors.  The  evidence 
available on corporate performance  suggests  that on average  Community 
industry has  not  performed  as well  as  its US  and  Japanese  competitors 
during  the  1970's.  Part of  the weakness  lies in  the relative inability of 
European  industry  to  generate an operating  surplus  which  can keep  up  with 
the rising cost  of capital,  with consequent adverse  impact on its 
investment  propensity and  sectoral  and  geographic  shifts of  resources. 
This vicious circle is undermining  the competitive position of  EC  industry 
and  its capacity  to  adjust  endogenously  to  present  and  foreseeable 
challenges. 
Analysis of  company  accounts  reveals  a  weaker  performance  in  terms  of  sales 
margins,  return on assets  and  remuneration of  equity capital  by  Community 
companies  than by US,  and  to  a  lesser extent,  Japanese companies.  For 
example,  in  1980,  the first hundred  industrial  groups  in Europe realised  an 
average  net profit on sales of  1.4%  against  2.4%  of  the first hundred 
Japanese  groups  and  4.8%  of  the  first hundred  US  groups.  The  gap  is also 
considerable  in  terms  of net profit on own  capital:  6.5%  for  European 
corporations,  14%  for  the Japanese,  15.6%  for  the Americans. 
Company  financial  structures also vary:  on  average  Community  companies 
rely more  on own  funds  than Japanese  companies  but  less  than  US  ones. 
However,  US  companies  can rely on a  stronger  financial  base  and  Japanese 
companies  enjoy  the positive effects of  long-standing  financial  discipline 
and are  favoured  by  the  lending policies of  Japanese  financial  institutions. 
However,  higher  levels  of  investment  expenditure would  not of  themselves 
solve current problems.  The  role of  management  is crucial.  Experience 
has  shown  that  important gains  in productivity  and  production costs, 
financial  results  and  market penetration can be  achieved  through  good 
organisation and  management.  Professional  salaried management  has 
developed  more  slowly in  the  Community  than in  the  US.  From  a  number  of 
studies  the greater preference of  the average American  and  Japanese manager 
for risk-taking emerges  together  with considerable  concern for  product 
quality - two  basic qualities which contribute  to  coping  efficiently with 
current compet1t1on.  Thus  historical delays  and  certain national 
characteristics may  have  had  a  negative  effect on industrial efficiency in 
the Community  and  hindered  the  implementation of  the  appropriate  strategies. 
Industrial  efficien~y and  competitiveness rely  to  a  considerable extent  on 
the  internal management  and  planning  of all aspects  oE  the enterprise.  There 
would  appear  to  be  room  for  improvement  in this  respect in many  European 
Community  companies.  Responsibility  for  this  improvement  lies not  only 
with  company  management  and  employees  but  also with  the  financial  institutions 
and  the public authorities.  That  corporate strategies play  a  crucial role 
in shaping  structural  change  is  further  demonstrated  by  the high proportion 
of  int~rnational  trade which  takes  the  form  of  inter-firm transactions. (vii) 
In this  context  European  corporations  should verify whether  their strategies 
live up  to  the  challenge  of  their American  and  Japanese competitors; 
particularly as  the  process  of  internal  adjustment within the  fitm is 
quicker  arid  can benefit more  readily  from  the necessary consensus  than 
adjustment brought  about by macro-econociic  measures; 
Adjustment  is certainly influenced  by  external  factors which  go  beyorid  the 
direct control of  the  company  but  this in itself is not a  justification for 
inaction,  as  the enterprise's main  challenge lies in combining  resources 
and  constraints  iri view of  economic  resuits.  Besides  the  invisible hand of 
the market arid  the visible hand  of  public policy,  company  organisation arid 
strategies cari  play a  transparent and  ftiridamentai  role in regaining 
international competitiveness. 
Priorities for  further  analysis 
This  analysis of  the competitiveness  of  Community  industry is  incompiete 
and  inconclusive.  To  some  extent,  this is in  the  rta ture of  the  ca·se,  for 
tlie  reasons described  in the  Introduction. 
However,  the work  done  for  the prepara'tion of  this report during  the past 
six months  has  clarified  the  need  for  a  more  systematic  approach  "to  the 
analysis of  industrial competitiveness within the  Coritm"ission. 
in  the first place,  the  analysis of  trade data needs  to  be  put on a 
permanent  basis  and  extended  to  constant 'price data;  the market shai:'e 
ati~lySis  should  be regularly updated,  taking  account  of  total world  tr~de 
ahd  of  the development of  local  produ~tion outside  the  Community,  particularly 
in  n~'wly industrialising countries.  For  this  purpose it will be  necessary 
to  have  access  to  the data bases  in international organisations. 
Secondly,  there is  the question of  international industrial  development. 
From  the point of view of  corporate  s'tdttegies  and  industrial policies, if 
a  problem or a  threat first comes  to  ii;gh t  in  the  trade s ta tis  tics, it is 
too late to do  anything  about it, other  than in a  defensive manner.  The 
Commission  should: 
monitor  Japanese  corporate strategies and  p).lblic  industrial policies; 
survey,  on a  regular basis  the  iitformation,  available  from  international 
organisations,  regarding  industr\·~:1  development  in  the developing 
countries,  beginning with  the  pr'i"ncipal  NIC' s; 
improve  the  flow of  information and  analysis about  industrial develop-
ments  in  the United  States. 
Thirdly,  this report deliberately ignores  the  tertiary sector,  not only for 
iack of  time  and  resources,  but also ''because  the relevant information 
concerning  the Community  is rudimentary'where it exists at all.  In fact 
this  is a  very  important area both for  technology  and  for ·employment. 
The  international  trade aspects are also  important,  because ·parts of  the 
teri  tiary sec tor  are - or  could become  - significant exporters.  The  United 
States already considers  the  services  industry as  a  major  source of  foreign 
e'x~hange  (1).  An  in-depth analysis  of  the  services industries  in the Community 
should be  a  high priority for  the  Co~ission because  there is some  conce'rn  a~ 
to  their technological  development  an'd  future competitiveness. 
(1)  See:  The  International Operati6-ns ··a"£  US  Service Industries,  Economic 
• \!.fo 
Consulting  Service  Inc. ,  June  1'981. (viii) 
Fourthly,  those parts of  the report dealing with wage  costs,  inflation and 
exchange rates raise more  questions  than  they give answers.  This  is 
regrettable,  but probably reflects  the reality.  However,  since  the 
Community  has,  through  the  European Monetary  System,  a  responsibility for 
exchange rate management  in the  Community,  it is most  important  that  the 
Commission understand,  as  thoroughly  as  possible,  the effect of monetary 
policies on  the international competitiveness of  exports  of manufactured 
products. 
The  analysis of  industrial development  in  the  Community  suffers  from 
several  lacunae,  some  of  which will  not be  filled  until  there  is  a 
significant improvement  in industrial statistics  (1).  This  is  in hand,  but 
will  take  time  and  demands  a  great deal  of  cooperation  from  the National 
Statistical Offices.  The  analysis also  depends  on sufficient computing 
capacity being allocated  to  this kind  of  work. 
In  this context it is necessary  to  explain and  apologise  to  Greece, 
Denmark,  Ireland and  Luxembourg.  .  Greece hardly appears  in  this  report at 
all because  the  period  covered  precedes  the  enlargement  (2). 
Regarding  Denmark,  Ireland  and  Luxembourg,  their industrial statistics are 
much  less complete,  in  time or  in coverage  than are  those of  other  Member 
States,  which is why  the  Commission's  computerised  data base for  industrial 
statistics was  set up  for  the  six larger Member  States'  data only. 
Luxembourg's  trade data is  included with  Belgium. 
But  the principal  lacuna  is  in the analysis of  specific industrial sectors. 
The  Commission has recently undertaken  thorough  analyses  of  a  few  sectors, 
automobiles  and  textiles in particular  (3),  and  the  corresponding reports 
are available  to  the  European Parliament.  This  work  is being continued  in 
other  important  sec tors. 
X  X  X 
The  additional analysis described  above  will  take  time.  It will also 
require resources  which are not at present available in  the  Commission 
departments  concerned. 
(l) 
(2) 
(3) 
In respect of  their coverage,  comparability,  disaggregation,  timeliness 
and availability. 
Community  industrial  and  trade statistics will  be  extended  progressively 
to  include  Greece  in so  far as  the  information is available. 
The  European Automo-bile  Industry  COH  (81)  317  Final  and 
The  situation and  ~respects of  the  textile and  clothing industriea 
in the  Community  COM  (81)  388  Final. - 1  -
I.  Introduction 
This  report about  the competitiveness of  Community  industry has  been 
prepared at the request of  the European Parliament's Committe  on 
Economic  and  Monetary Affairs.  It tallows  a  series of  tepotts 
published  by  the  Commission about different aspects  of  domestic  and 
international  economic  developments;  structural  change and  adjustment  (l). 
Since  this report deals with  industry,  and  in practice with manufacturing 
industry,  an attempt has been made  to  present  the available  information 
in a  disaggregated way  so  as  to  show  what  is happening  in the various 
branches of  industry.  This  approach has  one major  drawback  - the  ' 
welter  of statistics, particularly where we  present  the  information by 
Member  State as well.  We  can but ask  for  the reader's understanding, 
for  we  have  found  no  other solution. 
Each reader  who  is particularly familiar with one  or  other  of  the 
Member  States  is likely  to  find  Community  aggregates misleading 
simplifications;  each  industrial worker  or manager  will  inevitably 
feel  that  the data for his  "sectoi-1'  ·hides  a  multitude of  strengths  atld 
weaknesses  in individual  firms.  In a very real sense we  are discussing 
an unattainable concept:  in so  fa·r  as  the competitiveness  of  European 
industry is  the result of  the  comi>ihitive  performance of all the 
industrial enterprises  in the  Community it is not possible 'to describe 
it, let alone analyse it, in a  sing.le report.  Thus,  we  are obliged  to 
discuss  the  question in  terms  of  approximate  aggregates  which are a·t 
best proxies  for  the real world. 
A.  Objectives of  the Report 
What  we  have set out  to  do  therefore 'is  to  try and  present a  coherent 
survey of  the  evidence about  compe:tftiveness  and  the  factors  which 
affect it in  the  short  and  longer 'term.  The  information is not 
conclusive,  and  in some  respects it  is contradictory.  The  indications 
of  a  relative decline  in  the  Community  can be  interpreted  in different 
ways.  Explanations  for  the decline in competitiveness are hardly ever 
equally valid for  the  same  product ·or  sector  in each Member  State,  nor 
do  the  same  considerations  apply ·to  international competitiveness as 
to competitiveness in  the domestic "Cbiiii'\lunity  market. 
B.  The meaning of Competitiveness 
There is no  single measure of  competitiveness.  At  best it is a 
composite concept,  because different measures  (price,  export share, 
profitability, unit costs  ..•  )  give different results. 
(1)  See references  in Annex  1. - 2  -
In  this report we  have  endeavoured  to  present relevant  information 
about  the following  principal quantifiable factors: 
export market shares; 
specialisation of  industrial structure; 
costs and  exchange rates; 
profitability and  the  financial  structure of  industry; 
industrial  investment; 
the structure of  the  industrial labour  force. 
We  recognise  that  there are many  other  considerations which cannot be 
treated quantitatively and  that  - for  lack of  space and  information -
these have  had  to  be  treated  incidentally in  the report. 
A recent report of  the European Management  Forum  ( 1)  also  tried  to 
make  international comparisons  of  competitiveness  and  used  as  many  as 
240  different criteria, many  of which are unquantifiable. 
Even in areas which are ostensibly quantifiable,  there are a  number  of 
major statistical difficulties which weaken  the  significance of 
specific conclusions.  These  problems  are well  known  but  the main ones 
are set out in Annex  4  so  that all readers  are forewarned. 
Finally, it must  be  stressed  that "competitiveness" is in any  case a 
relative concept.  There is no  "race  from  A  to  B"  in economics,  except 
in comparing  individual  firms.  The  question is a  matter of  relative 
positions in terms  of  resources  and  products  and  the  change  in 
relative positions over  time.  The  indicators have  to  be  interpre~ed 
with  common  sense: 
international  economic  development,  especially industrialisation 
of  the NIC 
1 s  will lead  to  an apparent relative "decline
11  of  the 
presently developed  areas  in  terms  of percentage shares; 
a  declining  share in low value  added  activities may  be  a 
consequence  of  increased overall  competitiveness. 
There are also normative  considerations: 
underlying  any  evaluation of  the relative  pos~t~on of  European 
industry  there is a  historical or  political concept of  what  the 
position "ought"  to  be; 
different objectives  (output,  employment,  profits,  exports)  lead 
to different assessments. 
Competitiveness  is also  a  uynamic  concept;  the relative  pos~t1on of 
companies  and  countries  in  the  future  is not only  affected  by  the 
parameters determining present levels  and  trends,  but  also  by  changes  in 
the parameters  themselves  - investment,  the  training of  the  working  people, 
technology  and  innovation,  among  others. 
(1)  Report on Industrial  Competitiveness,  1981,  European Management  Forum, 
Geneva,  Novemb~r  1981. - 3  -
II.  The  Evidence  from  Trade 
This  Chapter of  the report is essentially a  review of  the  evidence 
from  international  trade,  exchange rate data and  an  international 
comparison of wage  costs as  they  are relevant  bO  assessing  the 
competitiveness  of  Community  industry. 
In  the first place we  describe,  briefly,  the  structure of  international 
trade by  the  major  groups of countries  and  principal product categories, 
including  the structure of  the  Community's  international and  domestic 
trade by product and  Member  State. 
Se~ondly, we  examine  trends  in  the  share of  international  trade  (1) 
accounted  for  by  Community  exports  of  various  products. 
Thirdly,  the  chapter refers  to  the  information which  the  Commission 
has developed recently concerning  the  trends  in specialisation and 
comparative  advantage of  the  Community's  trade  and  those of our 
principal international competitors. 
Finally,  we  examine  the relationship between prices,  costs and 
exchange rates as  they affect industrial  competitiveness. 
It is important  to  bear  in mind  in  the  following  discussion of  the 
structure and  trends of  international  trade  that many  factors  are at 
work  in addition  to  the operation of market prices.  It is  important 
to understand  these factors before reaching  conclusions  from  the data. 
For  example,  a  substantial  proportion of  OECD  exports benefit from 
official export credit,  sometimes  subsidised.  Secondly,  some  trade 
flows  arise from  major  investments  in processing or manufacturing 
plant.  Experience is  that in such  situations  a  major  change  in 
competitiveness  is necessary before  the plant is closed  or moved  and 
the  trade  flow is interrupted. 
Related  to  the  previous  point  is  the  fact  that a  very  large share of 
intern,ational  trade is internal  transactions between branches  or 
subsidiaries of  the  same  firm.  this has  recently been estimated  (2) 
at  45%  of  US  exports,  30%  of  Community  exports  (3)  and  only  17%  of 
Japanese exports,  and  there are good  reasons  to  expect  that  such 
exchanges will  be  to  some  extent cushioned  from  the  short-term effects 
of market prices for  products,  factors  and  currencies. 
Furthermore,  an ill-defined but possibly growing  share of  trade  takes 
place under  barter or buy-back deals which,  almost  by definition,  are 
· insensitive  to  market forces. 
(1)  On  the basis of  the  exports  or  the  imports  of  OECD  countries only. 
(2)  Dunning,  Pearce  "The  World's  Indus trial Enterprises",  Gower,  1981. 
(3)  Including  intra-EC  exports. - 4  -
A.  Changes  in World  Trade 
1.  World  trade 
The  volume  of  world  trade  increased between  1963  and  1973  by  an  average 
of  8.7%  per  year whereas  between  1973  and  1981  it increased  by  only  3.6% 
per year.  During  these periods  the average  annual  growth rate in world 
output fell  from  5.7%  to  3.1%  (1973-1980).  The  world  recession which 
began in  1973  has  clearly resulted  in disproportionate contraction in 
world  trade. 
Table  1  shows  that there was  little variation in  the  geographical 
distribution of  world  trade between  1963  and  1973  except for  the 
growth of  Japanese exports.  The  industrialised countries  increased 
their  share of  imports  and  exports  from  67%  to  71%  mainly at the 
expense of  the  State-trading countries.  Developing countries' 
share of  exports  and  imports  declined  slotvly. 
Table 1  a  World Tr!!de by  geographical  araa 
~  Import  a 
1963  1968  1913  1980  1963  1968  1973 
Total  world  trade  (billion $)  155  238  574  1973  155  238  574 
percentages  percentages 
Total (a l  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1.  Industrial countries  (b)  ~ ~ ]0.8  ~ ~ ~ lL.Q 
of which  : 
European  Community  (9  countries)  33,8  34,6  36,6  33' 3  34,7  33,7  35,7 
1980 
1973 
100.0 
~ 
34,6 
(of which  :  intra-EEC  trade)  (15,2)  (16,4)  (19,3)  (17,6)  (15,2)  (16,4)  (19,3)  (17,6) 
Rest  of Europe  '7,7  8,o  8,4  7,7  10,6  10,5  11,2  10,2 
USA  13,4  14,6  11,9  10,6  11,0  14,0  12,1  12,1 
Japan  3,4  5.3  6,4  6,6  3,7  4,5  6,0  6,2 
2.  Less-developed countries  20,6  lld  .!ill  ~ ~ .!§..]  M  .Ua1 
of vhich,·eountriaa in  1  r 
Africa  4,3  4,0  3,6  4,6  4,0  3,5  3,1  4,1 
America  7,3  5,8  5,1  5,4  6,3  6,1  5,4  6,3 
Asia  8,9  8,3  10,3  17,4  9,8  8,9  8,9  12,6 
(oil producing developing countries)  (  5,9)  (  5,8)  (  7,3)  ( 15 ,o)  (  2,9)  (  3,1)  (  3,5)  (  6,5) 
J,  c~untries with state trade  12,1  .!!..&l  10,0  .2.&  ll.a.l  ~  .2.&  M 
of which 
USSR  4,5  3,6  3,9  4,0  3,6  3,5 
4.  Unspecified  ~- ~  ~  ~  l.s.!.  l.s.!. .  h§.  £...2. 
Source  :  GATT  "International Trade" 
(a)  InCTUOing  intra-Community  trade 
{b)  Including  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  South  Africa - 5  -
The  most  striking development since  1973  has  undoubtedly been  the large 
increase in exports by  oil producing developing countries of  7.7  percentage 
poin~s to  15%  as  a  result of  the sharp rise in prices of petroleum.  · 
Meanwhile  their  imports  rose by  only 3 points and  those of developing countries. 
as  a  whole  by 5.5  points  to  23%.  Since  the relative shares  of  State- · 
·trading countries have only declined slightly since  1973,  the pattern in 
the industrialised countries has  been directly determined  by  the greater 
role played  by  the developing  countries.  In  1980,  the  industrialised 
countries'  share of  world  exports was  only  64%  compared  with  7~% in  ~973 
but  their  share of world  imports  was  67%.  The  gap  between  their  r~lative 
shares of  exports and  imports  highligh~s the  seriousness  of  the  imbalance~ 
faced  by  the industrialised countries  in  the  turbulent period  since  1973. 
Table  2  shows  the  structure of world  trade by  the principal  p.ro4uct groups. 
First, one must  note that apart from  the very rapid  growth  in  the  importan~e 
of  energy products between 1973  and  1980,  the overall structure of w.orld  · 
trade has  been t:afher  stable.  Previously,  between  1963-73,  trade  in 
engineering products  expanded  more  rapidly  than  total world  tr~de, but this 
is no  longer  the case. 
During  1963-1973  the relative share of  capital  goods  moved  from  25%  to  33%. 
The  increase in the price of  petroleum and  other  raw materials  ~ince 1973 
has  interrupted  this  trend.  Between  1973  and  1980,  the  share  o~ total 
exports of manufactured  products  from  OECD  countries  showed  only a  slight 
rise with moderate  increases  in  the  share of  intermediate products  -
probably on account of  higher  price rises  than for  capital  goods  - but 
these have not been as  high as  the  increases  for  petroleum products. 
The  main factor affecting  the structure of world  trade  since  1973  has 
therefore been  the doubling of  the share accounted  for  by  f~els, which 
increased  from  11%  to  24%  of world  exports  in seven years. 
Table  2  1  World  'bade lv  CoaodJ.tY  9rose 
Prod'UDt  Gr011p  1963  1968  1973 
Total llorld lbporte (billion US  ¢)  154  239  574 
Total hports 
100,0 
:peroeritagee 
100,0  .  100,0 
1.  Primary I''' >d'UDtS 
of which  :  ~  ~  .l.W 
fuels 
10,2  food  ~•d teverages  9,6  11,1 
raw  !tk\terLJ.iH  19,5  15,7  15,0 
12,5  10,1  11,6 
2.  :.!anufactured products 
of which  :  ~  ~  ~ 
iron n  ·.  _  ...  el 
4,8  4,8  chemicais  5,0 
engineering products  6,1  7,1  7,3 
of which  :  25,1  29,1  32,7 
~~.,,~..,. r., ••~ialhod in""'"'••)  I  .. ,,  office and telecommunications  equipment) 
road motor vehicles)  '  (  4,7)  (  6,6) 
3,0 
other machinery  and transport  equipment)  7,1 
domestic  equipment)  1o,aj 
textiles and clothing  6,o  5,9 
2,6 
other manufactured products  6,3 
14,0  16,1  9,3 
3.  Not  allocated  .!.&  .!.&2  l& 
Note  1  Base:  exports,  f.o.b. 
Ino1udins intra.-EEX:  trade 
Source  :  GATT  :  "International Trade" 
1980 
1913 
100,0 
~ 
23,7 
11,2 
8,4 
~ 
3,9 
7,7 
30,0 
r·ol 
3,0 
6,4 
10,0 . 
2,4 
4,8 
8,9 
.L.l TABLE  3 
N1'CE 
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The  European  Community  accounts  for  one-third of  total world  trade 
(1980),  as  reported by  GATT.  Rather  less  than half of  Community  trade 
is  extra-Community  trade.  In  1980  intra-Community  trade was 
251  billion ECU  and  extra-Community  trade was  221  billion ECU. 
Although all Community  trade  is classified  in international statistics 
as  international  trade,  intra-EC  trade  and  extra-EC  trade are 
different in important respects,  and  should  be  treated  separetely. 
Tables  3  and  4  set out  the  size and  structure of  the Community's 
international  trade  in manufactured  products. 
2.  Extra-Community Trade 
The  Community's  trade with  the rest of  the  world  is  spread  across  many 
world markets,  and  includes  a  very wide  range of  products.  However, 
most of  these  exports fall  into  a  few  industry classifications.  Of 
total  extra-EC  exports  68%  is accounted  for  by  six sectors  (metals, 
chemicals,  mechanical  and  electrical engineering,  motor vehicles, 
agro-industries). 
Table  3  gives  the detailed structure of  Community  extra-EC manufactured 
exports  by  industry and  Member  State of  origin in  1980. 
EXTRA-COMMUNITY  EXPORTS  OF  MANUFACTURED  PRODUCTS  BY  MEM9ER  STATE  lN  1'980  •••  X Of  EC-9  TOTAL 
CLIO  INDUS'l'RY  E.E.C.-9  BEl[;  I~ IlE2'lMMK  GERoll\NY  FIWlCE  IRELAND  rrALY  l'€IliER- UNITrn 
Co:le  r.ux. 
Bilioo EOJ 
I~  KINGOCM 
~tal extra-EEC exports  221,1  12,9  6,1  71,6  39,2  1,5  28,7  14,0  47 ,l 
of which: 
2-4  Manufacturing  1q3,6  10,'3  5,2  67,4  35,0  1 ,3  26,1  10,6  37,5 
Percentages 
2-4  Manufacturing  100,00  5,41  2,68  34,80  1  B, 10  0,69  13,46  5,47  19.38 
n  Meta1lif~rous ores  0,15  0,01  0,00  0,06  0,00  0,01  O,O.l  0,05  0,01 
2;>  Prel.  pro"ess.of metals  s,qs  1 '1l  0,09  3,05  l, 79  0,00  0,89  0,47  1,5~ 
53  P.xtr.  nf ,,;:hpr  minerals  l,U  0,01  0,00  0,05  0,03  0,01  0,08  0,04  0,92 
?4  ·-.  n-;r.-::t.-1].  rr.in•"'r,:d  £"1r"('(1.  ? , '")n  n,os  0,05  o.~8  0,42  0,02  0,64  0,04  0,37 
?5  CrPmiri'll  industry  12,27  0, 79  0,25  4,46  2,28  0,12  1,17  1,12  2,08 
2h  ;.•an-maciP  fihrPs  inr'ustry  n, r;e  O,Ol  0,00  0,:10  0,07  0,00  0,12  0,00  0,07 
31  ~·letal  artic1Ps  4,88  n, 15  0,12  1, 70  0,87  0,01 .  . . 1,06'  0,17  0,81 
32  :·:e<:l'>an ica 1 engineering  10,08  0,56  0,49  7,<18  2,76  0,03  2,82  0,57  3,86 
33  Office  ~  ~ata pror..  Mach.  1,45  0,04  0,02  0,44  0,28  0,04  0,20  0,08  0,36 
34  Electrical engineering  q,83  0,32  0,29  3,92  1.,83  0,05  1,09  0,53  1,80 
~c;  t~otor vehicles  & parts  )0,76  0,29  0,04  ~.48  2,05  0,00  1,09  0,11  1,70 
36  Other means  of transport  3,18  0,11  0,07  0,48  0,95  0,01  0,37  0,42  0,77 
37  Instrument engineering  1,94  0,03  0,05  0,83  0,33  0,02  0,18  0,09  0,42 
41/42  Foor,drink  & tobacco  7,41  0,38  0,63  1,19  1,94  0,25  0,54  1,23  1,25 
43  Textile  industry  1,56  0,27  0,12  1,09  0,51  0,02  0,71  0,19  0,63 
4.1  Leather  & 1eathf"r gor.ds  0,43  0,01  0,01  0,10  0,08  0,00  0,17  0,01  0,06 
45  Footwear  & clothing  2,32  0,04  0,09  0,54  0,40  0,02  0,815  0,04  0,31 
4fi  'T'i.Jnher  1'.  wo::Ylen  furn i tur'!  1 ,20  0,03  0,12  0,39  0,15  0,00  0,37  0,02  0,12 
47  Paper  &  paper  products  1.,86  0,06  0,05  0,67  0,37  0,01  0,18  0,09  0,44 
48  Ruther  & plast:ics  2,71  0,14  o, ll  0,83  0, 58  0,0?.  0,38  0,09  O,"i5 
49  Other manufacturing  inCl.  4,09  0,98  0,06  0,66  0,38  0,04  0,56  0,  lO  1,30 
Source  EUROSTAT - 7  -
In addition  to  the principal exporting  industries  and  Member  States 
mentioned  above,  there are significant amounts  of  exports  coming  frbrli 
the metals  sector  in Belgium,  from  the chemicals  and  agro-industries 
in  the  Netherlands,  from metal manufacturers  in Germany  and  Italy, 
aircraft and  railway equipment in France,  textiles in Germany  and  from 
clothing and  footwear  industry in Italy. 
In relation  to  the  size of  their economies  one may  also  draw a.ttention 
to  the  importance of  extra-EC  exports  of  food ·.products  ·for  Ir.eland  and 
of  food  products  and  mechanical  engineering for  Denmark. 
Thus,  although  the  structure of  the  Community's  international  expor.ts 
is constantly changing,  this picture of  the  situation in  1980  a.t  least 
gives  an indication of  the relative  importance of world  markets  for 
Community  industries.  Clearly in  the discussion which  follo:ws  of 
competitive performance  in different markets  and  sectors,  a  weak 
performance is of greater  significance for  income  and  employment in 
the  Community  the  greater  the  amount  of  exports which  are  thus 
exposed.  At  the  same  time,  the  impil.cit  requirement for  struc·:tura:l 
adjustment will be  the  larger. 
We  shall  see  that  to  some  extent  the  Community  is internationally 
competitive  in those products which we  export a  lot of  (which is not 
unexpected)  but  this is by  no  means  the case  in all important products 
and  in each Member  State.  Steel and  automobiles are evident .examples~ 
3.  Intra-Community Trade 
Most  international organisations ·0)  treat intra-Community  trade,  that 
is  the  exports  and  imports which  take place be tween  the  Community 
Member  States, gs  an integral  par·t  of  international  trade. 
This is not  satisfactory from  the  point of  view of  this report  b~cause 
in our  assessment of  international competitiveness  we  are looking 
primarily at our  performance  vis~a-vis Japan and  the  US  and  it is 
rather misleading  to dilute  the  i~ternational  trade data with intra-
Community  trade  (2). 
Furthermore,  intra-Community  trade  is subject  to  very different 
economic  influences  than  extra-Community  trade.  The  complementarity 
and  comparative  advantages  betwe·en  industries  in different Member 
States are not  the  same  as  those which  prevail  internationally.  For 
all their imperfections,  the  dome·~  tic market policies established  by 
the Treaties have  had  an effect. 
However,  this distinction between intra- and  extra-Community  trade does 
have  limitations:  the  economies  of  the  Member  States are not yet so 
integrated that  they can be  treated as  a  single European  economy,  as  one 
would  treat the  American or Japanese  economies  (3). 
Intra-Community  trade was  in 1980  more  important  than extra-Community 
trade,  for all products  and  for manufactured  products. 
(I)  UN,  GATT,  OECD 
(2)  Any  more  than  international trade statistics contain  the  trade between, 
say,  Florida and  California,  or between Hokkaido  and  Kyushu. 
(3)  Which  are of  course  also  conventional  simplifications  given the significant · 
regional disparities  and  differences  in factor  endowment  and  performance 
of different parts of  the  Japanes'e  and  American  economies. - ~ -
Intra-Community  trade is understandably more  important  for  the 
original Member  States  whose  industries  have  had more  time  to  adapt  to 
the unified domestic market,  and  for  the smaller Member  States, 
particularly Belgium and  the Netherlands. 
Table  4  presents  the  industrial  composition of  intra-Community  trade 
by  country of origin in  1980.  Compared  with  the  structure of  extra-
Community  trade,  the  following  points  emerge: 
German  and  French industry's strengths  in  the  Community  market 
appear  in  the  same  sectors  as  in international  trade,  with  the 
exception of  "other means  of  transport"  for  France; 
the  Community  market is much  more  important  than is  the  international  .. 
market for  the Italian textile,  footwear  and  clothing  industries; 
Table  4: 
the  importance of  the Community  market is  increasing  for  British 
industry,  and  it is already more  important  than international 
sales in five  sectors:  footwear  and  clothing,  office and  data 
processing machinery,  timber  and  wooden  furniture,  man-made 
fibres  and metalliferous ores; 
there are several  industries  for  which  the  Community  market is 
much  more  important  than  extra-Community markets.  These are 
food,  drink and  tobacco;  textiles;  rubber  and  plastics;  footwear 
and  clothing;  paper  and  paper  products;  office  and  data processing 
machinery;  timber  and  wooden  furniture;  metalliferous ores.  As 
one might  expect  these  include  some  products with relatively high 
transport costs,  and  some  products  for  which  the  Community  may  be 
losing its international comparative  advantage  and  for  which  the 
Common  Market provides  some  protection; 
comparing  Member  States'  share of manufacturing industry's 
exports it is apparent  that Belgium-Luxembourg,  the Netherlands 
and  Ireland have much  larger  exports  to  the  Community  market 
compared  to  their  extra-Community  exports.  Whilst  there may  be 
strong historical  and  geographical  reasons  to  explain this 
difference, it should  be borne  in mind  that  exports  include 
warehouse  exports,  which  tends  to overstate  total  exports  in 
countries which have  large  sea ports. 
INTRA-COMMUNITY  EXPORTS  OF  MANUFACTUR:.O PRODUCTS  BY  MEMBER  STATE  IN  1980  X OF  EC-9  TOTAL 
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B.  International Market Shares 
This part of  the report examines  the export performance of  Community 
industry vis-a-vis its major  international  competitors. 
The  approach adopted  has  been  to  examine  the  trends  in  the  Community's 
share  in international  trade  for  the products of  the  sec tors from  two 
points of view: 
the Community's  share of  OECD  exports  of manufactures  to  the world 
(this should  indicate how  Community  exports are performing 
against  those of other developed  countries,  in particular the USA 
and  Japan);  · 
the  Community's  share as  a  supplier  of  exports  of  OECD  imports 
of manufactures  from  the world  (this  should  indicate how  the 
Community  is performing against both developed  am  developing 
countries on  the  OECD  marke_t,  which  in  1980  accounted £or  62%  (l) 
of world  imports. 
All  analysis of  changes  in market.  shares  based  on  trade data  alone 
suffers  from  a  major  shortcoming,  that is  that it can  take  no  account 
of  changes  in trade which arise  f,rom  t~e development of  local 
production in other  countries.  To  do  so,  however,  would  r.equire 
detailed  and  up-to-date production and  consumption data. country-by-
country on a  worldwide basis,  so  as  to  base  the analysis on each 
country's  share of  the  total market for  a  product  group,  and  not. just 
that part of  the market which manifests  itself  through  the  international 
trade statistics.  Nor  can  the cqmpetitiveness  of  European industry in 
the domestic  Community  market  be assessed on  the basis of. cross-border 
transactions  alone.  The  total  ~omestic market,  including, national 
production and  consumption,  shoui~ be  taken into account.  However,  the 
statistical base  to  do  this in a  comparative and  up-to-date way  is still 
substantially lacking. 
This  problem  is partially resolved. in the developing  country and  OPEC 
data  shown  in Tables  6  and  7  for market shares  for  relatively 
sophisticated  industrial  product~-. in areas where  local production is 
still quite  low. 
Thus,  OECD  exports of,  for  example,  TV,  radio  and  Hi-Fi  equipment. to 
Africa represent virtually  the  to.tal market,  and  a  declining Community 
share is a  direct and  unambiguous.)ndication of declining competitiveness 
1.  Shares of  OECD  exports  to  the. world  (2) 
An  analysis of  OECD  export  shares  provides  a  measure  of whether  a· 
country has  been able  to ma.intain or  improve  its relative· share 
of  the industrialised world's  exports  or  whether,  on  the 
contrary,  its share has  fallen. 
Table  5  shows  the  changes  in; the  share  the Community,  the USA  and. 
Japan hold  in total exports  from  OECD  countries  to  the world  in 
twenty-five  product groups. 
(1)  Including  intra-Community  trade  .. 
(2)  Not  including  intra-Community  trade. i 
I 
: 
; 
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CHANGES  IN  SHARES  OF  OECD  EXPORTS  1973-80 
OECD  SHARES  OF  OECD  EXPORTS(1l  IN  1980  CHANGES  1973-80 
Exports(1l 
in  1980  JAPAN  USA  EEC(1l  JAPAN  USA  EEC(1) 
Bill ion  us  g  per  cent  percentage  points  difference 
Total  products  852  15.3  25.1  37.2  2.25  0.09  1.82 
Food,  be .·eraqes,  tobacco  75  2.3  42.8  33.3  -0.6  -1.1  7.6 
Agricult.rdl  products  21  0.7  55.8  9.4  -0.1  6.5  -0.8 
Mineral  "cJels  41  1.2  19.4  47.5  0.3  -1.4  11.2 
:·leta ls  v  .;o rked  18  4.1  33.1  13.1  2.5  13.1  2.6 
Qther  ra  ...  materials  22  1.0  16.3  40.0  -o.s  0.9  5.7 
~anufac~.red products  668  1'>'.1]  22.3  38.6  2.6  0.8  -0.4 
of  whicr: 
~~on-met.  -lin.  products  31  13.0  18.2  44.4  0.9  2.9  -2.1 
I ron  ano  steel  46  34.2  7.5  38.0  2.2  -0.4  -3.6 
'~eta l  pr~ducts  22  15.7  16.1  44.5  -o.o.  -0.9  2.8 
3a sic  cr~-icals  45  9.0  28.8  44.4  -0.9  3.3  -1.8 
Chemical  ::>roducts  24  4.8  25.1  47.5  o.s  2.2  -1.2 
~gricult-ral  machinery  9  10.3  34.8  39.7  3.4  -2.7  -0.5 
Electricol  machinery  40  22.3  23.0  40.1  7.7  -3.8  -2.0 
Power  9""·  machinery  20  17.1  27.5  40.9  3.8  -0.1  4. 4 
Jther  rT';:r.inery  90  13.3  23.9  45.4  4.2  0.2  -4.0 
Office  a~d telecom.  equipment  42  34.6  27.2  25.7  2.1  2.6  -1.4 
Optical,  clock,  photo  31  24.4  26.6  30.8  7.5  0.2  -3.6 
Road  vericles  89  32.5  16.4  32.7  14.8  -5.o  -4.7 
Other  t nnsport  equipment  37  14.6  43.2  33.8  -9.5  11.8  9.0 
Textiles  24  22.0  15.2  39.9  -1.2  4.2  -3.2 
Clothing  9  3.7  12. 1  48.1  -7.0  4.5  3.7 
Leather,  shoes  8  4.9  9.7  51.3  -1.8  3.3  -o.o 
Paper  32  3.5  19.0  16.3  0.5  2.9  0.9 
wood  fur-,iture  9  3.3  12.7  41.3  -2.8  -1.3  11.8 
Plastic,  rubber  31  15.1  20.7  47.5  -0.9  -0.4  0.2 
Other  Monuf.  products  30  14.7  29.4  45.1  -1.4  -3.8  6.1 
(1)  Not  including  intra-Community  trade  Source:  Calculations  by  Commission  Staff 
on  the  basis  of  OECO  trade  data 
A look at  the  shares  for  1980  over  the whole  range of  products 
(agricultural  and  manufactured  products,  energy  and  other  raw 
materials) shows that  the Community  is without doubt  the  largest 
exporter  in the  OECD  since its  extra-Community  exports  amount  to 
nearly  37%  of  the  OECD  total,  the  United  States  taking only  25%  and 
Japan  15%.  Moreover,  although Japan has  increased  its relative  share 
by  2.3  points  since  1973,  the  Community  has  also  fared  well  by 
increasing its own,  already very high,  level  by  1.8 points while  the 
United  States'  share has  remained  virtually unchanged. 
Taking manufactured  products  alone,  Japan's position appears  to  be 
relatively strong  (19.0%)  even  though  the  United  States  (22.3%)  and 
the Community  (38.6%)  continue  to  predominate.  Although at first 
sight  this  performance may  seem  encouraging,  there are grounds  for 
concern if one  looks at the gains  and  losses  in shares:  while  Japan 
has  increased its own  share by  2.6 points  since  1973  and  the  United 
States its share by  0.8 points,  the  EEC  has  seen its share  cut by 
0.4 points. - 11  -
Increased  competition in world  trade since  1973  - generated  in part by 
the  emergence  of  new  competitors  - could however  be  expected  to  affect 
first  those countries which initially held  the  largest shares.  Taking 
manufactured  products  as  a  whole,  the Japanese  advance does  not appear 
to  have been made  primarily at  the  expense of  the Community  or  the 
United  States.  Japan is also  subject to  greater  incentives  to  export 
manufactured  produ·cts  successfully  since it exports neither  raw 
materials  nor  agro-industrial products. 
The  United  States'  predominant  position cannot be  challenged  in 
agricultural products  and  unworked  metals;  they  have  substantially 
increased  their already large share of  these markets  since  1973.  In 
the  face of  such competition,  the  Community  has  to  play a  secondary 
role,  except perhaps  for  the  food  industries.  On  the other  hand, 
there is virtually no  Japanese  presence  in this  product category. 
S.ince  197 3,  the  US  share of  OECD  exports of  agricultural products 
increased  from  49%  to  56%,  compared  with  the  Community's mogest  9.4% 
and  Japan's  0.7%  - both declining. 
By  con~rast,  the  Community  predominates  for  the whole  range of 
industrial  intermediate products.  Its  share of  each of  these products 
is s.ignificantly larger  than its  t;wo  competitors'.  There  is little 
ind.ication at present that this strong position is  threatened·  in spite 
of  the considerable losses it has  sustained  in  the  steel  sector.  The 
American shares  tend  to  be  about  half of  the Community  shares  except 
in chemicals where  the difference is less marked,  but still significant. 
Japan's  share is strong  in  the  st~el. sec tor,  and,  if the present  trend 
continues,  it will  soon be  larger  than  the  Community's  share.  Japan's 
share of  exports of metal  products is approximately  the  same  as  the 
United States',  both far  smaller  than  the  Community's  share,  whilst 
Japan's  share of  chemicals  and  non-metallic mineral  products  exports 
does  not bear  comparison with  the  Community's  or  the United States'. 
In the capital  goods  sector,  the  shares  appear more  evenly distributed. 
Taking all machinery  exports  together,  including electrical machinery, 
the Community  is well  ahead  of its  two  competitors with shares greater 
than  40%;  this  lead is particularly marked  for  industrial machinery. 
Although  the  US  share for  agricult,_ural  machinery has  reached  35%  (a 
small  sec tor),  its share  for  capi,t_al  goods,  as  a  whole,  places it 
firmly  in second place although., s·;ti·ll  far  behind  the  Community.  Japan 
takes  the  third place for  these products with  shares  of  between  10% 
and  22%.  Since  1973,  however,  these  shares  have  been increasing, 
moving  up  7. 7  percentage points  for electrical machinery while  the 
Community  and  US  shares have  fallen~ - 12  -
The  Community  holds  25.7%  of  OECD  exports  for  office and  telecommunications 
equipment,  but this  share is falling.  Here  the  United  States  and 
especially Japan are  the market leaders,  accounting  for  27.2%  and 
34.6%  respectively of  OECD  exports,  the  USA  having  gained  ground  since 
1973  over  Japan with a  faster  rate of  increase.  As  regards  the 
precision engineering  industries,  the  three  competitors  are all 
similarly placed.  Although  the  Community  is currently in the  lead it 
is obvious  that if the  trends  between  1973  and  1980  continue  (+  7.5 points 
for  Japan,  -3.6 points for  the  EEC,  no  change  for  the  USA),  this 
advantage will  soon disappear. 
The  outstanding Japanese  performance  in the world  trade in motor 
vhicles has  caused  the greatest upheaval  since  1973.  Japan has  now 
caught up  with  the  Community  as  the world's biggest exporter  of motor 
vehicles.  It has  almost doubled  its share of  OECD  exports  in seven 
years,  pushing it up  to  almost  33%  in  1980  largely at the  expense of 
the Community  and  the  United  States which  lost 4.7  and  5.0 percentage 
points  respectively of  OECD  exports. 
As  far  as other  transport  equipment  (1)  is concerned,  however,  the 
United  States has  remained  unchallenged.  Not  only do  the United 
States hold  the largest share  (43%)  but  they  have also recorded 
considerable gains  since  1973  (+  11.8 points).  The  Community  is in 
second  place with  33.8%  of  total  OECD  exports  in  1980,  an  increase of 
9.0%  since  1973.  Japan,  however,  is not only  some  way  behind  (14.6%) 
but has also  suffered  substantial  losses  since  1973  (-9.5 points). 
The  Community  holds  a  relatively strong position in OECD  exports  for 
consumer  goods.  Japan has  only a  small  share with  the  exception of 
textiles and  rubber  and  plastic products.  However,  since  the data 
only covers  OECD  exports,  in those sectors  where  developing  country 
exports  are already significant,  particularly consumer  goods  such  as 
textiles,  leather and  footwear,  the export  shares  only reflect the 
relative positions of  the developed  countries with  each other in 
that part of  the market  which  they supply. 
In short,  were it not  for  the good  performance of  the  agro-industry 
and  raw  materials exports,  the overall performance of  the  Community's 
exports  would  have  been much  worse.  For  manufactured  products  as  a 
whole,  the  Community  lost  ground  relative  to  Japanese  and  United 
States  exports. 
Given  that  the  product categories  shown  in Table  5  are rather 
aggregated,  and  the data does  not show  in which world markets  the 
Community's  share was  changing,  we  have  analysed  the developments  for 
a  number  of  products  in the principal  world  markets. 
(I)  This  is  a  hybrid  category.  The  overall  movements  are  probably 
influenced primarily by  the aircraft industry,  but  the data  includes 
shipbuilding  and  railway rolling stock. - 13  -
Community  e;rpocts  of  27  products or product  groups  were  'compared 
to  total  OECD  exports  of  the  same  products.  In both cases intra.;. 
Community  exports were  removed  from  total exports.  The  Community's 
share of  OECD  exports  was  examined  over  the period  1968  to  I·98b  both 
in total and  in selected major  geographical  zones.  in vaiue  terms, 
these  27  products  accounted  for  35%  of  total  extra-Cororounity  exports. 
The  principal results of  this analysis  appear  in Tables  6 and  7.  The 
five  products  or product  groups  which  accounted  for  a  significant 
part of  OECD  exports  and  for  which  the  Community  increased ·or  maintained 
its share of  OECD  exports  are  shown  in Table  6.  The  Hve for  which 
the Community  suffered its greatest losses  in its share of  OECD  exports 
are  shown  in Table  7. 
Table 6  COMMUNITY  EXPORTS  TO  SPECIFIED  MARKETS-PRODUCTS  WHERE  TilE  COMMUNITY  DID  wELL  oR  KU.D  ITS  0811 
O!CD  EEC  E.t:.c.  EXPORTS  AS  A PERCENTAGE  OF  O.!.C.D.  ExPORTS  To  :-
PRODUCT  GROUP  YEAR  EXPORTS  EXPORTS  u.s.A  JAPA!f  !.P.T.A  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  0¥  O.P.!.C 
TO  WORLD  TO  WORLD  AMERICA  AFRICA  ASIA 
Mio  US$  %of  O!CD 
(1)  (l) 
1968  5255  .  31,0  25,9  40,4  76,4  26,8  83,6  51' 1  56,7 
1973  12052  33, I  23,7  33,0  74' 7  32,4  83,8  54,4  63,4 
MOTOR  VEHICLE  IIODIES,  \975  1727 I  15,9  25,4  35,4  70' 7  ~9,5  82,7  53,~  64,5 
ENGINES  AND  PARTS  1979  316QO  35,5  33,0  36,8  76,4  24,3  82,5  44,0  50,7 
1980  34504  38 t 7  35,6  32,2  75 ,3  25,4  82,8  46,9  57,1 
1968  3285  17 '6  37,2  5 ,I  17 ,o  22,9  46,8  41,6  41,0 
1973  ~692  17' 1  43,4  3. 7  29,6  28,6  29,6  33,0  53,7 
AIRCRAFT  1975  B122  19,2  55' 5  6,5  \8, I  16,2  55,2  28,0  34,5 
I Q79  1~291  29,5  SO ,I  5  t 7  19,8  28,5  62,9  25,1  37,4 
1980  21105  12 '5  49,2  7,9  39 '9  II ,3  57,2  23,3  32,5 
1968  2479  42 'l  22 '2  17 ,4  69,0  32' 6  76,5  46,9  58,0 
1973  ~790  42,4  19' 7  21,4  68,4  34,3  76 ,o.  48,0  59,7 
TELECOMm!Nl CATIONS  1975  9279  43,7  14,8  22,0  64,8  30,5  72,3  50,4  58,5 
EQUT PMENT  1979  17720  42,0  18,2  29,1  &7,7  32,1  71,6  48,9  59,3 
1980  20048  43,6  21 ,0  27,2  fi8,8  34 '3  79,2  53 ,I  65,4 
19&8  2492  41,2  58,9  41,3  78,6  37 '7  69,5  40,3  5o,o 
1973  5178  41 '2  58,4  40,0  711,0  39 '5  74,3  39,4  54,5 
ORGANIC  CHEMICALS  197 5  8481  42,5  61,2  43,9  77,6  34 '7  71,6  3o ,6.  49,4 
1979  17817  44,4  55,7  36,5  84,8  34,5  74,8  36,5  47 ,o 
1980  19325  43,3  54,9  30,3  84,3  32,8  72,4  36, I  47,7 
1968  1873  46,0  59,4  25,3  77,0  41,2  85,5  35,2  55,5 
PLASTIC  MATERIALS;  1973  4677  50,7  58,2  38,6  79,7  44,1  86,7  33,7  57,4 
REGENERATED  CELLUT..OSE;  1975  6185  50.7  56,8  29,2  78 '2  38,8  88, I  33,7  53,2 
RESINS  1979  14187  49,2  58,7  29,4  79,3  35,2  83,0  37,3  5.6' 3 
\980  16453  48,1  57,0  27,8  78,0  29,3  81,5  37,7  55,4 
NOTE  :PRODUCTS 
OECD 
OPEC 
(l) 
SITC  REV.1  7115+7326+7327+7328;734;7222+72491+72499;512;581 
not  including  Yugoslavia;Turkey  {1980  only) 
not  including  Gabon 
not  including  intra-EEC  trade 
Source  United  Nations  & Comm~ssion departments - 14  -
Table 7  COHMIJNITY  EXPORTS  TO  SPECIFIED  MARKETS-PRODUCTS  WHERE  THE  COMMUNITY  OlD  BADLY  , 
OECD  llEC  E.E.C.  EXPORTS  AS  A  PERCENTAGE  OF  O.E.C.D.  llXPORTS  TO  :-
PRODUCT  GROUP  Y!AII.  EXPORTS  EXPORTS  U.S.A 
TO  WORLD  TO  WORLD 
Mia  US$  %of  Ol!CD 
(l)  (1) 
1968  6591  44' 1  42,3 
1973  166~2  41,2  42,5 
IRON  AND  STEEL  1975  30016  41,1  31,9 
1979  42838  39,0  33,2 
1980  45702  36,4  27,8 
1968  5697  48,0  45,1 
1973  1) 583  42,8  39,4 
PASSENGER  MOTOR  CARS  1975  17 57 I  37 '9  32' 6 
1979  3~266  34,1  26,9 
1980  19697  31 , I  2'i,O 
1968  1763  22,4  8,0 
1973  4818  I 7, 7  7 • 3 
TV,RADIO,Hl-FL  1975  5622  22. 1  8,3 
EQUIPMENT  1979  11002  I 7 , 2  7,8 
1980  14332  1),4  5,8 
1968  1154  56,3  64,4 
1973  2392  ~4,5  52,4 
MACHINE  TOOLS  1975  3881  56,7  52,6 
FOR  WORKING  METALS  1979  6445  47,5  37 ,4 
1980  7460  48,0  38 ,I 
THERMIONIC  VALVES  AND  1968  654  40,6  38,4 
TUBES;  1973  2271  31,4  32,4 
TRANSISTORS;  1975  2891  31,4  37 '9 
ELECTRONIC  1979  5305  29,6  32,0 
MICRO-CIRCUITS  1980  6679  27  ,2  29,0 
NOTE  :PRODUCTS 
OECD 
OPEC 
(l) 
SITC  REV.!  67;7321;7241+7242+72492+8911;7151;7293 
not  including  Yugoslavia;Turkey  0980  only) 
not  including  Gabon 
not  including  intra-EEC  trade 
Source  United  Nations  & Co~ssion departments 
JAPAN  l!.F.T.A  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  OF 
AM!! RICA  AFRICA  ASIA 
18,7  76 '7  41,5  73,6  39,2 
17,4  71 '9  28,1  69,8  25,7 
19,2  67 '7  34,5  64,8  24,6 
16,0  71 '7  30,6  64,6  29,2 
15 '6  70 '7  27 ,9  61,6  25,7 
52' 7  90,0  33' 7  88,9  55' 5 
50,9  81,9  38,6  85,0  53,2 
51  , I  80,9  28,7  78,4  46,1 
66,4  81 '3  39,4  7.9 '2  29,0 
78,7  76,3  33,8  76,6  24,9 
21.2  JA, l  II ,6  44,6  22 '9 
36,9  'i3,6  fi,O  37,2  11,4 
27,6  48,2  6,3  30, I  10,9 
24,8  54,7  5,3  22,4  12,4 
21 '8  49,1  6,6  22, I  7 '8 
4  7 ,2  83,7  57' 7  85,8  53,3 
39' 7  82,4  50,4  88,0  48,2 
46,0  76,7  57,4  81,9  60,7 
48,8  76,0  45,8  80,2  42,4 
45' l  73,4  52,9  82,5  43,8 
3' 7  48,1  8,3  82,1  15,4 
9,4  62,2  11,6  74,2  9,2 
12,2  67 ,o  7,3  63,8  8,5 
19,5  64,5  10,6  7q ,8  16,8 
23,6  59,4  10' 5  72' 1  17 ,o 
2.  Shares  taken by major  suppliers of  OECD  imports  from  the world 
The  OECD  countries accounted  for  approximately  62%  of  world  imports  of 
manufactured  products  in  1980.  Taken as  a  whole  they  form  a  highly 
competitive market.  The  trends  in  the  shares  taken by  the major 
sources of  supply  (i.e.  exporters)  of  OECD  imports  (I)  from  the world 
can,  therefore,  provide an important  indicator of  how  the  Community  is 
performing  against not  just  the developed  but also  the developing 
countries.  These  trends were  analysed  for  a  representative cross-
section of  18  product  groups  for  the period  1968-80  {2). 
(1)  Excluding  intra-Community  trade; 
not including  New  Zealand,  Yugoslavia  and  Turkey. 
(2)  The  product groups  are defined  in Annex  5. 
O.P.I!.C 
61,2 
44,2 
35,2 
41,1 
39,8 
45,2 
51,8 
45,3 
32,9 
35 '7 
22' 5 
18 ') 
13,0 
12,2 
9,0 
72,5 
71,6 
74, l 
55,5 
63,8 
36,0 
41,4 
44,2 
54,5 
47,6 
~ - 15  -
The  principal points  which  emerge  from  this data are  that  the 
Community  has  a  growing market share  in only  three of  the  eighteen 
product groups:  (motor vehicle bodies,  engines  and  parts:  24%  of  OECD 
imports  in  1980; ·paper  and  paperboard:  7%;  and  pulp  and  was te'paper: 
2%). 
On  the other  hand,  the  Community  has  a  declining market  sh~re in ten 
of  the eighteen product groups:  (passenger  motor  cars:  27%;  lorries 
and  trucks:  17%;  organic chemicals:  34%;  plastic materials;  regenerated 
celluiose and  resins:  40%;  manufactured fertilisers:  11%;  iron and 
steel:  27%;  clothing and  accessories:  13%;  made-up  articles  in textile 
material:  11%;  ships  and  boats:  21%;  machine  tools  for  working metals: 
29%). 
The  Community's  important pos1t1on in world  trade is confirmed  in the 
fact  that it has  the largest market  share in six of  the  eighteen 
product groups:  (organic  chemicals:  34%;  plastic materials, 
generated  cellulose and  resins:  40%;  iron and  steel:  27%;  machine 
tools  for  working metals:  29%;  pharmaceuticals:  38%;  synthetic 
fibres:  37%).  However,  the  Community's  share  of  the first four  of 
these markets  is declining. 
The  USA  had  a  growing  market share  in only  three  of  the  eighteen 
product groups:  (manufactured fertilisers:  22%;  clothing and 
accessories:  3%;  pulp  and  wastepaper:  18%). 
Japan had  a  market share of  more  than  20%  in only four  of  the  eightee·n 
product  groups:  (passenger  motorcars:  42%  and  growing;  lorries and 
truckes:  27%  and  growing;  ships  and  boats:  24%  fluctuating/ 
declining;  machine  tools  for  working metals:  21%  and  growing). 
Japan had  a  market  share of  5%  or less  in ten of  the eighteen product 
groups. 
The developing countries had  the largest market share in four  of  the 
eighteen product  groups:  ( inorga'hic  chemicals:  25%;  clothing  and 
accessories:  48%;  woven  cotton fabrics:  31%;  made-up  articles of 
textile material:  33%). 
This  analysis of both OECD  export and  import data also  shows  that 
there are in many  cases  significant fluctuations  in shares  and  that 
these can and  do  change direction,  both upwards  and  downwards,  over  a 
relatively short  time  scale.  Nevertheless,  the findings  are sufficiently 
consistent across  a  broad  range of  sectors  and  over  a  reasonably  long 
time  scale  to  confirm that: 
the  Community's  performance varies considerably between sectors 
and  markets; 
the Community  does  not manifest dynamic  market leadership  in any 
sector; - 16  -
the relatively small  number  and  the  nature of  the  sectors  in 
which  the  Community's  shares  are growing  and  the volatility of 
its shares  in most of  the other  sectors  is  a  cause  for  some 
concern; 
the  US  would  appear  to  be  equally vulnerable  in  the majority of 
sec tors; 
whilst Japan has  a  strong  pos1t1on in some  of  the  sectors it has 
a  negligible or relatively small  share  in  the majority of markets 
in question. 
Both  the United  States and  the  Community  export a  wide  range of 
products  covering all sectors.  Although  this  provides  no  guarantee of 
success against foreign competition  - as  recent  trends  have  shown  - it 
does  provide  a  solid base  from  which  to  develop  international markets 
in  the future.  Japan,  on  the other  hand,  which  has  made  remarkable 
gains  in  terms  of  increased  market shares,  has  staked  its performance 
on  a  very limited number  of  sectors,  namely  steel,  office and 
telecommunications  equipment,  the precision engineering  industry and 
motor  cars. 
The  intrinsic risks of  the Japanese  strategy of  concentrating on a 
narrow product range have  evidently been more  than offset by  the 
resources  - both financial  and  managerial  - which  they  have  devoted  to 
success  in  these  chosen areas. 
C.  Industrial  Specialisation 
An  alternative approach  to  assessing changes  in compet1t1veness  is  to 
measure  changes  in each country's  and  the  Community's  degree  of  trade 
specialisation in each  product  group  (1).  The  computerised  data base 
which has  been used  for  this purpose  includes  intra-Community  trade  1n 
total  OECD  exports,  contrary  to  the  preceding discussion of market 
share data. 
1.  Specialisation 1n international  trade 
Tables  8  and  9  show  the relative weight of  exports  and  imports 
respectively,  in relation  to  the relative weight of  the  product as  a 
whole  in  to tal  OECD  trade.  Thus  in  the  case of  Community  trade  in 
road vehicles  in  1980:  the weight of  exports  of vehicles  in total 
Community  exports  was  only  84%  of  the weight  of  total  OECD  exports of 
vehicles  in total  OECD  trade.  This  low degree of  specialisation in 
exporting vehicles is declining.  On  the  other  hand,  on  the  same  basis 
the degree  of  dependence  on  imports  is  lower,  at 51%,  but  is rising. 
By  sharp  contrast,  Japanese  specialisation in vehicle exports  is 
rising rapidly and  dependence  on  imports  is not rising at all. 
(1)  This  approach  was  first developed  in  the report "Changes  in industrial 
structure in  the  European  economies  since  the oil crisis  1973-78"  -
European Economy  Special  Issue,  1979. - 17  -
The  most striking feature of  this data is the  narrow range of  the 
specialisation indices  for  Community  exports.  In  1980  the maximum  was 
1.23  (chemicals)  and  the minimum  was  0.56  (paper).  Fifteen product 
groups  fell within  the  range 0.80-1.20.  This  just means  that  the 
structure of  Community  exports of manufactured  products  is  qu~te close 
to  the average  structure of  OECD  exports.  The  position has  evolved 
little since  1963,  if anything  the range has  narrowed. 
By  contrast,  the range of  specialisation indices  in  the  US  and  Japan 
is much  wider  and  seems  to  be  increasing. 
The  Community  has  no  export product  to  compare with US  specialisation 
in aircraft  (2.03  in  1980)  and  Japanese  specialisation in office and 
telecommunications  equipment  (1.96). 
On  the other  hand,  for  the  indices of  import dependence  there is less 
difference in  the wider  range observed  for  the  Community,  the  USA  and 
Japan.  The  last having  the widest range,  with a  maximum  for  imports 
of  chemicals  (2.03)  and  a  minimum  for  road vehicles  (0.18). 
The  Community's  specialisation in intermediate products  has  hardly 
changed  since  1963  with  the  exception of  chemicals  where  the  index has 
increased.  Only  for  steel  products  is  the  index less  than  1.00.  The 
Community's  specialisation in ma~hinery is  above  the  OECD  average,  a 
decline in electrical machinery being offset by  an increase in 
industrial machines. 
By  contrast,  specialisation  ~n e.quipment  has  been deteriorating, 
particularly for office and  telecommunications  equipment  and  road 
vehicles.  As  for  consumer  goods,  we  note  low  and  generally declining 
specialisation indices  in the Community. 
The  situation of  the United  States is rather different for  although 
stability of  the specialisation index is  the major  characteristic,  the 
levels of  this  index are very different  to  those of  the Community.  For 
chemicals  the  level  and  change of  the  index  is  similar  to  that for  the 
Community,  but that for  the other base products .ia much  lower  and 
falling sharply.  For machinery  the levels are also  similar,  while  for 
the high  technology  group  (except  for vehicles)  they are far higher. 
The  extreme case with rapid  ch&nges  in index is Japan.  Here  be tween 
1963  and  1973  a  traditional less ·developed  export structure was 
revolutionised.  Slight falls  in general  in basic  products were 
countered  by  considerable increases  in machinery.  Very rapid 
increases  in the  index  for  the higher  technology  sec tors were 
contrasted  to  enormous  falls  in the  index  for  the  low  technology 
groups.  These  trends were  reinforced during  1973-1979.  In  terms  of 
levels  the differences with  the  Community  are particularly marked  for 
high  technology products  and  vehicles on  the  higher  side and  the  low 
technology  products  on  the other  whereas  the  specialisation remains 
weak  for machinery  exports,  but ·not for  electrical machines.  In  terms 
of  the index of  dependence,  this pattern is  exactly reversed with 
rising and  high levels of  import dependence for  low  technology 
products  and  falling  and  low  levels  for  several machinery branches, 
vehicles  and  office and  telecommunications  equipment. - 18  -
This  comparison  suggests  that  the pattern of  industrial specia-
lisation in  the  Community  has  only partially moved  in the 
direction of  adjustment  to  changes  in world  demand  and  world 
supply.  In certain sectors  the  Japanese  specialisation index  has 
reached  levels far  in excess  of  those  in either  the  Community  or  the 
USA.  The  United  States had  in  1963  a  good  specialisation profile  for 
an advanced  industrialised  country,  and  largely retained  this  profile 
though  to  1979  having high specialisation indices  in important 
technology :intensive sectors.  Their main weakness  is that  the  index 
of  dependence has risen sharply in some  technology  intensive areas  and 
has  fallen sharply for  textiles,  clothing  and  other  low  technology 
products. 
Table  8:  Index  of  Community  (1) 
Spe6ialisation  1973  1973 
' 
I1·on  and  Steel 
Hetal  products 
Basic  chemica.Js 
Citern:c~l  prcJdur=ts 
A~rjcul t11ral  mal'hi11ery 
EIE:'c.t"r.  ,ar:hincry 
Po·.~·r: r  -·.·~ 7':1-' r .l t i OH'.  ··,1:11  h. 
l)t her  :::.i.:l~i,,,~r:: 
l  1)1- f j , .•. t  1  t.!  lt~nllll.  eq11 i p11H'II l 
1 't)pt.,  L:lot:k,  phutu 
; Knad  'le:hicic:~J 
jOtll~r  transput·t  eql1ip~e11t 
IT  .. 
0.99 
1 .08 
0.99 
1. 21 
0.80 
1. 1  h 
1.1.) 
I JJ? 
II. y•, 
ll.  I'd 
I . J i 
0.7tl 
1. 01 
0. 99 
1  - 12 
1. 25 
1.0) 
1. 06 
I.!]'J 
I .  12 
0. ')b 
0. l7 
0.96 
1.11 
1 .0~ 
1 .23 
1. 10 
I. Oli 
1.1'> 
I. 21 
0. li 
O  .  .'l~ 
(). ,il, 
I.  J4 
1963 
0.42 
0.84 
!.  05 
1.14 
I. 81 
1.1)\ 
1 . .'') 
I.:!', 
I.  11 
l. I I 
l .1)0 
l . 43 
U.S.A. 
1973 
0.3:; 
0.74 
I . 11 
I.  07 
1 . 74 
1. 21, 
I .ld 
l. I h 
. l'l 
I. \0 
l .00 
l. 79 
1980 
0.33 
0. 70 
l. 22 
I. 14 
1.69 
I.  07 
1.'\'> 
I  I 7 
1. 12 
1.n 
0. 71 
2. )3 
ic~KtL~as  0.94  0.95  0  87  0.43  0.44 
I
ISh~~~·ng  0.99  0.79  o:s3  0.21  0.25  2:1~ 
Paper  1·05  1-16  1.06  0.38  0.27  0.35  '""'  '"'"''"'"  I  o.s.  "·"  o.;o  "·'"  "·"  o.·,. 
~~:::!':~o::~';:"~'-·--t  :!~ :  ll  ___ :  1;  :  !l  Ul  :;: 
lT_o~a~_:n:nu_f:~-t~res  1.00  1.00  1.00  -~-~-0----- 1 ~~~----;-_-00 
Source:  Comrnis;i"~~;c~;~  ·-;~  -b~~-~-~f-OE:Co-t rad.~ ·-d~:-·---------- ·---------- -- -
(1)  Extra-EC  trade.  a 
omm1.Hll ty 
Dependence  1963  1971  1980  1963 
U.S.A. 
1973  1980 
Table  9:  Index  of~·  --··c-- --;--·-(-I-)--··-
1
---- -------- --·----- ··-- ..  ·--·---..  --·--·--·--·----·-· .. ····- .. _,_,.,, 
Irun  and  Steel  0.77  0  R9 
t·!et~l  ?roducts  I  0. 71  o:84  g:~~  :  :g~  g:
9
9
5
1 
1·06 
- .  0.84 
Bast<:  chemtcals  1.12  1.13  1.00  0.77  0.62  0.64 
Chemicdl  praducts  0.85  0.98  Q.BJ  0.56  0.40  0.60 
Agr~cultural macl1inery 
Electr.  machinery 
Power  benerating mach. 
Other  machinery 
Office,  Telecom.  equipment 
Opt.,  clock,  photo 
Road  vehccles 
Other  transport  equipment 
Tc:<t i lo2s 
Cluthin~ 
Shoes 
0.30 
1. 00 
0.82 
0.98 
1. OS 
1. 24 
0.24 
1 . 02 
0.87 
0.9} 
I .01 
0.48 
1. 07 
0.67 
0.91 
1. 30 
1. 37 
0.33 
I . 67 
I • •J 7 
I. 18 
1 • 28 
I.  H 1 
I. !ll 
0. 7[) 
1. ) 2 
I .00 
0.42 
I.  01 
0.69 
0.84 
1 • 3  7 
1. 27 
0.51 
1. 68 
I . 20 
l .  ~~ 2 
I . ~I 
l • J 7 
1.1) 
n.r,7 
I.  4) 
1.0() 
Source:  C"mrli.ssi.on  Scr•Ji.ces  un  basis  nf  jJE.C!J  trade  data 
(1)  Extra-EC  trnde. 
1.10 
0.49 
0.40 
0. 31 
1. 1) 
0.89 
1 .07 
fl. 15 
0.97 
0.85 
I.  11 
0.52 
1. 41 
0.78 
1 • 7  5 
0.5) 
! . I J  ()_  Jr1 
I . lH  \. I 7 
I . L.)  1 . 4 7 
~. 20  ! . ()2 
I . '17  I . •  1~ 
0.  ~!,  0. r:;.:a 
1.75  1.76 
I .00  1.00 
I.  08 
1. 07 
1. 10 
0. 77 
I. 19 
0.86 
1. 63 
0.85 
O.J~ 
1.111 
1 . 2 7 
n.q2 
il. M  7 
0. 4 7 
I . 52 
I.  DO 
1963 
1. 72 
1.06 
0.00 
0. 38 
0.07 
0. IS 
0.')2 
II. ')9 
1 ' ., ) 
0.9) 
0  47 
I. 32 
2.47 
2.05 
1. 22 
0.35 
1  64 
0.90 
1.07 
JAPAN  ~ 
_1_9_7J  ____  19_8_o ___  _ 
1.85  1.75 
0. 89  0. 80  l 
1.57  0.44 
0.26  0.25 
0.42 
0.88 
0.89 
0  57 
2. 12 
\. 09 
1 .oq 
l- 78 
1.22 
0.45 
0.3~ 
0.25 
0.30 
0.81 
1.06 
0. 58 
I. 2C 
0.98 
0. 7) 
1.96 
I. 36 
I. '\9 
0.91 
O.'JA 
0. 13 
0. 21 
0. 24 
0.14 
0.67 
0.81 
·- ----------------- ---
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2.  Comparative  advantage  in high  technology  products 
We  have  also  compared  the  Community's  comparative advantage  in 
exporting  a  selected  group  of high  technology  products  (I)  with  that 
of  Japan and  the  USA  for  the  same  products. 
This  is done  by  calculating an index,  similar  to  the  specialisation 
index but which measures  the relative weight of  exports of  the high 
technology products  in total exports of  the Community  eompard  with  the 
weight  of  the Community's  total exports  in world  trade. 
Table  10  below gives  the resulting  indices  for  the Community,  USA, 
Japan and  the Member  States.  The  results  show  even more  striking 
differences  than do  the  specialisation indices,  both between countries 
and  over  time. 
The  low  and declining comparative advantage of  the  Community  may  be 
somewhat  exaggerated  because  the data unfortunately includes  intra-
Community  trade and,  as  we  saw  in Section II.A.2 above,  intra-
Community  trade  includes  a  larger proportion of  low-technology 
products  than does  extra-Community  trade. 
Notwithstanding,  these  indices of  comparative advantage confirm  the 
rapid  improvement  in Japan's position for  high  technology products,  as 
against a  moderate decline in the American  pos'ition and  a  distinct 
deterioration on  the part of  the  Community. 
Table  10  - Changes  in comparative  advantage  in exports of high 
technology products. 
Total  World  Manufacturing Exports  (2) 
1963  1970  1980 
Community  (I)  1.02  0.94  0.88 
USA  I.  29  I.  27  1.20 
JAPAN  0.56  0.87  1. 41 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.67  0.  77  0.79 
Denmark  0.58  0.60  0.66 
Germany  I.  21  1.06  0.99 
France  1.00  1.06  0.93 
Italy  0.84  0.83  0.63 
Ireland  0.43  0.67  1.03 
Netherlands  1.05  0.83  0.69 
U.K.  1.05  0.92  0.94 
(I)  Including intra-EC  trade 
Source:  Commission  Services,  DG  II 
(1)  See Annex  6. - 20  -
D.  Cost,  Productivity and  the  Exchange Rate 
1.  Wage  costs  and  productivity 
Considerable  importance is generally attached  to  changes  in unit wage 
costs  - for  want  of  details of  total production costs  - because  of  the 
theory  that production costs determine  the  prices  of  goods,  which  in 
turn determine  their competitiveness at home  and  abroad.  Unit wage 
costs  can be defined  as  the  ratio of  the hourly  money  wage  paid  to 
hourly productivity in volume  terms.  Analysing  them  provides  a  key  to 
determining  the extent  to  which costs affect competitiveness  and, 
hence,  a  country's foreign  trade  performance.  Since  the  significance 
of  movements  of  unit wage  costs varies depending  on whether  they are 
expressed  in national  currency or  in a  standard currency  (i.e.  the US 
dollar) or whether  one considers manufacturing  industry as  a  whole  or 
its constituent branches, it  makes  sense  to  analyse  the  trends  from 
each of  those angles  in  turn. 
(a)  Wage  Costs 
Taking unit wage  costs  in national  currency first,  between  1970  and 
1980  there were  such wide differences  in  the  trends  for  manufacturing 
indus try as  a  whole  in  those countries for  which  figures  are available  (I), 
that  the  countries split into  two  distinct groups.  On  the  one hand 
Italy and  the  United  Kingdom  recorded  average annual  increases of  over 
15%,  which means  that hourly wage  costs  there rose  by  IS%  more  than 
hourly productivity in volume. tert'lS.  On  the other hand  there were  the 
countries where  wage  increases  exerted  much  less pressure  - namely, 
Denmark with  increases of  7.9%,  Belgium with  6.8%,  Japan with  6.6%, 
Nether  lands with  6. 4%,  Germany  with  5. 5%,  the  United  States with 6. 2% 
and  France occupied  the middle  ground  with  increases of  9.9%.  In  the 
case of  Belgium,  the  steady deterioration in  the current account since 
1976  appears difficult to  reconcile with  the  encouraging  wage  trends 
in  that country since  1975.  However,  all  in all  the  countries which 
have  been most  successful at controlling  their  wage  costs  have also 
had  fewer  balance of  payments  problems. 
The  diverging  paths  taken by  the  individual  countries  in  the  '70s  (see 
graphs  Ia  and  lb)  illustrate the  extent  to  which  the  base year 
chosen - which  by  implication is regarded  as  a  year  of  stability - can 
affect the results.  For  inc>tance,  if 1970  is  taken as  the base year, 
the United  Kingdom  and  Italy are  in the worst posidonwhile Germany 
fares best,  closely followed  by  the Benelux  countries,  Japan and  the 
United  States.  On  the  othe•- hand,  if  1975  is chosen  the relative 
position of  Italy and  the United  Kingdom  remains  unchanged,  but Japan 
emerges  with by  far  the best performance:  an average  annual  increase 
in unit wage  costs of only  0.2%;  followed  by  the  Netherlands  on 2.6%, 
Belgium on  2.9%  and  Germany  on 4.2%.  At  the  same  time  the United 
States  slips appreciably closer  to  the middle  ground  occupied  by 
France with an average of  7.2%  as  against France's  8.7%. 
(1)  USA,  Japan,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  france,  J.taly,  the NetherlanJs 
and  the United  K'ingdom. lSG 
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(b)  Hourly  Productivity 
Since,  by definition,  the  hourly productivity in volume  terms  in 
manufacturing  indus try plays '·a  central part in de termini  rig  unit wage 
costs, it is also  important  to  consider  the  extent  to  which it.  too  can 
explain  the differences in wage  trends  from  one  country  to  ana ther. 
First,  Table 11  sho\·!S  that  th~ countries with  the highest growth in 
productivity  (i.e.  Belgium,  the  Netherlands  and  Japan)  have  also  had 
the best results in terms  of unit wage  costs, whilst  those  where 
productivity increases have  been slow have  experienced  the  sharpest 
wage  increases  (e.g.  the United  Kingdom),  except,  however,  in  the case 
of  the United  States,  which,  paradoxically,  combines  good  results  as 
regards wage  costs with a  mediocre performance  in  terms  of  productivity. 
Germany,  France  and  Italy do  not entirely fit into  this  framework;  the 
moderate increase in productivity in  those countries was  accompanied 
by  below-average,  average  and  above-average wage  increases respectively. 
One  cannot go  so  far  as  to  say  that productivity  trends are inversely 
proportional  to  changes  in unit wage  costs,  but  rapid  increases  in 
productivity have  a  valuable moderating  influence on unit wage  costs, 
though  the case of  the United  States  shows  that  this does  not 
necessarily happen. - 22  -
Table  11:  Wage  Costs  and  Productivity,  Annu~l  Growth  R~tes  in  7. 
1960-1970 
Hourly  wage  cost  in national currencies 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United  Kingdom 
CE  7  (b) 
USA 
Japan 
9.8 
II.  I 
8.7 
8.6 
II.  I 
12.0 
7. I 
9.0 
4.5 
I J. 5 
Hourly  productivity  in volume 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United  Kingdom 
CE  7 
USA 
Japan 
6.4 
6.8 
6. I 
5.7 
7. I 
7. I 
4.2 
5.8 
2.9 
10.5 
~e  costs  in national  currencies 
Belgium  3.2 
Denmark  4. 0 
France  2.4 
Germany  2.7 
Italy  ).7 
Netherlands  4.6 
United  Kingdom  2.8 
CE  7  3.0 
USA 
Japan 
I. 5 
2.7 
Unit  wage  costs  in  US  Dollar" 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Gcrm.1ny 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United  Kingdom 
CE  7 
USA 
Japan 
3.2 
).0 
1.7 
1.4 
·1.n 
,.,s 
1 .n 
2.6 
I.') 
2.8 
1970-1980 
15.0 
I J. 5 
I 5. J 
IO.<J 
20.8 
13.6 
18.0 
15.8 
8.8 
]!, . 5 
7.4 
5.2 
4.9 
IJ.2 
4.5 
6.1, 
2.2 
'•. 5 
2.4 
7.4 
6.8 
7. 9 
9.9 
f),') 
11.6 
A,/ 1 
I 5. ~ 
IO.R 
6.'2 
6.h 
17.0 
11.1, 
12 .1+ 
11.:· 
lll.'l 
1:'.'' 
12. <) 
17..4 
6.2 
II.  g 
(n)  C;llcnlnt<•d  nn  thl'- b:J:'-IiH  or  ln)•,;Jrithmi!·  rr,•11d  of  lndcx 
(b)  l·:xc l ntl ing  I rcland,  Lux.emUouq.~ and  Crt'l'l.'l' 
(c)  1975-1979 
1973-1980 
13.0 
12.6 
I 5. 3 
9.7 
20.0 
II. 3 
19.0 
I). 4 
'1.3 
II.  0 
A.6 
4.4 
I~  • 9 
4.8 
l. 5 
...  ) .  ) 
I. 4 
3.8 
I . 7 
7.2 
6. 1 
7.8 
10.0 
4.7 
lh.O 
I 7. J 
II . 2 
7.~ 
1.6 
I II. 7 
q • .:) 
11.0 
I I . 2 
q. (\ 
I fl. I 
II .R 
1.) 
A.S 
(a) 
\975-1980 
9.4 
10.9 
14.2 
8.6 
17.9 
9.J 
17.2 
13.8 
8.9 
8. 1 
6.8(c1 
3.8 
5. I 
4.2 
4.9 
6. 6 (C') 
I .9 
4.2 
l.li 
7.9 
2.9 
6.8 
8.7 
4.2 
12.4 
2.6 
I 5.0 
9.2 
7. 2 
0.2 
7.7 
7. 2 
9.0 
10.7 
0.5 
7. 6 
16. I 
I il. 'i 
7.2 
5.8 
On  comparing  the average increases  in unit wage  costs  and  those  in 
hourly productivity in volume  terms  over  the  '60s  and  '70s, it is 
clear that  the more  or  less general  explosion of unit  labour costs  is only 
slightly due  to  lower  growth in hourly productivity  and  is much  more 
directly due  to  increases  in hourly wage  costs  (wages  plus  social-
security contributions).  Moreover,  although  the  average values  for 
each decade  suggest that hourly productivity is growing  slower  than 
costs,  the  annual  figures  plotted  in the  graph  neither  prove  nor 
disprove  the  theory  that  there is an underlying  downward  trend  in 
productivity.  The  sharp fluctuations  in  the figures,  which mean  among 
other  things  that  the mean values  are calculated over  a  period  which 
begins with a  boom  year  and  finishing with  a  slump  year,  suggest  that 
the mean value for  the  1970s  might be  too  low  and  that  the real  figure 
is closer  to  the  1960s  level.  At  any  event,  it does  not seem  that a 
fall  in the rate of  growth of  productivity could  have  been at the root 
of  the  competitiveness  problems  experienced  in the  1970s. 10 
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6raph  2:  Hourly  productivity  in  volume  terms  in  manufacturing  i 1 ~ustry 
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(c)  Unit Wage  Costs 
The  sectoral analysis of unit wage  costs  in  13  branches  of  industry in 
six Community  countries  (1)  reve~led  that  the  trends  in both unit 
costs  and  hourly productivity in volume  terms  were  to  a  very large 
extent heterogeneous  from  one  sector  and  from  one country  to  another. 
As  regards  the possible link between unit wage  costs  in  the  individual 
sec tors and  foreign  trade performance,  the results vary considerably, . 
depending  on  the  category of  products concerned.  In  the case of 
intermediate products,  for  instance,  foreign trade performance  seems 
to  be  linked  to  Hage  eosts.  Con"ersely,'  there is no  evidence of  any 
such link in the case of capital goods;  naturally,  this does  not 
necessarily mean  that  there is in fact  no  such link but it nevertheless 
indicates  that foreign  trade  d-ep~ands  equally heavily on a  wide  range 
of qualitative factors,  among  which  the size of  the home  market and 
strength of  the world. market  s'eem  to  play a  decisive part.  Finally, 
there is no  obvious  link betwee~ costs  and  the foreign  trade performance 
in  the  food  products or current consumer  goods  sec tors either. 
However,  the  textiles,  leather  and  clothing  industry is one  notable 
exception since  the relative inc·rease in wage  costs  in each country 
directly determines  how  much  or  t ts  share of  the world market it 
loses. 
Conversion of  the unit wage  cos,ts  from  the  national  currency  into  US 
dollars  lends  greater depth  to  the results  and  illustrates  the 
important part which changes  in the  exchange rate play in determining 
the relative trends  in production ·costs  and,  hence,  in foreign  trade. 
(1)  Belgium,  Germany,  France,  Italy,  Netherlands  and  the United  Kingdom. .... 
/ 
/ 
,' 
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The  importance of  the  exchange rate  emerges  only after  1970;  the 
stable exchange rates of  the  '60s  mean  that  the  results  for  that 
period  hardly  change  if  they are converted  from  the  national  currency 
to  US  dollars,  except  in  the  case of  the  United  Kingdom  and,  to  a 
lesser extent,  France.  Since  then,  however,  the  collapse of  the 
Bretton Woods  system has made  way  for  sharp  fluctuations  in parities 
with  the result that national  changes  in unit wage  costs  as  such have 
surrendered most  of  their  importance  to  fluctuations  in exchange 
rates,  which,  in turn,  are broadly affected by  wage  costs. 
For  instance,  the differences between  the  national  trends  between  1970 
and  1980  emerge  clearly when  the figures  are  expressed  in  the national 
currencies but are partly obscured  when  US  dollars are used  (see 
graph  3).  The depreciation of  the dollar has  put  the United  States  ~n 
an extremely advantageous  position compared  with all  the other 
countries.  Its average annual  increase  in unit wage  costs  stood at 
6.2%,  while  the  figure  for  the other  countries  ranged  from  10.9%  in 
Italy  to  13.2%  in Germany.  Consequently,  the  country which  has  been 
most  successful at containing  its unit wage  costs at home  comes  last 
but one  if the figures  are converted  into  US  dollars,  slightly above 
the United  Kingdom  where  the  changes  in exchange parity have  not 
sufficed  to counteract  the  combined  impact  of  the  large wage  increases 
and  low  growth in productivity caused,  in particular,  by  the rapid 
appreciation of  the  pound  since  1978.  If the figures are  expressed  in 
US  dollars,  Japan and  Italy maintain  the  same  advantage over all  the 
other  countries  except,  of  course,  the  United  States . 
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The  Benelux countries  and  France  come  between Japan and  Italy at the 
top  and  Germany  at the bottom.  Consequently~ when  wage  costs  are 
expressed  in US  dollars,  the  situation no  longer  appears  to  be  the 
same  in  those countries performing poorly, in  this  area and  those  which 
have structural balance of  payments  problems  as it seems  to  be  the 
same  when  they are given in national  currencies. 
Although  one  cannot  draw  any  practical  conclusions  from  this, it 
~evertheless raises  a  number  of  questions.  Firstly, it serves as  a 
reminder of  the  limitations of  analyses  such  as  this,  in view of  the 
fact  t"j:lat  they are based on wage  costs rather  than on total production 
costs,  that  the figures  are converted  into  the  standard  currency at 
.the  exchange rate for  the dollar rather  than at the effective exchange 
rate  (see section II.b.2)  and  that virtually nothing  is known  about 
the currency actually used  for  payment  p~rposes.  Over  and  above  these 
ques~ions of  the method  employeq,  there is another  fundamental 
question  to  be answered  - namely,  ~f  firm  control over  production 
costs at home  enhances  the country's competitive position and,  hence, 
its foreign  trade performance,  why  does  fluctuation in  the  exchange 
rate cancel  out or even negate  the resultant advantages  or disadvantages? 
Is it because  the  wage  cost  tre~~s for  the products  on which  a 
country's foreign  trade performance hinges differ from  tho.se  for 
industry as a  whole?  Or  is it because  there is  a  large range of 
products whose  competitiveness does  not depend  primarily on price, 
which would  normally be determin.ed  by  the costs  in one  way  or  another? 
Or  coul~ it be  that  the competitive position of  a  country depends  more 
on  the  ~ize and  state of health of  its economy  and  that wage  costs  in 
~tional currency  should  be  inter.preted  as  only one  indicator of 
health? 
Whatever  the  answer,  one  can appreciate  the  importance of  factors 
which are not directly linked  to.  costs  and  prices,  i.e. all  the 
qualitative factors  which affect a.  country's  foreign  trade.  What  is 
more,  these factors  seem  to  grqw,  in importance as  the products  become 
more distinctive and  more  sophis~icated, as  is  the case with  industrial 
machinery,  for  example. 
Finally,  perhaps  there is no  i~ediate link be tween  production costs 
and  prices.  If one accepts  th~·.t. prices on  the various world. markets 
are determined  by  supply  and  d.em~nd and  by  the other  special  features 
of  each market  (i.e.  demand  pat.ter,ns,  taxation and  so  forth),  i.t seems 
feasible  that firms  and  industr.i.es. from  certain countries might. 
achieve  good  results regardless  (to  some  extent)  of  their costs. 
Nevertheless  even  this  path leads. back  to  the  central  importance of 
cos~s.  Although  they might not have  a  direct influence on foreign 
trade performance,  in conjunc  tipn with prices  they affect the 
profitability of  production aruj.,  by  extension,  the  potential  for 
investment and  for  increasing productivity am,  ultimately,  the 
industry's  chances of  survival  and  of  competing  on world  markets. in· 
the  long  term. - 26  -
2.  Competitiveness  and  the  "Real"  Exchange  Rate 
Since  the  end  of  the  era of  fixed  exchange  rates  in  1972  both 
exchange rates  and  price  and  cost  inflation differentials have 
diverged  sharply.  Some  Community  countries have  become  aHsociated 
with relatively  low  rates of  inflation accompanied  by rising 
exchange  rates  - normally  Germany,  the Netherlands  and  Belgium/ 
Luxembourg  - whilst others have  experienced  relatively high  inflation 
rates  and  falling  exchange  rates  - namely  the  UK,  Italy and  Ireland. 
The  net effect of  these diverse movements  on  international cost  and 
price competitiveness has,  as  a  consequence,  been difficult  to  assess. 
A  number  of  technical  approaches  have  been developed  to  allow us  to 
measure  the  extent  to  which  movements  in the  exchange  rates  of  a 
currency  have  been offset by  (opposite)  movements  in its relative 
domestic  cost  and  price levels  (as  against its principal  competitors). 
These  measures  are often referred  to  as  indicators of  the  "real" 
exchange  rate of  a  currency,  or of  the cost and  price  competitiveness 
of  a  country. 
The  "real" exchange rate  1.s  of  course purely conceptual;  one  cannot, 
for  example,  hold  "real"  (in this  sense)  D-Marks.  There  are also 
considerable  technical difficulties  in their compilation and  interpretation. 
For  compilation one  needs,  ideally,  a  cost and  price  indicator of 
tradeable  goods  and  services;  such  indicators  do  not  exist and  therefore 
we  use  proxies  such  as  the wholesale prices  of  manufactured  goods  to 
reflect price competitiveness,  or unit  labour  costs  in manufacturing  to 
reflect cost  competitiveness.  The availability,  quality,  timeliness 
and  coverage of  these proxies vary  from  country  to  country  and  over  time. 
Interpretation of  the results  is restricted because  these  indicators 
of  "real" exchange  rates  can only  show  us  the magnitude  and  direction 
of  changes;  they tell  us  nothing about  the levels  of  the  ''real" 
exchange  rate  in itself.  Conclusions  about  the  appropriateness  of  the 
level  - and  indeed  the  changes  themselves  - are  the  product of  judgment. 
Nevertheless,  certain useful  conclusions  can be  drawn  from  an  examination 
of  the data  on price  competitiveness  (1),  based  on  the wholesale prices 
of  manufactures,  between  1970  and  1980  as  detailed  in the  table  below: 
Tablej1_: Changes  in "real" exchange  rates between  1970  and  1980 
Indicators  of  D  F 
Relative prices  -54  +5 
multiplied  by 
Effective  exchange 
rate 
equals 
"Real"  exchange 
rate 
+65  -2 
+  7  +3 
UK  I  NL 
percent 
+77  +98  -28 
-35  -96  +32 
+31  +  I  +  3 
B/L  DK  IRL  USA 
-41  -2  +29  +10 
+24  +2  -39  -26 
-14  +I  - 8  -16 
J 
-21 
+32 
+  7 
Note:  a  (+)  plus  sign means  that  the  "real" exchange  rate has  risen; 
a  (-)  negative  sign means  that  the  "real" exchange  rate has 
fallen. 
Source:  Commission  Services,  DC  II 
(1)  It has  become  a  convention  to  use  wholesale  prices  of manufacturing as 
the basis  for  a  "quick" estimate of  the  "real" exchange  rate;  however, 
other  cost  and  price indicators  can be  used,  and  tend  to tell  the 
same  story. - 27  -
In every case  the effective exchange rate has  moved  in the opposite 
direction  to relative prices. thereby  confirming  the view  that  the 
"real" exchange rate is more  stable in the  longer  term  than  the 
effective  (or  nominal)  exchange rate;  thus  the  exchange rate moves  to 
offset inflation differentials in  the  longer  term. 
However,  it is clear  that  these offsetting movements  have been 
incomplete  not only over  the  longer  term,  but  even more  so  during 
shorter periods. 
(a)  The  secular movements 
We  have already seen from  Table  12  that,  inter alia,  "real"  exchange 
rate movements  have  tended  to  be restrained by  nominal  or  effective 
e~charige rate movements  at least wheri  measured over  a  number  of years. 
The  problem is  that  any one  period  could  be  unrepresentative of  the 
general  development  of  a  "real" exchange rate.  It is  therefore useful 
to put  the period chosen into a  longer-term context where underlying 
economic  forces  have  had  time  to  "average-out"  the cyclical movements. 
For  this purpose  the  period  chosen is  the decade  of  the  1970's  (I). 
Table  13  below shows  the  indicator of  the "real"  exchange rates as 
compared  to  the average of  the  1970's  for  the Member  States  (excluding 
Greece),  the  USA  and  Japan. 
Table  13  "Real"  Rates  of  Exchange 
1970-1979  100 
D  F  UK  I  NL  B/L  DK  IRL  USA  J 
1970  92  102  100  103  94  102  82  104  114  92 
1980  99  105  131  104  97  90  93  97  96  98 
1981  90  100  131  99  93  82  89  94  111  103 
1981  Q4  91  99  124  98  96  81  92  98  112  1oo· 
Note:  a  rise in  the  index m·eans  an increase 1n  the "real" rate of 
exchange and  vice versa. 
Source:  Commission  Services,  DG  II. 
(I)  Although  this is an arbitrary period it includes  almost completely 
the  two  currency and  current external balance cycles  of  the D-Mark 
and  the Yen  whilst balancing  two  years  (1970  and  1971)  of  an "overvalued" 
with  two  years  (1978  and  1979)  of  an "undervalued"  US  dollar.  In 
addition  the  Community  as  a  whole  was  in broad  current external  equilibrium 
(with a  current.balance of  +0.1%  of  GDP)  over  that period. - 28  -
For  the  Community  as  a  whole  there have  been substantial gains  in 
price competitiveness between 1980  and  1981,  and  by  the  fourth  quarter 
of  1981  - the latest date for  which data is available - these  gains 
had  been retained.  Over  the  same  period  both  the  USA,  in particular, 
and  Japan had  lost price competitiveness. 
In the longer  term context it appears  that Germany,  the Netherlands, 
Belgium/Luxembourg,  Denmark  and  Ireland  (I)  are substantially more 
price competitive  than in  the  1970's whilst both  the  UK  and  the  USA 
have  lost out considerably on  this front.  For France,  Italy and  Japan 
little has  changed. 
(b)  The  cyclical movements 
There have  been  two  distinct cycles  in Community  and  world  exchange 
rates  in  the  1970's,  with both  the  D-Mark  and  the  Yen  tending  to rise 
strongly up  to  before  the first and  second oil price hikes  and  then 
experiencing  sharp falls.  These  movements  have  been particularly 
strong against  the  US  dollar.  In general  the  movements  of  the  D-Mark 
have  tended  to  take  the continental  European currencies  with it and  as 
a  consequence of all  this "real"  exchange rates  in  the  Community  - as 
measured  on a  quarterly basis  - have  tended  to  fluctuate  in a  wide 
band  frequently  exceeding  20%  in total during  the  period  1970  to  1980 
or  1981.  In addition  these movements  have  happened  rather  rapidly  and 
usually after periods  of relative stability,  such  that  the  "real" 
exchange rate may  move  by,  say,  5%  per  quarter  over  1  year or  so. 
To  illustrate the above  remarks it is useful  to  examine  the  developments 
since  1970  of  the  "real" D-Mark- the  second  most widely  held  and 
traded  currency after  the  US  dollar. 
The  "real"  exchange rate of  the  D-Mark  has  been  subjected  to  considerable 
swings during  the  period  from  1970  onwards  (see Graph  4).  On  the 
basis of  quarterly data  the  "real" rate has  seen rises of  17.5%  in 
4  quarters  - or  more  than  4%  per  quarter  - in  the  period  from  the 
third quarter of  1972  to  the  third  quarter  of  1973  - just before  the 
first oil price hike  - to  be followed  by  a  total  fall of  15.5%  in the 
9  quarters  to  the fourth quarter of  1975  -or about  1.5%  per  quarter. 
The  real rate  then drifted up  moderately at a  rate of  about  1%  per 
quarter  to  remain at a  rate within  5%  of  its average value  in  the 
1970's  from  the  fourth quarter of  1978  to  the  fourth  quarter  of  1979; 
thereafter it started its sharp fall  of  14%  -or more  than  2.5%  a 
quarter- in  the  5  quarters  to  early  1981.  The  real rate in  1981  was 
some  10%  below  the  average of  the  1970's  and  a  little lower  than  in 
1970  itself  . 
By  and  large  the "real
11  D-Mark  has  moved  within a  range of  (+)  plus 
13%  and  (-)  minus  13%  - a  total  range  of  26%  of  its average value  in 
the  1970's. 
(1)  This result has  to  be  interpreted with great care  since  Ireland has 
undoubtedly gained against  the  UK  but lost against its continental 
competitors. 110 
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GRAPH  4:  THE  REAL  DEUTSCH-MARK 
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The  German  experience of  a  strorigiy fluctuating  "real"  exchange  rate 
h3:s  beeri far  ftom  unique,  as  cari  be  seen from  the  table below which 
gives  the maximum  band  within which  the  quarterly  estimate~ o'f  i:h-e 
"real"  exchange rate indicators  H.ilve  fluctuated.  By  and  large 
E~top~an currencies have  tendea  ~o vary within a  total  band  of  about 
20%  - with  the  exception of  the  "teal" pound  sterling which,  due  to 
its recent rise,  has moved  about  within a  band  of  more  than  SO%.  The 
teiative instability of  the real doilar  and  yen  - at least in 
comparism with  the  non-sterling  Eutopean currencies -is to  be  noted. 
Table  14:  The  range of  the  "re:il  ii  exchange rate as  compared  to  the 
average of  1970-1979. 
1970-1981  percentages 
D  F  UK  I  NL  B/L  DK  IRL  USA  J 
Quarterly 
maximum  +13  +  7  +39  +10  +  8  +  4  +  8  +  6  +20  +23 
Quarterly 
minimum  -13  -12  -15  - 8  - 8  -18  -15  -11  -12  -15 
Total  range  26  19  54  18  16  22  23  17  32  38 
Source:  Commission  Services,  rJG  It - 30  -
The  implications  for  trade  and  competLtLveness  of  such  fluctuating 
real  exchange rates are difficult to measure  as  these more  violent 
movements  have  occurred  simultaneously with  new  shocks  to  the  world 
economy,  namely  the first and  second  oil price hikes,  divergent  and 
accelerating rates of  inflation and  a  world  wide rise in unemployment. 
Nevertheless it must be said that by  and  large  the direction of  these 
"real"  exchange rate movements  has  been consistent with underlying 
economLc  factors,  particularly  the  external  current balances. 
However,  it is sometimes  held  that  the equilibrating influence of  real 
exchange rate changes  has  been  thwarted  as  economic  agents  have  seen 
that "real" rate changes  have  not been  sustained  in even  the medium 
term  (say,  up  to  5  years)  and  have  been unwilling  to base  investment 
decisions on cost  and  price signals which may  turn against  them  just 
at the crucial moment.  Such  considerations  are particularly  important 
for  international competitiveness  with  large scale projects  that  take 
many  years  from  conception  to  completion. 
(c)  Short-term movements 
Short-term variations  in nominal  (or  effective)  exchange rates have 
increased  strongly in the past decade  as  the world  wide  system  of 
fixed  but adjustable exchange  rates  gave  way  to  floating rate regimes 
and  the  emergence of  ad  hoc  and  geographical  exchange rate arrangements. 
The  table below details  the  average  change  in  (effective)  exchange 
rates between  end  of months  for  the  three year  periods  1967-1969, 
1970-1972,  1973-1975,  1975-1978  and  for  the latest period  available 
1979-1980.  Full  calculations  for  1981  are not yet available. 
Table  15:  Mean  effective  exchange rate changes  - up  or  down  -
between end  of  months 
Percentages 
1967-69  1970-72  1973-75  1976-78  1979-80 
percent 
USA  0.30  0.49  2.35  1. 98  2.36 
D  0.58  0.60  2.23  1.88  1.86 
F  0.59  0.55  2.16  1. 70  1. 64 
UK  0.67  0.60  0.97  2.51  2.46 
I  0.33  0.44  1. 90  2.29  1.63 
NL  0.33  0.54  l.  98  l.  75  I.  61 
B/L  0.32  0.45  1.80  1. 71  1. 61 
JAPAN  0.30  0. 57  2.01  2.24  3.29 
SWEDEN  0.30  0.44  1.77  1.81  1.53 
SWITZER LAND  0.40  0.63  2.42  2.48  2.09 
CANADA  0.35  0.69  2.08  2.32  2.07 
Unweighted 
Average  0.42  0.56  2.06  2.06  2.02 
Source:  Commission  Services,  DG  II. - 31  -
It is clear that short-term variability of  exchange :rates  h'av~  -
increased  dramatically since  the  final  collapse of  tile  Bretton 'woods 
system. in  1972;  before  then  the  typical  change  in  exc'nahg~ ~a'te~ 
between end  of months  was  abo.ut  0. 5%  and  somewhat  less for  the us 
dollar which  remains  the inain  poi~t of  reference and  in wnic!'h  t'lle 
largest volumes  of  currency  transactions are conducted.  Since  1972 
currency variability has  quadrupled  to  2%  ·per  ni6ntli.  ·(;)n  av·erag~. (aiid 
indeed  in the first month  of  1981  exceeded  4%  per  moiiH1) .  As  th~ us 
dollar has  become  both absoluteiy am  relatively  (to  the  average  and 
the continental  European currencies)  more  unstable over  ti'i'tt~  .it has 
increased instability in  the parities of  the rest of  the  wo~'lci"'s  cU:rrenties. 
It is i_nteresting  to  note  tha·i::  the variability of 'the  EM·s  ·~urr'iineie·s 
since  .the  beginning of  the  exchange ra  t'e  arrangements. in sp,r'tng  nn9 
has  by  and  large been reduced  both absolutely  and  reLative  to  the 
average,  the  US  dollar  and  the Japanese  yen. 
Of  course,  when  inflation rates  proceed  at different ra  .. tes frojil  one 
country  to  another  one would  expect exchange rate va'riabili'ty 'to 
reflect the  normal  pattern of  the  exchange r·a·te  falling  to offset 
higher  inflation  r.~tes and  vice versa.  It could  be  arguea  that  the 
increased variability of  nominal  'Cor  effective)  e'xchang'e  .ra't~:s  as  in 
the  table reflects  these offsetdng price movements  and  that real 
exchange rates  (on  a  monthly basfs)  are  stable·,  both  in a'bsolufe  terms 
and  over  time.  Evidence does  not,  however,  bear  this out;  iridero  tire 
contrary is  the  case with inflation differentials being  reinfor'c'ed  by 
exchange rate changes  on balance. 
Table  16  details  the  same  informa~don as  aoove  but with  exchan;ge rate 
changes  adjusted  for  inflation  r~t'e diffe'rentiais. 
Table  16:  Mean real exchange rate changes  - up  or  down  -
·between  end  of  months 
1967-69  1970-72  1973-75  1976-78  1979...;80 
Percentages 
D  1.09  0. 77  2.46  I.  96  2.12 
F  1.27  0.90  2. 10  2.76  2.87 
I  . 0.80  0.67  2. 16  2.23  1.87 
NL  0.96  0.  9}5  2.26  2.00  2.02 
B/L  0.81  0. 76  2.01  1.86  1.81 
USA  0.77  0.7 5  2.66  2.12  2.64 
JAPAN  0.81  0.83  2.35  2.27  3.23 
SWIDEN  0.74  o. 72  I.  94  2.06  l.  73 
CANADA  0.82  0.80  2.42  2.38  2.29 
Unweighted 
Average  0.96  0.82  2.29  2.24  2.25 
Source:  Commission  Services,  DG  ti. - 32  -
III.  The  Evidence  from  Industry 
As  we  have  seen from  the  previous  chapter,  the  Community  is  the 
largest  trading area  in  the world  accounting  for  19%  of  world  exports 
and  20%  of  world  imports  in  1980,  even after  domestic  inter-State 
trade has been excluded.  Furthermore,  the  share of  world  trade  in 
manufactured  products  is  even higher,  26,5%  in  1980  compared  with  16% 
for  the USA  and  14%  for  Japan.  In  1980  84%  of  the  Community's  exports 
were  manufactured  products.  Which  is why  this report focusses  on  the 
structure and  performance of manufacturing  industry.  This  point of 
view is inevitably  incomplete  in  so  far  as  agricultural  exports  are a 
significant element  in  the  Community's  trade,  and  because  the 
development of  tertiary or  services activities  is  becoming  an 
increasingly  important fact  in  the development of  the domestic 
economy.  However,  for  the  time being,  and  indeed  for  the  foreseeable 
future,  the international competitive position of  the  Community's 
economy  will  depend  overwhelmingly on  the  performance of  manufacturing 
industry. 
In this part of  the report,  we  examine  the  structure of  manufacturing 
industry in  the  Community,  the  resources  used  in industry,  particularly 
capital  and  labour,  from  a  quantitative,  and  where  possible,  a 
qualitative point of view. 
This  assessment is inevitably not exhaustive  because  the  competitiveness 
of a  firm  is very much  affected  by  the  technology  incorporated  in its 
capital  equipment,  by  the  education and  training of  its  employees  and 
by  its management  and  financial  structure.  There  is  no  simple way  of 
measuring  and relating the  effects of  these different factors  (1). 
A.  The  Structure of  Industry in  the  Community 
In  the first place it is useful  to  have  an overall picture of  the  size 
and  structure of  industry in  the  Community,  and  the  relative  importance 
of  the principal  sectors  in each Member  State.  Manufacturing  industry 
accounts  for  about  30%  of  GDP  in  the  Community;  this  share  has  been 
rather  stable since  1970.  The  largest sectors  in  1979  were,  the 
agricultural  industries  (food,  beverages  and  tobacco)  which  accounted 
for  14%  of value  added  in manufacturing,  and  chemicals,  metal 
products,  industrial machines,  electrical goods  and  transport 
equipment,  accounting  for  9-10%  each. 
The  shares of  the different  sectors  in total value  added  in manufacturing 
industry have  changed  slowly during  the  1970's.  A few  sectors  such  as 
chemicals  and  transport equipment have  increased  in relative  importance, 
whereas  textiles,  leather  and  clothing  have  declined  quite rapidly  and 
food,  beverages  and  tobacco  declined  more  slowly. 
Value  added  in comparatively advanced  sectors  such as  industrial 
machines,  office machines  and  electrical goods  have  grown rather  more 
slowly,  than one might  have  been expected,  considering  the above-averqge 
rate of  growth  of  investment  in  these  sectors. 
(1)  See  Research  on Productivity Growth  and  Productivity Difference, 
R.R.  Nelson,  Journal of  Economic  Literature,  September  1981,  for  a 
review of  recent literature on  this  subject. - 33  -
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~l1  ll&nW'aohr!!!l indUIIt!Z  in the C-unitz 3l;  •!!l~~ a!!d  lt-.ber States in 1212 
(Peroordaaes) 
Community 
(a)  • 
Value  added in 
manuf'aotured  100.%  (b)  3.77 
product.  a 
of wb.ioh  1 
Metallic minerals  5.66  0.)1 
No~atallio minerals  5·79  0.23 
Chemicals  9-48  0.41 
Metal  products  9-25  o. 32 
Industrial machines  9-77  0.)2 
Office. machines  2.98  o.o1 
3lectrical goods  9.08  0.)3 
Transport  equipment  9.91  0,)3 
Food,  beverages and 
tobacco  14.12  0.60 
Textiles,  leather  8.7.:\  0.))  goods,  clothing 
Paper and  pap~r  6.24  0.20  products 
Rubber  and plastic 
3.72  o.u  products 
other. manuf11.9tured,  5.28  0.25  products 
(a)  Not  1no1uciin8 De.nmark1  Ireland and Greece 
. (b)  100 %  a  493.5 billion ECU 
(3~8 billion ECU,  1975  prices) 
~  J1'  I 
)6.23  22.96  14.62 
2.04  l.  23  0.90 
2.19,  1.27  1.03 
).  74;  2.11  1,20 
3.96  2.57  1.09 
4-59  1.66  1.08 
1.49  0.59  0.23 
4.18.  l.  69  0.99 
).16  ).28  0.99· 
4-75  ).65  1. 90 
2.20  1.89  2. 73 
2.37  1.21  0.88 
1.66  o. 11·  0.58 
1.89·  1.04  1.21 
HL  ~ 
4  .• 20.  16.01 
0.16  1.00 
0.23  0,,82 
0,6)  l.  39. 
0,)§  0.95 
0,))  1.77 
0,06  0~60 
0.49  1.40 
0.24.  1.89 
o.n  2.49 
0.18,  1.41 
0.44  1.13 
0,10  0.50 
0.24  0.65 
Nota  :  Data in nat.ional  currencies converted to ECU  at ourr;ent  emb.ange  rates before calculation of percentage 
Source  1  EUROSTAT  +  DG  II 
Table  17  shows  the structure of  industry in  the Member  States in 1979. 
The  most striking feature is  the wide distribution of activities. among 
the Member  States.  Tndividual  sec tors  in individual  Member  States  aL·e 
by-and-large quite small  in rela.ti.on  to  the overall  position. 
At  the  given level of  disaggreg~tion,  no  individual  sector in any  one  Member 
State accounts  for  more  than 5%.of  value added  in manufacturing  in the 
Community.  On  the  other hand  six, sectors  in Germany  account  for  more  than 
2.  5%  of value added  in manufactur.ing;  three  in France and  only one  in Italy. 
A very  large proportion of  total. manufacturing activity is  in Germany 
(38%),  followed  by  France  (23%) '· the United Kingdom  (16%)  ~nd by  Italy: 
(15%). - 34  -
B.  Resources  and  the Factors of  Production 
I.  Investment in Manufacturing  Industry 
Total  gross  investment in the  Community  economy  is of  the order  of  20% 
of  GDP.  However,  investment  in manufacturing  industry is only about 
3%  of  GDP.  Thus  it is a  small,  if crucial  component of  domestic 
product.  The  indications are  that it is  stagnating  in the  Community 
compared  with continued  growth  in Japan. 
The real measure of  the capital  used  in industry  is  the  stock of 
capital.  This  is determined  not only by  the rate of  investment,  but 
by  the  cumulative results of  past  investment.  However,  the  measures 
of  capital  stock are at best very approximate  because its amortisation  (1) 
has  to  be  estimated  and  because definitions differ between countries  (2). 
Table  18  compares  investment  in manufacturing  in  the  Community  with 
Japan and  the  United  States  for  the years  1970,  1975  and  1979.  In 
recent years  the relative positions have  been similar,  although 
Japan's  leading position was  even more  striking during  the  1960's. 
Table  18:  Investment  in  Manufacturin~ 
(1975  prices  and  exchange rates) 
Com;,tunity  Japan  USA 
1970  1975  1979  1970  1975  1979  1970  1975 
Total  investment 
billion ECU  229  236  263  1 1  I  131  170  202  201 
percent of  GDP  24%  22%  21%  35%  32%  33%  18%  16% 
Manufacturin~ investment 
percent of  GDP  5.2%  3.8%  3.0%  9.6%  6. 1%  5.2%  2.8%  2.1% 
percent of  total 
investment  23%  18%  15%  27%  19%  16%  13%  13% 
billion ECU 
(approx.)  53  42  39  30  25  27  26  26 
Sources:  US  National  Accounts  ERA-Aggregates 
Japan - Economic  Planning Agency 
EUROSTAT. 
This data  shows  up  the higher  level  of manufacturing  investment  ~n 
1979 
255 
17% 
2.6% 
14% 
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Japan  in relation to  the  size of  their  economy,  with  the result that  the 
stock of  capital  in Japanese manufacturing  industry has rapidly caught up 
with  the  Community  and  the United  States. 
(1)  i.e.  the rate at which  existing capital  is being  used  up  or  scrapped. 
(2)  The  widespread,  but  by  no  means  uniform practice of  leasing factories 
and  equipment  affects  the  comparability of  investment  and  capital  stock 
data  in manufacturing  industry. - 35  -
Table  19:  Manufacturing  Investment  1n  the  Community  (b) 
Volume  Index,  1975  - 100 
Billion 
ECU 
1975  70  75  76  77  78  79  80 
F.R.  Germany  13.33  146  100  i66  to's  108  I  i 9  i2'7 
France  10.06  103  100  168  102  r·oo 
Italy  6. 72  11 0  100  97  98  91  100  .. 
Netherlands (a)  2.20  113  100  90  104  108  105  .. 
Belgium  2.21  99  100  88  73  71  72 
Luxembourg  0.13  117  100  80  106 
U.K.  6.09  116  100  95  100  107  11 i  100 
Ireland  0.38  74  100  99  102  i36 
(a)  Netherlands:  including  energy  arid  construction 
(b)  Denmark:  not available 
Source:  Eurostat 
In recent years,  manufacturing  investment has  not been a  buoyant 
element in  the  Community  economy.  Table  19  shows  the well-known 
substantial differences between  the Member  States,  arid  unimpressive 
trends with  the exception of  the Federal Republic  and  - on a  different 
scale  - Ireland.  Among  the  larger  Member  States,  the absolute level 
of manufacturing  investment in France  arid  Germany  is about  twice  as 
high as it is  in Italy and  the  U.K. 
The  low and,  in several  Member  States,  the stagnant or  declining level 
of manufacturing  investment is not just a  reflection of  the recession 
since  1975.  There has  also  been a  shift in all major  industrialised 
areas,  including  the  Community,  t.dwards  service activities,  and  the 
level of  investment  in certain established  capital  intensive industries 
has  been declining  {steel,  chem:ic'iiis,  refining etc.),  whereas  the 
technological  improvements  of  m~cio-elec  tronics applications,  for 
example,  permit  substantial  pro'ducHvity  improvements  in certain 
activities with relatively little investment. 
Three  sectors account  for  40%  of  all manufacturing  investment  in  the 
Community  { 1):  Chemical  products·,  Transport  equipment  and  Fo6d, 
beverages  and  tobacco.  Among  the  Member  States,  in  1978,  the Federal 
Republic  accounted  for  about  35%  of manufacturing  investment and 
France,  I~aly and  the United  Kingdom  together  for  about  52%. 
Table  20  shows  the distribution of  manufacturing  investment  by Member 
State and  sector in  1978. 
(1)  Not  including Luxembourg,  Irelaifd,  Denmark  and  Greece,  for  which  the 
data is not  available on  this hasi's. I 
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TABLE  20  MANUFACTURING  INVESTMENTS  BY  MEMBER  STATE  AND  BRANCH  (1978) 
percent  of  total  manufacturing  investments<al 
Sector  TOTAL(a) 
EUR/6 
D 
Manufacturing  Inv.estment s  1  OOY.  38.64 
;.~f>tall ic  ,,in-::-r  ~~:;  7.78  2.02 
i1on-metallic  miner~ls  7.14  i  3.08 
Chemical  products  14.75 
I  4. 81 
I  f·letdl  proo•Jcts  6.48  2.91 
Agricul.  and  industr.  machines  7.89  3.59 
Office  machines  3.64  1. 58 
Electrical  goods  7.85  3.41 
Transport  equipment  12.33  4.94 
Food,  beverages,  tobacco  13.43  4, 76 
Textile,  clothing,  leather  4.76  1. 55 
Paper,  Printing  products  5.94  2.32 
Rubber,  Plastic  products  3.17  1. 53 
Other  manufactur.  products  4. c\3  2.16 
(a)  Not  including  Denmark,  Ireland  and  Greece 
(a)  NACE  R25 
Source:  EUROSTAT  81  National  Accounts  by  Branch 
<current  prices,  current  exchange  rates) 
r•lember  States 
F  I  N  8  UK 
22.66  13.34  6.15  3.68  15.53 
2.13  1.68  (), 18  0.20  1.58 
1. 63  0.99  0.45  0.35  0.66 
2.56  2.06  1. 52  0.72  3.09 
1. 56  11.78  0.34  0.16  0.75 
1.41  1.00  0.25  0.24  1.41 
1. 52  0.22  0.09  0.00  0.23 
1.67  0.96  0.55  0.19  1.06 
3.25  1.88  0. 28  0.22  1. 75 
3.03  1.20  1.45  0.72  2.28 
0.90  1. 09  0.18  0.23  0.82 
1. 29  0.57  0.47  0.30  0.99 
0.73  0.49  0.11  0.13  0.18 
0.97  o. 43  0.28  0.23  0. 76 
--
Note:  100X  53.79  bill  ions  ECU 
For  the  same  sectors  and  countries  the  trends  in manufacturing 
investment are presented  in Table  21  in  the  form  of  average  annual 
rates of  change. 
The  changes  in  the rate of  investment by  sector are of  interest 
because  they are  a  direct indication of  changes  in industrial 
structure which  may  not yet be  apparent  in  the  structure of  value 
added  and  exports.  The  data  has  to  be  treated  with  caution because 
small  and  fluctuating  changes  do  not necessarily reveal  a  definite 
trend.  That  is why  in Table  21  the  rates  of  change  which are not 
significant have  been put  in brackets.  Notwithstanding  these 
uncertainties,  certain definite  trends  do  emerge,  particularly for 
the  Community  as  a  whole. - 37  -
..!.Jl..S~~-~_I_N  _  _!i_M_~l£Fii:_~U_RING_INVESTME_N_Ts  _  _u.!. ..  B.I_l_A_fiiS_ii_E2 
Averaye  annual  changes  for  the  period  19i'O  - 1979 
D  NL  B  ,__ _________ ----------·  -
UK 
ferrous  & non-ferrous  ores & metals, 
other  than  radio-active 
-4.4  (-2.6)  -5.8  -10.8  -8.4  (+1.7)  (-2.7) 
Non-metallic  minerals  and  mineral  products 
Chemical  products 
(-2.5)  2.5  (-0.2)  4.0  (0.4)  +34.7  (-1.5) 
(0.5)  (-1.1)  <-2.5)  -3.4  (0.8)  (-3.6)  <1.0) 
~etal products,  except  machinery 
& transport  equipment  (0.8l  -4.4 
Agricultural  and  industrial  machinery  (0.5)  5.7 
Office & data  processing  machinec,  precision 
& optical  instruments  2.1  4.9 
Electrical  goods 
Transport  equipment 
food,  beverage•,  tobacco 
Textile & clothing,  leather  and  footwc~r 
Paper  & printing products 
2.7 
z.o 
co.n 
-3.7 
( 1. 5) 
5.4 
4.6 
(0.1) 
-6.6 
co. 5) 
3.4 
3.6 
<3.6) 
7.3 
( 1. 6) 
2.3 
2.5 
2.0 
Rubber  & plastic products  (-1.2)  -5.7  -4.2 
Other  manufacturing  products  <-0.9)  (-0.6)  3.1 
{0.2)  -15.1 
1.6  ( 5.0)  ( 
< 1. 5l 
C-1. 5l 
5.3 
-3.5 
5.2 
( 2) 
co. 7) 
3.6 
6.2 
-6.4 
(4 .8) 
( 
(0) 
+24 
-19.8 
(-0.8) 
-15 
+37 
5.9  3.6  -20.4 
5.5  <-0.6J  C+1.Bl 
(0.2l 
2.1 
(1.0) 
1.7 
<2. 5l 
(0.6) 
-6.6 
<l.OJ 
-9.8 
(0. 5) 
Note:  The  brac~~ts indicate  that  the  correlation  coefficient  in  the  linear  regression  is  low. 
(a)  Greece  and  Denmark  excluded 
Source:Commission  Ge~vf.ces.  DC:  Irr,  ba~cd on 
National  Accounts  by  Uranches 
EUROSTAT  1981 
EC  (a) 
-3.65 
-1.95 
(0.44) 
(-0.58) 
1.92 
3.27 
3.21 
2.43 
1.48 
-1,.1 
(0. 77) 
-3.3 
(Q) 
Thus  it appears  that considerable  adjustment  has  in fact  been taking 
place in  the relative importance of  the branches,  in  terms  of 
investment effort.  In several  cases  the  structural aqjustments 
implied  by  such changes  are quite salient,  particularly  the decline in 
investment in textiles and  clothing and  rubber  and  plastics  industries. 
On  the other  hand,  investment has definitely been rising rapidly in 
office equipment  and  electrical  goods.  It is also  likely that  investment 
in metal  industries has  been declining  and  investment  in transport 
equipment  has  been rising at about  the rates  indicated in Table  21. 
In  this context  the overall  movements  in the rate of  investment make 
sense  in  terms of what  we  know  about  the  general  direction of 
structural change  in Community  inqustry.  There are,  however,  striking 
differences  in particular  sectors  in individual Member  States,  such as 
the dramatic decline in  investmen~ in the metals  industries in the 
Netherlands,  the modest  UK  performance  in office and  electrical goods. 
an  growing  investment  in textiles. and  clothing in Italy. 
Over  time,  the effect of very different rates of  investment result  i~ 
different capital stock in  the manufacturing  industries of different 
countries,  illustrated in Table '22. - 38  -
Table  22:  Manufacturing  CaEital  Stock  in the  Community,  USA,  JaEan 
at constant  1970  prices  and  exchange rates 
(buildings  and  equipment) 
Capital  Stock  Average  rate  Capital  Stock 
in Manufacturing  of  increase  per  employee(b) 
1970  1975  1965-70  1970-75  1970  1975 
(billion ECU)  (percent  per  year)  (thousand  ECU) 
Belgium  15.5  20.8  6.5  6. 1 
Germany  121 . 6  159.5  6.5  5.6 
France  75.8  100.2  5.2  5.7 
Italy  55.6  71.1  3.9  5.0 
Netherlands  19.5  25.5  7.8  5.5 
U.K.  71.4  83.4  4.2  3.2 
Connnuni ty (a)  359.1  460.4  5.4  5. 1 
USA  323.8  375.0  4.2  3.0 
Japan  103.5  171. 1  14.0  10.6 
Sources:  Commission Services,  DG  III based  on: 
- Deutsches  Institut fur  Wirtschaftsforschung,  Berlin 
Evaluation of  Gross  Fixed  Capital  Stock,  Nov.  79 
13 
13 
15 
12 
1  7 
9 
12 
17 
9 
- US  Department  of  Commerce  - Survey  of  Current Business,  Feb.  81 
- Economic  Planning  Agency  Tokyo 
Private  Corporate  Capital  Stock,  March  81. 
(a)  Data  not available for  Luxembourg,  Denmark,  Ireland  and  Greece. 
20 
19 
18 
15 
25 
1  1 
16 
21 
15 
(b)  Order  of  magnitude,  rounded  to  nearest  thousand  ECU  per  person  employed. 
The  calculation of  the  level  of  capital  stock is at best very  approximate 
because of  the  assumptions  which  have  to  be  made  about amortisation 
rates,  and  some  differences which arise purely  from  different economic 
structures  (1).  On  the other hand,  the  comparison of  the rate of 
growth of  capital  stock is probably a  more  reliable indicator.  The 
estimates  of  capital stock per  employed  person are also of  interest as 
an indication of  the capital intensity of  manufacturing  industry. 
The  most  striking indication from  this data is  the very rapid  growth 
in the capital stock  in Japan.  This,  combined  with  the high rate of 
return  to assets  employed  in Japanese  industry,  combine  in providing 
the basis  for  the  substantial  growth  in Japanese productivity and 
output. 
(1)  For  example,  a  small  country with  a  large steel or refining  industry 
will  tend  to  have  a  high capital  stock per  employee. - 39  -
On  the other hand,  the data  suggest  that capital  employed  per  emp~oyee 
in American  industry has  been  S,tagnating  since  the mid-1970'S,  and 
that an analagous  situation .prevails  i~ most of  the Member  StatfO!S· 
The  low level  and  slow increase  in the  United  Kingdqm  is particularly 
preoccupying  for  a  substantially  indu~trialised country. 
This  information is available  for  USA  and  Japan up  t9  1979,  pu~  1975 
is the most  recent year  for  which  the  data  is  availabl~ for all the 
large Member  States.  The  partial data available for  mor~ recent years 
suggests' that the rate of  growth  of manuf(lcturing capital  sto,ck  slowed 
down  considerably after  1975  in  the  Community  and  in  Jap~n. 
An  indicator of  the efficiency with which  the capital  stock is being 
used  is  the partial measure  of productivity of  Cqpital,  d~fined as  the 
ratio of value  added  to  the  amount  of  capital  stock  employed.  The 
resu~ts of  calculations related  to  this  indicator are  summarised 
below. 
Table  23:  Capital  Productivity of  the Manufacturing  Industry 
(Value Added/Gross  Capital  Stock  - 1975  ~rices 
1965  1970 
Germany  60.2  56.9 
]france  40.4  45.9 
Italy  36.3  46.5 
Netherlands  40.3  37.9 
Belgium  37.7  37.6 
UK  45.7  42.5 
Community(a)  46.9  48. 1 
USA  84.4  76.2 
JAPAN  54.6  61.6 
19-75 
4.5,.  7-
43. 1 
4.0,.5 
3,2 .. 0: 
34  .. 0 
3.7.2 
41.. 4 
69 .• 9 
47-.5 
··~ 
1976 
47.0 
44.3 
J3.0 
35.5 
37.7 
74. 1 
51.5 
1977 
44.3 
33.2 
37.1 
76.4 
52.8 
1978 
.  .. 
4.3. 8 
36.7 
77 .o 
54.7 
(a)  Not  including Denmark,  Irela~~,,  Luxembourg  and  Greece 
Source:  See  Table  22. 
2.  International  Investment  Flows 
1979 
'  . 
76.0 
56.9 
The  level  and  characteristics of  investment are affected  by  the  size 
and  direction of  international  investment  flows.  However,  there is no 
direct and  simple relationship beb.reen international  investment arrl 
competitiveness.  Although  there  is. obviously  some  link between the 
international  location decisions, of. multinational  companies  and  their 
expectations  as  to  the  compe ti  ti  v.e11ess  of  their new  inves,tmen ts,  many 
other factors  come  into  play  such.as  the  location of  existing plant, 
governments'  incentive policies  and  the  socio-economic  climate  in  the 
country concerned.  Suffice  ther,e_fore  to  illustrate in Taple  24 - 40  -
the relative importance of  international  investment  flows  and  from  the 
Community,  Japan and  the  USA.  In economic  terms  such  flows  mean  an 
increase or  decrease  in financial  resources available domestically, 
and  can lead  to  an  intensification of  competition on domestic  and 
international markets. 
Table  24:  International  Investment Flows  as  a  % of  GDP 
EC-9 
us 
Japan 
EC-9 
us 
Japan 
(1)  1978 
Inward 
Outward 
direct investment 
1970 
.58 
. 15 
.OS 
direct  investment 
.54 
.74 
. I 7 
Sources:  Community  Services,  DG  II 
1975 
.48 
. 1  7 
.04 
.55 
.94 
.35 
1979 
. 45  (1) 
.33 
.03 
. 66  (1) 
1.05 
.27 
1980 
.42 
.03 
.7 2 
-.12 
Assessing  the role of  international  investment is  further  complicated 
by  the fact  that  the data for  the  Community  does  not distinguish 
adequately  the level of  international  investment in manufacturing 
industry,  nor  does it separate domestic  flows  between Member  States 
from  international flows. 
3.  Technology and  Innovation 
Changes  in  the  quantity of  factors  of  production and  their relative 
proportions  employed  in the  economy  will determine  the  growth  and 
productivity of  the  economic  system  in  the  short run,  but  from  the 
point of  view of  the competitiveness  of  modern  industrial economies, 
changes  in the quality of  the factors  of  production are more  important 
in the medium  term. 
Thus  it  is  the level of  knowledge applied  in the  economy  both  through 
technology  embodied  in equipment,  and  through  the  individual  and 
collective skills of  working  people,  which  is becoming  increasingly 
determinant. - 41  -
Improvements  in  the  level of  industrial  technology manifest  themselves 
in three main ways:  firstly,  in  the  introduction of  new  products  or 
improvements  in existing products;  secondly,  improvements  in the 
production process;  and  thirdly,  improvements  in the human  organisation 
of  the production process.  The  overall  process  of  introducing  these 
changes  ~n a  commercially successful way  has  to  come  to  be  known  as 
innovation  (I). 
This  crucial  process  of  innovation is very complex  in a  mature 
industrial  society.  The  Commission has  recently undertaken a  thorough 
analysis of  the relationship between innovation and  public policies 
with a  view  to  providing  the basis for  encouraging  - and  removing 
obstacles- to  innovation in  the future  (2). 
There is little evidence  that  the  shortcomings  of  Community  industry's 
comparative  advantage for  high  technology products  (3)  result  from  a 
deficiency in fundamental  research.  Although Europe  has  lost its lead 
in  this area  to  the  US  since World  War  II,  total  R and  D expenditure 
in the  Community  is still twice as  high as  in Japan,  even  ·though  this 
expenditure fell  as  a  proportion of  GDP  during  the  1970s.  A cons"iderable 
amount  of  R and  D in the  US  and  the  Community  is spent on  space  and 
defence  so  that its effects on commercial  life are haphazard.  If one 
considers  only economically-oriented R and  D in  terms  of  share of  GDP, 
the approximate  figures  are  1. 7%  in  the  US  and  EC  and  2%  in Japan. · 
Contrary  to  trends  in  the  US  and  EC,  the Japanese  share is rising. 
Table  25:  Government  financed  R and  D in  the  Community  as  % of  GDP 
D  F  I  NL  B  UK  IRL  DK  EC 
1970  0.96  1.23  0.46  0.93  0. 77  1. 24  0.34  0.55  0.98 
1975  1.23  1.17  0.36  0.96  0.73  1.27  0.44  0.58  1.04 
1980  1.14  1.13  0.47  0.97  0. 62  I • 1  I  0.49  0.45  0.98 
Source:  EUROSTAT 
Examination of  these  trends  shows  ·that a  high level  of  R and  D 
expenditure on its own  does  not necessarily lead  to  a  faster  growth of 
welfare in a  country nor  greater performance on world markets.  The 
explanation would  appear  to lie in a  more  complex  mosaic  of  economic 
and  social factors,  including production and  quality control, 
marketing  and  design. 
(I)  See also  "Innovation et politiques  economiques"  in "Ref lets et 
Perspectives de la vie  economique",  1981,  for  a  discussion of  the 
relationship between innovation and  industrial development. 
(2)  Innovation- Development  of  action,  DG  XIII- SEC(81)1859,  24.11.81. 
(3)  See  section II.B.  on Industrial Specialisation,  above. - 42  -
4.  Energy as  a  factor of  production 
The  central  importance  of  energy  for  the  economic  health of  the 
Community  is not in doubt,  and  the  Commission has  argued  that 
policies  (I)  to  accelerate  the  process  of  adjustment  to  high oil 
prices,  and  to  reduce  dependence on imported oil,  are an essential 
condition for  economic  recovery.  At  this point,  however,  policy 
makers  encounter  a  dilemma. 
On  the  one hand,  there  is mounting  recogn1 t1on  that  the price 
mechanism  is an essential component  of  policies for  structural change. 
On  the other  hand,  policy proposals  that seek  to  accelerate structural 
change via the price mechanism,  for  example  by  increasing  taxes  on 
oil,  encounter vigorous objections  from  indus try  that Govermnent  is 
seeking  to  exacerbate its crisis of  competitiveness  by deliberately 
placing it at a  disadvantage in relation  to  industry elsewhere. 
This  part of  the report  therefore  focusses  on  the  impact of  the  energy 
situation on  the  competitive performance  of  industry.  Energy  is 
viewed  here as  a  factor of  production,  and  the  questions wpich arise 
are:  how  important a  contribution does  energy make  to  overall costs? 
What  will be  the cost of  energy  to  industry in Europe  compared  to 
competitor countries?  How  great is  the  scope  for  substitution of 
labour  and  capital for  energy? 
(a)  The  contribution of  energy  to  overall  costs 
There has  been a  marked variation in  the  price increases  experienced 
in different  energy  sectors.  Table  26  gives  an indication of  the real 
increase in prices  in  the  four  main  energy  sec tors  for  four  Member 
States. 
Table  26:  1980  Index of  real  increase  in 2rices  1973  100 
Germany  France  Italy  UK 
Coal  (200)  (200)  (200)  (200) 
Oil  288  385  338  238 
Gas  159-222  209-290  295-311  136-179 
Electricity  1"13  123  158  110 
Source: 
11Energy Pricing  - Policy and  Transparency
11  COH(81)539 
These  figures,  which are representative of  those  for  other Member 
States,  suggest  in broad  terms  that in  the period  1970-1980 prices of 
industrial oil have risen by  a  factor  of  three or  four,  those for  coal 
and  gas  have doubled,  while electricity prices  have risen only 
slightly in real  terms. 
(1) 
11Energy  and  Economic  Policy
11  (COM(81)583)  and  in "The  Development of 
an  Energy Strategy for  the  Community"  (COM(81)540). - 43  -
In  1970,  energy costs accounted  for more  than  10%  of  total direc€ and 
indirect costs  in only six sectors of  which one  (transpprt services) 
is subject to  international competition in a  strictly  limit~d sense. 
In  the other five  sectors,  oil products  account for  a  significant 
share of  total costs,  but in none  of  them  is oil dominant. 
Table  27:  Energy  intensive industries 
Paper 
Building materials 
Chemicals 
Steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Estimated  energy content 
of total cost  1980 
15.05 
23.07 
15.02 
22.43 
16.50 
Source:  Commission  Services,  DG  XVII,  based  on  1970  input-output 
coefficients. 
Energy costs have risen  to  over  10%  of  total costs  ~n the course of 
the  1970's  in eight sectors of  wbich one,  w~ter supply,  is D;Ot  subject 
to  international  compe tl. twn,  and  .;mother  (cons true  tion)  is  sub j.ec t  to 
competition only in a  limited  se~se. 
Table  28:  Moderate  energy  - consuming  sec tors 
Textiles 
Rubber  and  plastics 
Construction 
Minerals 
Engineering 
Automobiles 
Est~mated energy  content 
of  total cost  1980 
% 
Other  transport construction, 
12.22 
12.73 
11 • 07 
12.54 
11 . 78 
10.59 
11 • 11 
Source:  See  Table  27. 
The  general  conclusion is that  even  in energy-intensive  sectors, 
energy represents  a  relatively m9qest proportion of  total costs; 
any disadvantages  suffered  through. high  and  rising energy costs  in 
Europe  are  in general  no  greater  ~han companies  should  be  able  to 
absorb  through  increases  in  produ~tivity. 
However,  there are  individual  processes within sectors  that are 
immensely  energy-intensive  and  wh~re energy costs are of critical 
importance  to  the cost of  the process as  a  whole.  Particular mention 
should be made  of  aluminium  smel ti!lg  where  electricity accounts  for 
be tween half  and  three-quarters of,  direct costs;  the  same  is  true of 
certain bulk chemicals,  especiall,y alkalis;  in  the construction sec tor 
certain ceramic materials  are very, energy-intensive,  and  cement 
manufacture  involves an energy content of  around  50%  of  total direct 
costs. - 44  -
(b)  Energy  pr~ces 
Changes  in energy  prices are of  equal  importance  to  their absolute 
level in any  analysis of  the  impact of  energy on  the  competitive 
position of  the  economy.  Unfortunately,  here  too it is  impossible  to 
draw  any meaningful  comparism  between  the  situation in the  individual 
industrialised countries  for  want  of  harmonised  statistics covering 
them all. 
Table  29  below lists the  1980  indices  for  the  nominal  energy prices 
and  for  the actual  prices for all  three consumer  sectors,  i.e. 
industry,  transport and  the domestic  sector  (1973  = 100).  The  OECD 
indices for Japan and  the United  States  have  also  been added. 
However,  they  cannot be  compared  directly with  those  for  the Community. 
Table  29:  Energy  12rice  indices  in  1980 
Current  prices  Constant  1973  prices 
Industry  Transport  Domestic  Industry  Transport  Domestic 
sec tor  sec tor 
D  187  161  186  135  11 7  135 
F  303  282  271  142  138  132 
I  639  375  433  210  123  140 
NL  290  194  266  178  119  163 
B  248  214  206  149  129  123 
UK  374  330  268  127  112  96 
Source:  EUROSTAT 
Very broadly  speaking,  the real after-tax prices  for  energy have moved 
as  follows: 
(i)  in every country,  the  prices  of  the energy products  for  individual 
consumption have risen faster  than  the prices  to  the  other 
sectors; 
(ii)  in most  cases,  the  prices of  the  products  for  consumption by 
domes tic households,  or by  the residential  and  tertiary sec tor, 
have  seen average  increases; 
(iii)  in many  countries,  the  increase  in energy  prices  to  the  transport 
sec tor  has been relatively modest  because  of  the  special  tax 
concessions  for motor  fuel; 
(iv)  Finally,  although  there have  been appreciable  increases  in the 
real prices after  tax,  the average annual  increase remained 
between  6%  and  7%  between  1973  and  1980,  which  is still not 
enough  to  impose  any  great constraints on most  sec tors of 
industry,  where  energy still accounts  for  less  than  7%  of  the 
production costs. 
OECD  data on  energy prices  shows  comparable  trends  for  the  USA  and  Japan 
up  to  1980  when  the series was  discontinued because it contained  serious 
methodological floo:r:s.  Throughout  the  1980's oil  and  gas  prices  in Canada 
and  the  USA  were  controlled at levels well  below  those prevailing elsewhere. 
But oil prices  in the  US  were decontrolled  in  1981  and  have  moved  sharply 
up  to world  levels.  Gas  prices  are  to  be decontrolled  in  1985. 
Canada is  the only  OECD  country which  now  holds  both  oi~ and  gas  prices 
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Japan and  the  Newly  Industrialisi~g Countries  are  (with  the  exception 
qf  Indonesia)  generally rather more dependent on imported oil  thart  the 
Community.  Energy prices  in Japan are in general  comparable  to  those 
prevailing in the  Community. 
(c)  Energy  and  competitiveness 
On  the strength of  the above  analysis  one  would  not expect energy  to 
have  exe~cised an important  inflven~~ on  the  Community's market share, 
except in  the  energy  intensive sectors.  In  these  sectors one  would 
expect  to  observe  a  relatively strong  performance on  the part of  the 
United  States  and  a  relatively we~k.one o~ the part of  Japan. 
The  cha,nges  in market shares  shown  in Table  5  (page  10}  suggests  that 
in mo.s,t  energy  intensive  sec tors  ( 1),  cheap oil may  have  given  US 
~r.ldus:try an advantage in  the  short-term.  However,  iron and  steel: 
pres;ents  a  striking contrast.  T¥o  further  qualifications  need  to  be 
m~de in this conte,xt: 
(ii) 
The  energy factor  is  evider:ttly  far  from decisive,  since Japan 
~n~reased its market  share  in each  energy-inl!ensive sector. 
In particular, it is char  ac t;er is  tic of  most  energy-intet).S,ive 
products.  that  they are bulky, a~ costly  tro  transport!  - often more 
so  than energy.  It is  s t;r~k~_ng  that  indus tries which  are very 
dependent  on coal,  especia1l,y steel  and  cement,  have  shown. no 
tendency  so  far  to  relocate clpse  tp  the American,  Aus,tralian and 
South African coalfields. 
In so  far  as  evidence does  exist that low  energy prices. ·have. 
enabled  the  United  States  ~o. expand  or  retain its ·market share  in 
energy-intensive markets,  this. has  not necessarily assisted  the 
competitive position of  the  U:nited. States  in. the  long  term.  The 
US  advantage  in oil prices has  now  been largely eliminated,  and 
in gas  prices is likely  to  come  to  an end  in the medium  term.  The· 
US  long-run advantage  in coaJ  seems  to  have  been less significant 
than  the short-run advantag.e_  in oil and  gas.  It is  therefore 
probable  that  the American a1:tificial  advantage  in oil and  gas 
pr.ices has  had  the effect of!  discouraging  specialisation in 
sec tors  where  the  US  has.  g~nu~ne long-run  comparative  advantage. 
The  general  issue of  adaptation. tp: higher  energy prices is  a  complex 
one.  There are marked variations, in the level  of  energy  efficiency 
between individual  countries,  a~d there is no  simple relationship 
b.etween  investment,  growth  and  e.nergy  efficiency.  Energy  consumption 
per unit of  GDP  tends  to  rise sha.rply while  a  country  is going  through 
the process  of  industrialisation,· but  to  fall  in weal thy  countries 
when  they begin  to  specialise i!l.high  technology  services.  The  scope 
for  energy  saving,  even  in energy-intensive  industries is very large; 
the  optimum  savings  can usually. be  achieved  only by  a  radical  change 
in process,  often using  a  differe~t fuel.  It follows  that,  other 
things being equal,  countries  w.~t·ll· high levels of  inves-tmen:t  in· 
manufacturing  industry and  a  rapid  turnover  of  the capital  stock will 
best.  adapt  to  changes  in energy  p~Jces  (2). 
(1)  The  following  five  sectors  acco)l~.t for  the bulk of  energy used  in 
manufacturing  industry:  Non-metallic mineral  products,  unworked  .. metals, 
iron and  steel, basic  chemicals.,  paper. 
(2)  These  issues are  explored  in more  .. detail in the Commission's 
Communication  to  the Council  "Inv.estment  in the Rational  Use  of Energy", 
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The  preliminary conclusion is, however,  that despite  the Community's 
unfavourable  energy  situation,  energy costs will not for  most sectors 
be  a  major  factor  in  the ·performance of manufacturing  industry over 
the  next  ten  to  twenty  years. 
One  important qualification must  however  be made  with respect  to  the 
chemical  industry.  OPEC  countries have  adopted  an  industrial  strategy 
based  on  their access  to  cheap  hydrocarbons,  and  it is  estimated  that 
they have under  construction plant for  the manufacture of  basic 
chemicals  equal  to  15-20%  of  the  installed capacity of  the  industry 
within  the  Community.  There can be  no  doubt  that  the OPEC  countries 
will  succeed  in selling their products  in our markets,  both by 
reducing  the producer rent  taken on oil and  gas,  and  by  linking  the 
supply of  crude  to  political obligations  to  accept  their product,  in 
spite of  the fact  that  the  economics  of  location remote  from  markets 
in consuming  countries may  not be particularly favourable. 
5.  The  influence of human  capital on  competitiv~ness 
The  changing pattern of  employment  in recent decades,  and  in particular 
the shift  towards  the  service  sector,  has  increased  the  importance of 
human  capital as  a  determinant of  competitiveness  in developed 
countries.  In  these countries  the  growth  of  the  economy  is limited  as 
much  by  the rate of  development  of  human  as  of  physical capital  (a 
good  example  is  the current shortage of  people able  to  develop 
computer  software).  The  growing  sophistication and  technical 
composition of  the production process  has  increased  the demand  for 
skilled labour at all levels,  and  automation of  many  repetitive  tasks 
is likely  to  further  reduce  the demand  for  unskilled  labour  in  the 
future.  In addition,  the  speed  of  technical  change  and  the rapid 
internationalisation of  new  products  and  processes,  both by  making 
certain skills redundant  and  by  creating  a  constant demand  for  new 
skills, has made  the  existence and  quality of  a  comprehensive 
vocational  education system an important  input  to  the  industrial 
system. 
However,  any  assessment  of  human  capital must  include a  number  of 
variables which are not readily quantifiable.  Apart  from directly 
relevant effects,  such as  on productivity levels,  the  composition of 
the labour  force  has  a  less well  defined  impact on competitiveness 
through social attitudes  to  work,  acceptance of  change etc.  which are 
important  to  competitiveness  in  the  longer  term. 
In many  respects  the  Community,  Japan and  the  US  have  similar human 
capital  endowments  - an educated  work  force,  rising levels  of  female 
participation,  low levels of  population growth,  broadly  similar 
employment  structures etc.  However,  a  closer  look reveals differences 
in  trends  and orientation which will  in  the  longer  term  influence 
competitiveness  levels. - 47  -
(a)  Population 
The  demographic  situation of  each of  the  three groups  under  consideration 
will  evolve differently in the. medium-term.  The  total  population of 
all three groups will  increase up  to  1990  with  the  smallest increase 
bei~g in  the  Community  (EC  1%,  Japan  6%,  US  10%).  The  populations  of 
Japan and  the  Community  are ageing more  rapidly  than  that of  the US. 
By  1990  it is expected  that  43%  qf  the  EC  and  Japan~se populations 
will be  aged  15-44 whereas  in  the  US  the  figure  is projected  as  46% 
and  the projections for  those aged  over  65  are EC  15%,  US  12%,  Japat;t 
II%. 
(b)  Education 
As  a  result of both population  trends  and  of  the  tight labour market 
situation,  demand  for  education in general  and  vocational  education 
and  further  training in  particul~r increased  during  the  1970's •. 
The  USA  has  a  relatively high proportion of  the  population in the 
educational  system while Japanese  and  European levels are considerably 
lower  and  more directly comparable.  In most countries  there has  been 
a  rapid  increase in  the  number  o~ third level  students  and  a  steady 
increase in  the number  of first and  second  level  pupils. 
There are considerable difference·s  in emphasis  in  the  higher 
education systems  of  the countries  in question with  the highes,t 
proportion of  students  following  courses  in medical  sciences  in  the 
Community;  social  science  in Japan while  in  the  US  there is  a  wider 
spread across  the range of  studies..  Enrolment of  19-24 year olds  in 
third level  education averaged  24%  in the  Community,  32.5%  in Japan 
and  rose  to  56%  in the USA. 
Table  30:  The  proportion of  students  t;aking  subject of direct relevance 
to  industry 
Commerce,  Business 
administration 
Natural  science 
Maths,  computer  science 
Engineering 
Source:  UNESCO  YEARBOOK 
Community 
5.6 
8. I 
1.6 
10.9 
JAPAN 
(1976  -percent) 
1..8 
0.6 
17.8 
USA 
11.0 
5  .• 2 
1.5 
3.7 
From  Table  30 it can be  seen  tha,t.  the position varies widely,  there is an. 
orientation towards  business  studj  .. es  in the US,  towar.ds  engin,eering  Japat;t  and 
in  the  Community  a  less marked  'tr.end  in favour  of  engineering  and 
the natural  sciences.  · - 48  -
Trends  in female  education were  comparable  in all  three  groups  with 
the vast majority of  women  studying  the humanities  or  teacher 
tralnlng.  In  the  Community,  women  make  up  around  42%  of  the  third 
level  students  ranging  from  34%  in  the Netherlands  to  46.9%  in France. 
In Japan female  participation is only  20.4%  while  in  the  US  it is 
47.9%. 
(c)  Vocational  Training 
In both  the  Community  and  USA  the vocational  tralnlng  system is a 
mixture of off-the-job  programmes  run by  state and  local authorities 
and  private company  training whereas  in Japan most vocational  training 
lS  done  in  the  company,  on  the  job. 
In  the  Community  in  1978,  24%  of  16-17  and  41%  of  17-18 year olds left 
school  and  pursued  no  further  education or  training.  In both  the  US 
and  the  Community  unemployment  is highest among  the unskilled/semi-
skilled as  these are  the  jobs  most likely  to  come  under  pressure  from 
automation,  imports  and  from  low-cost countries.  However,  the 
majority are undergoing  full-time  education or  training  and  some  (15% 
of  16-17  and  18%  of  17-18 year  olds)  are  involved  in part-time 
training. 
In  the  Community,  the level  of  vocational  tralnlng within  the  school 
system is quite low.  The  level of  further  training  is very  low  indeed 
in all Hember  States,  indicating  that there  is little recourse  to 
formal  ongoing  training or retraining once  a  person enters  the  labour 
force  full-time.  In all only between  2.5-10%  take courses  to  improve 
training already acquired or  to  receive  new  training.  The  apparently 
low level of  further  training is especially worrying  in view of  the 
current speed  and  extent of  technological  change  because it implies 
the likely outdating of  skills and  an undesirable degree of  rigidity. 
However,  the official statistics do  not  take  account of  in-company 
training of older workers  which may  be  significant in  some  companies 
and  in some  sectors. 
In  1978  over  17  million Americans  (the  labour  force  numbers  102m) 
were  engaged  on federally aided vocational  programmes,  3.3 m in office 
occupations  and  3.4 m in trade  and  industrial  training.  As  in the 
Community  the main  training effort is  concentrated  on  the  under  25
1 s 
but,  unlike  the  Community,  almost  40%  of  those enrolled  on vocational 
courses  in 1976  were  over  35  indicating a  greater  degree of  retraining 
and  updating of  skills. 
~)  The  Labour  Force 
The  civilian working  population is of  roughly  similar size  in  the 
Community  (109  m in  1979)  and  in  the  USA  (102  m in  1979)  and  almost 
double  that of  Japan  (56 min  1979).  Structural  changes  in  the  labour 
force result from  changes  in the  total  population of  working  age  (15-
65)  and  participation rates within  the relevant age  groups.  The 
active population is forecast  to  rise in most Member  States until at 
least  1990  and  is expected  to  stabilise  thereafter.  A similar 
situation is forecast for  the  USA  and  Japan,  but  the active  population 
of  the  US  will  grow at a  faster  rate over  the  period,  overtaking  that 
of  the  EC  around  the  turn of  the century. - 49  -
Throughout  most of  the  1980's  the  labour market wiii  be  under.hea~y 
pressure  to provide  jobs  bo~h for  large numbers  of  young  pebpie  . 
ent~ring the labour market for  the first time  (the corisequettce of  high 
birth rates  in  the  1960's)  and  increasing  ntimbers  of  woril~n seeking 
employment.  · 
(e)  Labour  Force Specialisation 
The  propqrtion of professional,  t~chnical and  rebi ted. workers  is 
roughly similar in the  USA  and  the  Community  but signi.fidn
1tly  low~r 
in Japan.  By  contrast,  the  share of  administrative  and  ~anageri~l 
s~aff in the USA  at  10.2%  is considerably higher  than in  eit~er Japan 
(  ~  .'  I%) or the  Community  (D  3. I%'  F,  3. 2%!  even  allow.iii&: for. tit:~  ... '  . 
different  time  periods  used.  Another  difference lies  iri  the  miinber  of 
~ales ~orkers, highest  in Japan  (i2.6%)  and  lowest  in  the ·us.A  (6.1%). 
O~e~ a  15-20 year  period all  cou~tries showed  siinil.ir cieVelbpm·e·n·ts  -
an increase in  the  number  of  technical,  professional  and  clerical 
workers,  a  decline in agriculture  an.'ci.  production worker·s •.  in.  in6st 
countries  the  number  of  administrative,  managerial  ;irid  s.iles  ~brlters 
increased only slightly while  in France and  the  us  the  sha·-re.  of  sales 
workers  actually declined.  Thus  :the  shif't  to  the whife  colla~r 's'er\rice 
sector has  occurred  in all  these countries bringing with it a 
requirement for  higher  levels of  training and  erlucation. 
The occupational  structure of  Japan  shows  considerable dif'feiehces 
from  that of  the  Community  and  th~ USA  - the  evolution is in  the  saine 
direction but is  taking  place later.  In particular  the high number  of 
agricultural  and  sales workers  is out of  step with  the pattern in 
other developed  countries  and  ref,lects  the fact  that  the attention 
paid  to  industrial  development has  not been equally extended  to  other 
sectors ?f  the  economy. 
It is also interesting  to  focus  more  narrowly on a  particular skill 
category,  e.g.  on  the  number  of  scientists  arid  engineers  in  the  labour 
force,  professions which are currently receiving much  attention  ~n 
view of  the  important role of  R  and  D and  technical  know-how  in our 
present day  society. 
Table  31 :Scientists and  Engineer's  per  10.000  m  the Labour  Force  196.5-
1977 
.I;"' 
1965  1968  1972  I975  I977 
France  21.0  26.,4  28. I  29.3  29.9(a) 
Germany  22.6  25.:9  35.7  39.4  40.5 
UK  21.4  17.2  27.8  30.6  NA 
Japan  24.6  31.1  38.1  47.9  49.9 
USA  64. 1  66 ... 9  58.3  56.4  57.4 
(a)  1976 
Source:  US  National  Science Board,  Science Indicators  I978. - so  -
The  US  remains  the clear  leader  although  the  gap  between it and  the 
other countries has  narrowed  significantly since  1965  and  within  the 
US  the  situation has  fluctuated  around  a  declining  trend  from  the  high 
point of  1968.  Japan has  doubled  its  share of  engineers  and  scientists 
per  10.000 of  the labour  force  in twelve  years,  as  one would  expect 
from  the  emphasis  on engineering  in third level  education.  Of  the 
three  EC  countries mentioned  Germany  has  made  most progress,  starting 
from  a  position roughly  similar  to  France  and  the  UK  in  1965  but 
growing at a  much  faster  rate.  However,  the  gap  between  the  Community 
and  its other  industrialised  competitors  remains  considerable  and 
unless  there is a  marked  change  in  the preferences of  third level 
students  the  Community  is likely  to  continue at a  disadvantage in 
terms  of  high  technology  and  its application. 
(f)  Labour  Force Productivity 
The  link between  investment,  technology  and  human  capital  and  the 
overall productivity of  the  labour  force  cannot be  established 
directly.  Table  11  (page  22)  summarised  the rate of  growth of  hourly 
productivity in real  terms  since  1960  in  the  Community  and  in  the  US 
and  Japan. 
The data- which  is discussed  ~n greater  detail  in Chapter  Il.D.1 
confirms  the  sustained  growth  ~n Japanese productivity,  low and 
declining productivity growth  in  the  USA  and  the  wide  range of 
situations  in the  Community. 
Concerning manufacturing  industry,  a  recent  OECD  study  (1)  found  that 
one of  the main reasons  for  the decline  in US  productivity was  the 
inadequate  rhythm of  investment which  also  had  some  influence by  the 
closing of  the  technological  gap  with  the  US  and  by  inter-sectoral 
transfers.  By  contrast,  the rigidity of  the  labour  market  and  varying 
managerial  capabilities are  put  forward  to  explain  the declining 
growth  of  productivity in  the  UK. 
Table  32  shows  the evolution of  apparent labour  productivity in 
manufacturing  industry,  since  1975.  The  increase in  the Japanese rate 
is particularly striking.  Productivity increases  in a  number  of 
Community  countries outstripped  those of  the  USA  during  the decade. 
Table  32:  Apparent  Labour  Productivity  (a)  in Manufacturing Industry 
1965  1970  1975  1978  1979 
(1975=100) 
USA  86.0  89. 1  100  110.3  111. 1 
JAPAN  40.9  73.3  100  140.1  149.5 
BELGIUM  55.7  78.8  100  124.3  132.5 
DENMARK  79.0  100 
FRANCE  84.4  100  117.6  123.7 
GERMANY  68.5  86.8  100  112.8  1 17. 8 
ITALY  94.3  100  117.9 
NETHER LANDS  76.0  100  120.4 
UK  75.2  88. 1  100  107.4 
(a)  Value-added  in manufacbtring  at  constant prices 
N  of  persons  employed; 
Source:  OECD 
(1)  OECD  CPE.WP2  (79)8,  and  DSTI/IND/81.40. - 51  -
C.  Sectoral  Performance 
The  performance of  a  number  of  industrial sectors has  been  examined 
with a  view  to  identifying  some  of  the key factors which may  have 
accounted  for  their comparative  strengths  and  weaknesses.  The  sectors 
concerned  are motor vehicles,  chemicals,  pharmaceuticals,  iron and 
steel, clothing,  pulp,  paper  and  board,  aerospace,  shipbuilding and 
machine  tools.  . 
This  analysis  attempts  to relate  the  observed  experience  in individual 
sectors  to  the broader  factors described  in  the preceding  sections of 
this report. 
These sectors make  up  a  representative cross-section of  EC  industry. 
They  include sectors which  are characterised,  amongst other features: 
by high,  medium  and  low-technology; 
small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  giant multinationals; 
growth or decline; 
capital-intensity or  labour-intensity; 
considerable export-potential or  limited export-potential. 
The  examination of  their performance  suggests  that amongst  the many 
factors  which have  influenced  their competitive  performance  the 
following  would  appear  to  be of  particular importance: 
Degree of  specialisation 
The relative success  of  the  EC  aerospace  and  the paper/paperboard 
sectors would  appear  to  stem  from  a  concentration on  specialised 
products,  e.g.  airbus  and civil helicopters  in the  former  case; 
special  grades  of  papers  in the latter  case.  The  poor  performance 
of  the  steel  sec tor may  be  p'artially due  to  its relative lack of 
specialisation. 
Commitment  to research and  d~velopment  (R  and  D) 
The  aerospace,  the  chemical :and,  in particular,  the pharmaceutical 
sectors have  committed  significant resources  to  R and  D.  On  the 
other  hand,  R and  D has  had  a  very  limited  impact in shipbuilding, 
clothing and  machine  tools. 
Capacity utilisation 
Under-utilisation of capacity has  had  adverse  effects on  the 
profitability of  enterprises operating in a  number  of  sectors. 
Synthetic fibres,  steel  and  shipbuilding have  been affected 
particularly badly in recent'years.  In addition  to  the direct 
financial  consequences  for  the enterprises it has  also  severely 
limited  their possibilities  for  investing  in R  and  D and  in new 
capital  equipment. - 52  -
Product range,  design and  quality 
The  clothing  sector,  which is characterised  by  low-skilled 
labour-intensive production,  has  been able  to  compete  successfully 
in fashion products  which require  a  high degree  of  design 
creativity.  Although  the  EC  motor  vehicles  sector  has  a  good 
range of  products  in terms  of  both  type  and  quality  a  rationalisation 
of  the product range would  almost certainly result in greater 
economies  of  scale.  Unlike its Japanese counterpart,  which 
concentrates  on relatively  long  production runs  for  standardised 
products,  the  EC  machine-tool  sector  tends  to  produce  to  the 
specific designs of  the  consumer  - a  larger  output  of  a  more 
standard range of  product  should  contribute  to  a  more  competitive 
performance. 
Intra-Community  cooperation 
An  increasing degree of  intra-Community  cooperation between 
enterprises exists  in some  sectors,  e.g.  aerospace  and  motor 
cars.  In others little or  none  exists,  e.g.  shipbuilding.  It 
may  be no  coincidence  that  some  of  the  sectors which  have 
performed  better  than average  and  which require high output 
levels  to  survive have  cooperated  at Community  or  European level 
to  produce  trans-European products,  e.g.  Airbus,  "European"  or 
"World"  cars. 
Sectoral structures 
The  optimum  size of  an enterprise will  vary  from  sector  to  sector 
and within a  sector depending  on many  factors,  including,  amongst 
others,  the  scale of  the  markets  in which it is operating,  the 
production technology,  the  role of  R and  D.  A number  of  the 
sectors  examined,  e.g.  aerospace  and  clothing,  are characterised 
by many  enterprises which are probably  too  small  or otherwise 
ill-equipped  to  invest on a  sufficient scale  (in production, 
marketing,  R and  D)  to  be able  to  exploit  the  opportunities 
offered by markets  which  have  shifted  from  a  national  to  a 
continental or,  even,  world  dimension  (and,  equally  important,  to 
be able  to defend  their  existing markets  against competitors  who 
are operating on  the  appropriate  scale). 
Sectors which have  traditionally operated  on a  relatively large 
scale at the  national  level  and  which have  also  in a  number  of 
cases  o·pera ted  at  the multinational  level,  e.g.  the motor 
vehicles  sec tor,  have  recognised  the  need  to  reorganise production 
on  the basis  of multi-plant specialisation if they are  to  compete 
successfully.  This  is clearly demonstrated  by  the  growth  of  the 
EC's  share  in  the  OECD's  imports  of  motor  vehicle bodies,  engines 
and  parts. - 53  -
Intra-Community barriers  to  trade 
Obstacles  to  the free movement  of  their products  appear  to  be  a 
factor  reducing  the ability  of  the pharmaceutical  and  the 
electrical and  mechanical  engineering  sectors  to  exploit fuily 
possible production economies  of  scale. 
Given  the restricted  size of  the domestic markets  of  EC  enterprises, 
the difficulty for  non-national  enterprises of  obtaining public 
purchasing contracts  in other  countries  has  had.  a  similar effect 
within the aerospace  sector. 
Exchange rate fluctuations 
Both  the aerospace  and  the  shipbuilding  sectors appear  to  be 
particularly susceptible  to  exchange rate fluctuations  of  the  US 
dollar.  In  the case of  shipbuilding  the relative  exch~nge rates 
between EC  currencies  and  the  US  dollar and  the Japanese Yen  are 
of critical importance. 
Whilst,  as  can be  seen from  the above,  all sectors possess  some 
strengths and,  usually,  many  more  weaknesses,  the  mix  varies  from 
sector  to  sector.  The  more  successful  sectors would  appear  to  have 
certain common  characteristics,  e.g.  market,  rather  than production, 
oriented products;  an appropriate degree of  specialisation;  structures 
adapted  to  the  scale of  the markets  in which  the  enterpise is 
operating.  Given  the base provided  by  the sizeable output of most  of 
the  EC  sectors  examined,  the  scope  for  considerable  improvements  in 
competitiveness  exists. 
D.  Corporate  Structure and  Perform~n~e 
1.  The  importance of  the  firm 
The macro-economic  approach  developed  in  the  previous  chapter  gives  a 
picture of  the competitiveness of  European  industry,  in which 
efficient resource allocation and  management,  together  with natural 
endowments,  play a  central role.  A second  way  of  looking at  the 
question is  therefore  to  see what  we  know  about  how  resources  are used 
within  the  firms  themselves. 
Since investment and  productivity appear  to  be  the  focal  point of 
weakness  in the  supply  side of  our  economies,  there is  a  need  to 
enlarge  the analysis  in the micro-economic direction,  focussing  on  the 
behaviour of  the basic unit in industry,  the manufacturing  enterprise. 
Economic  performance,  financial  structures  and  corporate management of 
manufacturing  enterprises must  be  taken into account  in any  evaluation 
of competitiveness,  as  the  company  is both  the point at which 
production-oriented resources  are  combined  and  the  subject of 
competition at world  level. - 54  -
2.  A Micro-economic  approach 
In order  to  appreciate efficiency  in resource allocation and  management 
we  have brought  together  the  evidence  provided  by  different  sources 
such as national statistics,  company  accounts  and  business organisations. 
National  accounts  cover  the manufacturing  sector  as  a  whole  and 
are broken down  by  sector:  in principle  they  are  the most 
comprehensive  source  allowing  international  comparisons  of 
economic  results of manufacturing activities as  represented  by 
operating surpluses,  notably  when  they are harmonised. 
Company  accounts  give different kinds  of  information;  profits 
usually include not only  the operating surplus  but  also  gains 
from  stock appreciation. 
Company  accounts  and  their  indications  on  profits  and  financial 
structures are not subject  to  general  systematic aggregation on  a 
harmonised basis:  this  is  one  only for  limited  samples  (especially 
when  international  comparison is  involved)  usually covering  the 
larger corporations.  Different accounting  methods  and  tax 
conventions  also bias  some  of  the data  and  this  is difficult  to 
correct at  the  present stage of  work  in this  field.  It remains 
nevertheless  true  that  these differences  are  in principle due  to 
national realities which reflect and  influence respective 
competitive  performances,  as  this  information is  increasingly 
supplied by  specialised  sources  and  is  apparently used  by  the 
business  community. 
Information about  company  organisation and  structure  is based  on 
business management  concepts  which are usually qualitiative and 
descriptive.  Although  the appraisal  of  this  factor  is on a 
different basis  from  the previous  ones,  it is based  on widely  ,, 
applied methods,  which  provide  useful  insights  into  the  ways  in 
which companies  function. 
Emphasis  has  been placed  on large enterprises because of  data 
availability and  because  they are on  the  front  line of  international 
compet1t1on.  Although  smaller  companies  play  an  important role, 
bigger  companies  are vital: 
the performance  of  big  companies  determines  to  a  great 
extent  the overall  eompetitiveness  of  the European  economy. 
In particular,  they  account  for  a  large proportion of 
international  trade  in manufactures,  much  of  which  takes  the 
form  of  intra-firm transactions; 
because  the  complex  and  turbulent market environment 
requires organisations which  can act as  stabilisers and  can 
internalise structural  change; 
our  main competiton;  have  already made  their  choice  in  this 
direction.  Unless  it is able  to  adapt its own  strategies, 
European industry will  be  forced  to  adjust  to  those of  other 
large enterprises. GRAPH  5: 
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Problems  of  coverage,  comparability  and  exclusions  limit our 
conclusions at this stage  to: 
drawing  attention  to  this field  of  micro-economic  analysis, 
which does  not  seem  to  have  been sufficiently developed  and 
debated  in  the  Community,  but  which  could  be  relevant  ~n 
terms  of  industrial adjustment;  and 
suggesting a  number  of  questions  which  are  in  lin~ with,  and 
provide  consistent interpretation of,  oth?;r  inqicatiohs  that 
the  competitiveness  of  European  industry is declining. 
3.  Economic  performance of  the manufacturing  se~tor 
For  the  purposes  of  this analysis,  performance  is measured  by  ~he 
operating  surplus,  which  is  the  surplus  arising  from  productive 
activities once  inputs  of materials  and  labour have  been paid .for,  and 
before paying direct taxes  and  financial  charges.  When  te'iated  to  the 
stock of  fixed  assets  employed  in production,  irrespective of  their 
financing,  it gives  the concept of  return on productive  capital. 
Return on capital  in manufacturing  has  been declining  inGerq~ahy arrl 
the  UK  since  1955,  according  to  OECD  data  (1),  while  the downward 
trend was  less  pronounced  in  the  u~ and  Japan,  both of  which  recorder 
better results. 
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OECD  data based  on  national  accounts.  Rates  of  return based  on gross 
measures  have  the principal  advantage of  by-passing  the whole  problem 
of  calculating capital  consumption for  both profits and  capital  stock. 
Moreover,  it turns  out  that gro.ss  and  net OECD  data are quite  in line. 
Capital  stock is calculated by  cumulation of  investment following  the 
perpetual  inventory method. - 56  -
A study currently being undertaken in the  Commission analyses  the 
ratio of net operating profit on the  aggregate working  plus  fixed 
capital  employed  in manufacturing  industry.  Preliminary results 
provide  evidence of  declining rates of  return from  1960  to  1979  in the 
four  large member  countries. 
Further  evidence is provided  by  performance appreciation based  on  the 
share of operating profit in value  added.  Where  comparison is 
possible,  profit shares decreased  in Community  countries  less  than  the 
rate of profit on capital  employed  declined.  The  US  experience was 
similar but  the opposite was  recorded  in Japan,  where rates of  return 
on capital were maintained  through  improved  capital productivity,  even 
with decreasing  shares of value  added  going  to  profits. 
Performance  appreciation based  on micro-economic  notion of  operating 
surplus  therefore highlights certain weaknesses  in the  economic 
efficiency of manufacturing  operations: 
within  the  Community,  when compared  with other  economic  activities 
and  between member  countries; 
vis a vis international competition,  when  compared  with our  main 
industrial competitors,  notably Japan. 
Where  data is available,  the  indications are  that  the  problem  for  EC 
indus try 1 ies more  in its capacity  to  generate  a  surplus rather  than 
in its allocation. 
Along  the  same  lines,  a  recent analysis  undertaken for  the  Commission  (1) 
based,  amongst other  indicators,  on profit shares,  concluded  that an 
essential point often neglected,  besides  the  need  for  tight control  of 
production costs,  is  the  increase in value added  generated either  in 
volume or  in price,  by  moving  to higher value-added  products. 
The persistence of  such  a  weakness  in  the  capacity  to  generate  a 
surplus well  beyond  the  short-term cyclical fluctuations,  combined 
with  the recent rising cost of  capital  is likely  to: 
have  negative  effects on  the  investment propensity of  Community 
indus try and  to  induce  sectoral  and  geographic  shifts of 
resources; 
lead  to  a  vicious circle which undermines  the  compet1t1ve 
position of  EC  industry and  its capacity to  adjust endogenously 
to present and  foreseeable challenges. 
Indeed,  weak  levels  and  trends  of  operating profit in manufacturing 
have  since  1973  been accompanied  by  a  deterioration of  other major 
economic  indicators  such as value  added,  gross  capital  formation and 
employment. 
(1)  "Competitivites  sectorielles et performances  dans  l'industrie 
europeenne",  B.  de  Closset,  Mars  1981. - 57  -
4.  Company  accounts  and  financiai  structures 
If the economic  performance of resources  engaged  irt manufacturing 
activities in the  EC  has  not been satisfactory,  neither has  that of 
the main actor in manufacturing,  the  industrial firm. 
Company  accounts,  though  their major  shortcomings  in periods of  rapid 
inflation are well  known,  are nevertheless  the most common  ref·erence. 
to  evaluate company  performance.  The  evidence fits with  the r·esults 
of national  accounts:  significant  samples  of  larger corporations  show 
that the sales margins,  return on assets and  remuneration of  equi  t'y 
capital are weaker  for  Community  companies.  In 1980,  the  fir~t 
hundred  industrial  groups  in Europ·e  realised an average  net profit on 
sales of  1,4%  against 2,4%  of  the first hundred  Japanes·e  groups· and 
4,8%  of  the first hundred  US  groups.  The  gap  is alSo  considerable in 
terms of net profit on own  capital:  6,5%  for  European corporations, 
i4%  for  the Japanese,  15,6%  for  the Americans  (I). 
If oil companies  are excluded  from  the  sample,  European ·co'rpO'ratioriS 
recC?rded  an aggregated  loss of  0, I%  on own  capital while US  a:nd 
Japanese corporations reached  respectively a  11 ,s%  and  a  13;8%  'profit. 
There are quite different results  among  the Member  States.  The  major 
Italian corporations  suffered  the largest losses,  while German 
companies  fared best  from  this point of view. 
Similar divergences  become apparent in other  samples of major 
corporations,  which highlight the ·better  performances  of  US  companies. 
Table 33:  Net Erofit on  sale~ of 
392  manufacturing  enterErises  (a) 
1970  1973  1977  Number  of  companies 
iri  1977  sample 
. Germany  2,44  1 '.95  I,  77  31 
France  4,49  2,59  1,83  23 
Italy  4,45  0,33  -5,51  7 
UK  4,37  6,21  3,91  40 
Netherlands  3,90  4,8  3,60  3 
Belgium  3,97  3  ,_58  0,32  3 
J1;1.pan  (b)  4, 15  ·4,".1  1,76  103 
USA  4,87  5,93  4,77  182 
(a)  NET  post-tax profit on gross  sales of  392  major  enterprises,  including 
oil companies  and  major  retailer's. 
(b)  Japanese  sample has  a  higher  proportion of  smaller  enterprises. 
Source:  MITI  Management  analysis of  world  corporations  - Tokyo  - Fiscal years 
1973-1979. 
(1)  Le  Nouvel  Economis te  "Special  5000°  - N°  hors  serie,  decembre  1981 • i 
I 
I 
I 
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Company  financial  structures vary considerably between member 
countries,  but  there are  some  common  features:  On  average,  EC 
industrial companies  rely more  on their  own  funds  than Japanese  firms 
but much  less  than American ones,  while their liquidity seems  to  be 
less able  to  assure  the  shock-absorber  function with  the constancy of 
Japanese firms,  especially in the case of  bigger corporations. 
It is quite clear  that in  the  presence of  weak  economic  performance, 
unbalanced financial  structures,  especially in  terms  of  external 
borrowing,  run  the risk of  amplifying  problems  for  EC  industry.  On 
the other hand,  US  industry can rely on stronger financial  bases  and 
Japanese firms  enjoy the positive effects of  a  long-standing financial 
discipline,  certainly favoured  by  the prevailing  lending policies of 
their financial  institutions. 
5.  Market  and  industry structures 
Market and  industry structures have been subjected  to  profound  changes 
resulting from  the double pressure of  demand  changes  and  industrial 
adaptation. 
Even  in  terms  of  structures,  some  indicators point  to unsatisfactory 
evidence for  EC  industry: 
as regards direct investment,  the  increase of  outward  flows  from 
EC  countries since  the mid-60's  surpassed  that of  inward  flows. 
Beyond  the positive aspects  of  the  increasing outward  orientation 
of  EC  investment,  these  trends  could  also mean a  decreasing 
interest both of  foreign and  domestic  investors  in  the EC; 
multinationality of  production of  EC  corporations  is weaker  than 
that of  the Americans  and  is much  lower  if intra-Community 
production is  excluded; 
the recently recorded  increase in intra-firm cooperation in the 
Community  was  due  to national operations,  while  international 
operations  stayed  constant. 
----··--------
'Table  34:  National  and  international operatione  in the COIIIIDUnity,  by  izlduetry,  1977-79 
Metal  industries  Servlce.f 
--------
of which:  Other 
Energy  Chemicals  Textiles  manu- Food  of  which: 
i  Year 
1 Machinery  I  facturing  Industry 
Total 
I  Total  Sanking Holding 
i  and  I Electrical  Metal 
mechanical ;Engineering  goods 
and  ~~:ompanies 
I  nsurancE 
I  parts  !  (I) 
:  i 
' 
! 
Number  of  operations 
:  !  ~---1- !  I  1772  24~ 
!  52  203  101  1971  634  -- -- I  379  179  55 
r 
! 
1978  73J  -- --·  56 
!  17&  I 
109  380  194  '656  182  58 
:  ~~0  I 
I 
1979  881  232  163  88  I  217  146  629  225  741  234  44 
'  i  i  - -
I 
: 
As  percentage of  total 
I 
! 
I 
-
I 
T 
1977  27  -- --·  -- i  2  9  5  16  8  33  II  2 
1978  32  -- --
I 
-- 2  8  5  17  8  28  8  3 
1979  30  a  6  6  3  7  5  22  I 
a  25  8  2 
!  : 
I) Excluding  machinery  and  transport  equipment 
Source:  EC  Commission- 1980  Competition Report 
Total 
!  2  320 
!2  304 
'2 927 
100 
100 
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As  the  internationalisation of  production for  EC  companies  seems  to 
be  accompanied  by  higher  return on  sales,  delays  in this  field run 
the risk of being  costly in terms  of  corporate  performance. 
The  larger  size of  the firm  seems  to  go  together with sales  growth 
of  Community  companies,  but not with  the rates·of return to  sales, 
which are higher  for  smaller  companies.  The  increase in the size 
of  Community  companies  recorded  from  1962  to  1977  could  then have 
led  to decreasing overall returns  on  sales of  Community  industry. 
Companies  of  va~tly different size  and  organisation evidently operate' 
very successfully in the  same  market and it is in order  to  approach 
this question from  an agnostic point of view.  Large  firms  benefit 
from  economies  of  scale,  privileged access  to  resources,  and  specialisation 
at  the plant level  and  among  senior management.  On  the other hand,  . 
they may  also  suffer  from  inertia,  costly overheads,  problems  of 
communications  and motivation and  from  other  quasi-bureaucratic 
phenomenae. 
Small  firms  benefit from  flexibility,  the  low  threshold  of  rapid 
growth,  good  communications within  the  firms,  and  the possibility of. 
product  specialisation  to  fit specific niches  in  the market.  On  the 
other hand  they  suffer  from  inadequate resources,  insufficient 
information about  the  economy  and  the market  (when  management  is not: 
specialised),  low Rand D and  consequently weak  technqlogical 
innovation. 
The  dilemma  of  the large firm  is  that it has  the  knowledge  and  finance
1 
to  innovate but may  not have  the organisational abilities  to  do  so. 
The  dilemma of  the  small  firm  is  that it has  the  flexibility and 
motivation  to  innovate; it may  not have  the resources  and  the 
knowledge. 
In the past,  many  large firms  have  tried  to  overcome  their  inherent 
disadvantages  through decentralisation and  by  creating  autonomous  · 
r'profi  t  centres"  in their subsidiaries.  This  approach  is now  meeting  , 
an opposing  trend  towards  interna·tional rationalisation of multinational , 
activities which may  reduce  subsidiaries'  autonomy.  This  process may 
be  a  vehicle for medium-term  gains  but may  result in less  flexibl~  I 
structures in  the  longer  term.  On  the other hand,  many  small  firms 
have  overcome  their  shortcomings,  often with significant help  from  thei 
public authorities,  chambers  of  commerce  or  the  banks.  Thus  the 
predominance of  small  companies :-'in  some  parts of  the Community  is 
regarded as an advantage. - 60  -
IV.  Company  Organisation and  Management 
In  the  company  the  primary responsibility for  performance lies with 
the management,  whose  function is  to  combine  productive resources with 
a  view  to  an economic  result. 
While most of  the attention is  taken by  availability and  cost of 
productive factors,  a  major risk lies in the  neglect of  the basic  fact 
that it is business organisation which determines  the  actual  employment, 
cost and  performances  of  these factors. 
There are plenty of  examples  to  show  that investment  expenditure  ~s 
not sufficient in itself: it can even be  damaging,  if it is not 
chosen,  implemented  and  managed  properly. 
When  analysing manufacturing  competitiveness,  having moved  from  the 
macro  to  the micro  dimension,  it is  then necessary  to  take  in  to 
consideration not only  the hardware  such as  equipment  and  machinery 
but also  the  software represented by  corporate management.  Indeed, 
several authors  have attributed  the leading role in bringing about 
economic  growth  to business  organisation  (1).  They  believe that  the 
organisational response  is not only  the basis for daily operations but 
also  the  strategic  element  in coping with fundamental  changes  in the 
process  of  production and markets  in modern business,  rather  than 
entrepreneurial talents,  capital markets  or  public policies. 
Experience  proves  that  important gains,  not only in productivity and 
production costs,  but also  in market identification,  commercial 
dynamism,  financial  results  and  technical  innovation can be  achieved 
through organisational  and  management  techniques.  One  example will 
suffice:  the  US  Federal  Trade Commission has  recently  estimated  that 
a  50%  increase of annual  inventory  turnover  (which  has  proved  to  be 
possible with  the adoption of  sophisticated  inventory control  such as 
the Material  Requirement  Planning  - MRP)  from  the  average level  of  7 
in 1980  would  increase operating  income  for  the  typical  US  manufacturer 
by about  11%  (2).  Beyond  the organisation,  implementation and  control 
of  specific phases of  the process,  the most difficult task is  that  of 
harmonising  and  finalising  the entire process  - from  the research  to 
the commercial  phase -with given objectives. 
It is certain that organisation,  management  and  strategies are not 
natural  endowments.  They  can be  learned,  applied,  improved,  sold and 
bought like any other  software.  This  has  already happened  when,  for 
example,  the  Japanese  went  to  the  US  to  study American management 
techniques,  and  happens  even more  so  today,  now  that Japanese  companies 
are selling their specific organisational methods  back  to  other 
industrialised countries. 
(f)  See A.H.  COLE  ;'The  Entrepreneur:  Introductory Remarks" 
American  Economic  Review,  May  1968;  T.  COCHRAN  "The  Business 
Revolution"  American Historical  Review,  Dec.  1975; 
(2)  See  C.  BERNAN  "A  Big  Pay-off  from  Inventory Control",  Fortune, 
July  1981. An  evaluation of  the Community  situation a·s  regards  industria-l 
management  must first  take  into account its development. 
The  function of professional  salaried management  has  developed  in the 
Community  much  more  slowly  than in the  US  for  several reasons: 
higher direct involvement of  owners  in company  managein~nt• 
This  may  create an  ambiguous  relationship between the actual 
operational responsibility in the company  and  the privilege 
of  ownership  and  probably contributes  to  the adversary relation-
ships which  exist in parts of  European  industry. 
t!le  national  fragmentation of  European markets.  Professional 
management  has first developed  a~ best performed  to 'deal with 
mass  production and  mass  distribution problems  on very large 
homogeneous  markets.  The  higher  degree of  fragmentation and 
segmentation of  European markets  has  reduced  both  the  interest in 
adopting  new  mass  production  techniques  and  the incentive  to 
integrate production with  large purchasing  and  marketing 
organisations; 
different types  of  institutional arrangements  for  ~he .fitll!' s 
property.  National  differences  such as  the  industry-wide holding 
in the  UK,  the  cartel in Germany,  the industrial financial 
holding in France,  the industrial holding state-oYinership in 
Italy have brought about  specific basic modes  of ope·ra tiona  which , 
did  not stimulate  transnational  inter-changeability of mimagement.i 
This historical delay is still evident  in recent  times:  by  1970,  for 
example,  the divisional  structure in which  a  general  office is 
responsible for measuring  performance,  planning  and  allocating 
resources,  and  coordinating and  controlling  the operating units  was 
adopted by  54  of  the  100  largest companies  in France,  by  50  in·Germany 
and  by  57  in the  UK,  compared  with 80  in  the  US  (I). 
The  internationalisation of marke'ts  now  brings different institutional 
~nd organisational structures  into direct confrontation. 
Among  managers,  different cultural values  and  social  norms,  not to 
mention economic  and  political systems,  produce different behaviour 
and  goals. 
An  extensive  investigation  (over  100.000  cases)  has highlighted 
similarities and  differences  in many  aspects of management  style and 
methods  across national boundaries  (2). 
(1)  A.D.  CHANDLER  JR  and  H.  DAEMS  "Managerial  Hierarchies" 
Harvard University Press  - Cambridge  MASS.  1980. 
(2)  B.M.  BASS  - P.C.  BURGER  "Asses·snient of Managers  -An International; 
Comparison"  - The  Free Press,  New  York,  1979. - 62  -
There  is evidence of  national characterisation in  the  greater 
preference of American  and  Japanese management  for  risk-taking 
together with considerable concern for  product quality,  two  basic 
assets which  contribute  to  coping  efficiently with current competition. 
Historical delays  and  national characteristics have  therefore marked 
efficiency of  EC  industrial management  and  imposed  constraints on  the 
implementation of  appropriate strategic policies. 
On  the world  scene,  three  approaches  seem  to  be  the most effective: 
overall  cost leadership 
product differentiation 
market or  product focus. 
Failure  to  develop  a  strategy in at least one  of  these directions 
leads  to  a 
11stuck-in-the-middle
11  position which  almost guarantees 
marginalisation. 
In this  perspective,  the  need  for  dynamism  and  innovation concerns  not 
only product arid  process,  but even more  so  organisation and  management 
styles.  It has,  for  example,  been found  that  the managerial, 
structural  and  operating  requirements  for  innovation and  cost-cutting 
can be mutually antithetical  (1).  If  the  applied  performance measures 
are  those appropriate  to  a  strategy of  cost minimisation,  when 
strategies stress either  innovation or  quality,  manufacturing 
management  linked  to  productivity and  costs  is  likely  to  adopt a  cost 
minimisation attitude,  therefore drawing  the  firm  away  from  its stated 
purpose. 
This  shows  once again that industrial efficiency and  comp~titiveness 
rely  to  a  great extent on  the uay  in which  peot:-~le  and  resources  <:>.re  . 
organised \lithin. the  firm. 
The  orientation  of  industrial management  appears  to differ  from 
one  firm  to  another  depending on the priority attached  to  their 
responsiveness  to market  signals  and  to  technical  constraints  and 
opportunities  of  the  productive process.  Although it is not possible 
to  generalise  from  this point of view,  it does  seem  that  the major 
Japanese corporations  have  succeeded  in integrating  the best of  both 
approaches.  They  tend  to  have  the most  comprehensive  strategies, 
encompassing  a  world  market  orientation as  well  as  successful  organisation 
c£ production including  the optimum  application of  high  technologies. 
Community  companies  need  to  be able  to  reconcile  their own  strate~ies and 
management methods  to  the  long-term needs  of  the market  and  to  the necessary 
flexibility and  innovativeness  in  the productive process,  be~~use 
experience  shows  that tnere  is  a  clear link between adaptability  and 
prosperity,  even  survival. 
(1)  See  amongst others,  M.E.  PCRTER  "Competitive Strategy", 
Free Press  - New  York  1980. ANNEX  1 
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Methodological  and  Statistical Problems 
This  note refers  to  the principal  problems  encountered  in using  and 
interpreting statistics of  the kind which are used  extensively in this 
report. 
Aggregation problems:  the aggregate data for  a  group  of  countries  (as  in 
the Community)  or  a  group  of  firms  (as  in a  "sector")  masks  the disparities 
within the  group. 
Index number  problems:  the best way  to illustrate trends  is often to  use 
an  index  number.  But  if the composition of  the variable changes  (as  in an 
export price index),  then the validity of  the  index is vitiated. 
Exchange  rate changes  and  inflation affect international comparisons.  Data 
which is corrected  to  constant prices  and  exchange rates  do  not necessarily 
reflect differences  in purchasing  power. 
Sampling  problems:  some  of  the data used  in the report is based  on 
statistical samples.  In this  case  the results may  be  much  less  significant 
for  small  samples  (for  example  a  few  companies  in one  country)  than  they 
are for  the  sample  as  a  whole. 
Furthermore  some  of  the  industrial data excludes  small  firms,  and  this  to 
different degrees  in different countries. 
Accounting  conventions:  Comparing  corporate data is bedevilled by 
different statistical and  accounting  conventions  concerning  the classification 
of  companies'  assets,  their profitability and  the amortisation of  their 
investments. 
Differences  in definition give  rise to particular difficulties  in relation 
to  the definition of  "sectors" or product  groups.  It is  important  to 
appreciate  this because  so  much  industrial  information is classified by 
"sectors",which at first sight appear  to  be  unique  and  common-sense 
concepts. 
The  concept of  an  industrial  sector is useful in so  far  as  sub-groups  of 
industrial activities  can be expected  to  perform in many  respects  in a 
similar way.  In practice, it is very difficult to delineate  the boundaries 
of  individual sectors.  The  definition of  the "same"  sector often varies 
between different countries  and  especially in this context between 
Community  countries  and  third countries.  The  Community  also  has  an 
internationally unique  definition of  the  iron and  steel industry  (ECSC) 
which  extends  to  some  Community  statistics. 
The analysis  of  the performance of industrial  sectors depends  to  a 
considerable degree on  the availability of  a  sufficient range  of  accurate 
and  comparable statistical data.  However,  both the quantity  and  quality of 
the statistical data which is available is often imadequate.  The 
main weaknesses  of official industrial statistics concern: - 2  -
.·,  ~  •••  '1,  '~·  ~··· 1 ..  *~.;'  ~.i·o:.:· 
the  limited availability of  disaggregated  .. harmonised ,.data ; at the. 
international level.  Disaggregated  ,a~d detailed  .. st;d~dcs,  ~ft~n . 
•  •  I  ·  '  <  •  '..  •  '  :.  '\ ';I•  f  'I  ',•'  !  •.  o'' ~··r~ I• it:\ ·  ~  j, 
e,x1s.t  on nat1onal  level, but  then not  harmon1sed  and  not  comparable 
between countries. 
l  '  '  '  ,.  :  \.  'I'  j  '  ,  •,  ~  'r  'I I  "'; 'I:  I...,  1- J,  i  ~.: r' 
the  ,dif~erent bases on whiGh. st~d~~ical  _dat~.  ~!:l.  Pf,qd';l~~~:•·H~L:,!;,,. 
example,  some  dat~. is  .. prodl;lc~  ..  ~~~e~~  ~.·,g~. p:r}s~si~ci.ti~~:~nJ:~~nat!R,I,l~t,,,.,· 
trade;_1.some ,data 1s: estaphs~ent:o~.  en~~r,pr:pu~  b~seP,,,  e .• g.·;~.emP.loYI)lent 
,  f.  1  .  •  •  ,  -1  "  .: J  •  ,  ~-- •  I  .-: <'-n~~  .. -,  .t, ~  .  "I  ~.  '-f;  ~  •. 
and.investment) •.  The  conversionfrom production.value on,nomenclature 
to  a~other can be  done  but  o~ly ~~ ~  ~ath~r  ~gg~~g~ted  i;v~l~ 
~h~. ~~ri~ider~ble time-lag  ¥~ic~.  ~;~;{i~ ~~i~~~  h~i:~~~~ ~~}~~:i:~:  y~~~  ~i{J· 
the publication of  much  of  the structural data  • 
. ··  :·  i:  ;  ,•.- '  .t~~  ..  ;~  ·)  t-•:;~  :·,j-···:  ~-;1.  ~~i'-'~~';'1:~l~.f;ai.t;·,·~· 
Taken .over;all ,, these  statisti!=-al..,diff~~;u~~~es,tJleat}.  .~hl!-t.,~!t~\ g~aFH~a~jye,,, 
information tends  to  suggest greater homogeneity  and, stability than;is.in 
,  •  •  •  •  ·  .  ~  ••·  l<'l  ,~."  •  .•  t  •!  •  J,  ,  ~  'lr'  -4-;  ~~  1  .-,  ~ ·  ..  ,  ~ •  ;  -t- ..  ~  r,  .....  .  i ... 
'reality  th~,.case  ..  II\. the  Copllllun~ty  -~~ !t.nov.  th~~  .~l,ter~, c:t~~  ;v:~.~~~<:~>~i.~~~F~P.-<;-es 
in industrial  .. performance  . in, the  same  sector. in different·. Me:nber  States  .• 
These  di~ferences·. do  not  always  appe~fr,;.fr!?.m  .~~~i s~~ti~Hc~(:~~t~,.  1J?~.Jn~ 
o~her hand,  analysis. which.  tr~~,s  to.  ~~~e,~  a~~ou~t  ..  ~f them  tends  to  become 
either impressionistic or extraordinarily detailed. ANNEX  5 
( 1) 
Definitions  of  product  groups  used  to examine  shares  of  OECD  imports 
SITC 
Rev. 
251 
2662 
512 
513 
541 
561 
581 
641 
652 
656 
67 
7114 
7115+7326+7327+7328 
7151 
7321 
7323 
735 
8411+8412+8413+8414 
(Chapter  II  A 2) 
Product  group 
Pulp  and  waste  papers 
Synthetic  fibres 
Organic  chemicals 
Inorganic  chemicals 
Pharmaceutical  products 
Manufactured  fertilizers 
Plastic materials,  regenerated  cellulose  and  resins 
Paper  and  paperboard 
Woven  cotton  fabrics 
Made-up  articles of  textile material 
Iron  and  steel 
Aircraft  engines 
Motor  vehicle  bodies,  engines  and  parts 
Machine  tools  for  working  metals 
Passenger  motor  cars 
Lorries  and  trucks 
Ships  and  boats 
Clothing  and  accessories 
(1)0ECD  countries  not  including  Yugoslavia,  New  Zealand  and,  for  1980  only, 
Turkey. ANNEX  6 
Classification of  selected high  technology  sectors:  Standard 
International Trade  Classification  (SITC)  Revision  2  for  1980 
Revision 1  for  1963  and  1970  data 
SITC  2 
CODE 
1980 
523 
524 
541 
Description of  Product  Sectors 
Other  inorganic  chemicals;  organic and  inorganic 
compounds  of  precious metals 
Radio-active and  associated materials 
Medicinal  and  pharmaceutical products 
741  Engines  and  motors  non  electric  (reaction,  gas  turbine, 
turbo-propellers) 
716  Rotating electric plant 
718-7  Nuclear reactors 
736  Machine  tools  for working  metal 
752  Automatic data processing machines  incl.  peripherals 
761 
763 
Television receivers 
Gramophones  and  other  sound  recorders 
764  Telecommunications  equipment 
771 
773 
774 
Electric power  machinery other than  716  above 
Equipment  for  distributing electricity 
Electric medical  apparatus  incl.  radiology 
775  Household  electric equipment 
776 
781 
782.1 
791.1 
792 
871.0 
872.0 
874 
881.1 
881.2 
882.2. 
884.1 
885 
Valves,  tubes,  diodes,  transistors, microcircuits 
Passenger motor-cars 
Motor  vehicles  for  transport of  goods 
Electric rail locomotives 
Aircraft and  equipment parts 
Optical  instruments  and  apparatus 
Medical  instruments  and  appliances 
Measuring,  checking,  analysing,  controlling  instruments 
Photographic  came~as  (other  than cirte) 
Cinematographic  cameras,  projectors,  incl.  sound  records 
Photographic  film and  paper 
Lenses,  prisms  and  other optical elements 
Watches  and  clocks 
This  list provides  the most  comprehensive  coverage of  high  technology 
products  possible,  within the limits of  SITC  revision 2. 
SITC  1 
CODE 
1963/70 
514 
515 
541 
711-7 
89L 11 
723 
726 
729.3 
732.1 
732.3 
731.2 
734 
899.99 
861.3 
861.7 
729.52 
861.9 
861.4 
861.5 
862.4 
861.1 
864 